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Eleventh Circuit Rules FAA Does Not Create Subject Matter Jurisdiction

August 16, 2021 by Alex Silverman

Brett-Andrew Nelson filed a petition to confirm an arbitration award issued by the Sitcomm Arbitration Association. The award purported to award Nelson $500,000 from each of the four defendants based on their breach of an unspecified “contractual agreement.” Nelson claimed the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award based solely on 9 U.S.C. § 9. The district court dismissed the petition with prejudice, finding no evidence of a valid contract between the parties. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held sua sponte that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Nelson’s petition. While the petition claimed jurisdiction based on section 9 of the FAA, the Eleventh Circuit found the FAA does not create jurisdiction on its own; there must instead be an independent jurisdictional foundation. Because Nelson failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court found the district court should have dismissed the petition without prejudice, rather than with prejudice. The matter was thus vacated and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss the case without prejudice.

Nelson v. Jackson, No. 21-10440 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Jurisdiction Issues

Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Petition to Confirm “Sham” Arbitration Award

August 13, 2021 by Michael Wolgin

A pro se plaintiff had sought to confirm a $116,313 award by “Sitcomm Arbitration Association,” which had allegedly ruled that TD Auto Finance LLC was liable for breach of contract. TD Auto Finance contested the petition by moving to dismiss, contending that the award was a “sham” related to the repossession of the plaintiff’s car and that it had never agreed to participate in an arbitration. The district court agreed with TD Auto Finance and dismissed the petition, finding that the plaintiff failed to submit a valid agreement to arbitrate and noting that the purported award was incomprehensible, lacked factual findings and legal conclusions, and did not support the existence of an agreement between the parties.

On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s argument that TD Auto Finance was barred from challenging the award because it had not moved to vacate it within the three-month statutory time period. The court ruled that it was unnecessary to consider this issue, where, as here, the district court properly denied a petition to confirm that lacked “evidence of a genuine arbitration award and an agreement between the parties.”

Pena v. TD Auto Finance LLC, No. 21-1670 (3d Cir. July 15, 2021).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Eleventh Circuit Denies Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award Based on Alleged Bias Where Arbitrator’s Prior Employment by Opposing Law Firm Was Disclosed

August 12, 2021 by Benjamin Stearns

A pro se litigant sought to vacate an adverse summary judgment in arbitration that rejected her wrongfully termination claim. At the outset of the arbitration proceeding, the parties agreed on the selection of the proposed arbitrator, even though his curriculum vitae showed that he had previously served as the managing shareholder of an office of the law firm representing the employer adverse to the pro se litigant. This fact was further mentioned by the law firm in an email to the pro se litigant, and again by the arbitrator himself in another email to the parties.

After the arbitrator entered judgment for the employer, the pro se litigant sought to vacate the award, alleging that the arbitrator had failed to disclose his friendship with one of the lawyers representing the employer. The pro se litigant based her argument in part on the discovery of a photograph of the arbitrator and opposing counsel “standing arm in arm in celebration of [the arbitrator’s] 50th birthday” and further that this “undisclosed relationship and their friendship demonstrates bias.”

The Eleventh Circuit found these arguments insufficient to demonstrate the requisite bias. The court noted that the arbitrator’s prior employment by the law firm had been disclosed and stated that “it follows necessarily from this disclosure that he likely has friendships with many of [the firm’s] employees.” Further, to the extent the alleged friendship “should have been separately disclosed, we have explained that standing alone, the fact that an arbitrator had previous contacts with counsel for one of the parties does not suggest evident partiality.” To demonstrate bias, the pro se litigant had to produce some additional basis, such as “financial incentives” or “concurrent representations” involving opposing counsel that “might give a reasonable impression of partiality.” The evidence that was presented offered “mere speculation of unfair bias … which is too remote, uncertain and speculative to create a reasonable impression of partiality.”

Perez v. Cigna Health & Life Insurance Co., No. 20-12730 (11th Cir. July 13, 2021).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Court Refuses to Vacate Award Stemming From Workplace Personal Injury

August 5, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to vacate an arbitration award stemming from a workplace personal injury after the arbitrator concluded that the employee was primarily responsible for his own injuries.

Daniel Pacelli was working for Vane Line Bunkering Inc. (known as “Vane Brothers”), as a tankerman on one of Vane Brothers’ barges in New York Harbor when he slipped, fell, and was injured on ice while attempting to salt the deck of the barge. He initiated an arbitration action against Vane Brothers. A JAMS arbitrator heard the case and concluded that Pacelli had sustained $986,750 in damages and that both Pacelli and Vane Brothers were negligent. More specifically, the arbitrator concluded that Pacelli was 70% at fault while Vane Brothers was 30% at fault. The arbitrator therefore reduced Pacelli’s damages accordingly. Pacelli moved to vacate the award.

The district court declined to vacate the award. It rejected Pacelli’s arguments that the arbitrator had (1) manifestly disregarded the law; (2) been partial to Vane Brothers; (3) engaged in “misbehavior” by repeatedly delaying his decision; and (4) improperly failed to award interest.

With respect to manifest disregard, the court concluded that the arbitrator had applied the law regarding contributory negligence to the facts of the case and had supported his decision regarding comparative fault with evidence from the record, including evidence that Pacelli had acted carelessly by attempting to salt a narrow part of the deck at night and in freezing temperatures without seeking assistance. The court noted that the Second Circuit does not recognize manifest disregard of the evidence as a ground for vacating an award and refused to reweigh the evidence.

The court also rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator had been partial to Vane Brothers. After the arbitration hearing but months before the arbitrator issued his decision, the arbitrator disclosed that he had a small ownership interest in JAMS and JAMS disclosed that it had a small number of other arbitrations with Vane Brothers, its counsel, and/or its counsel’s law firm. The court noted that Pacelli had waived this argument by not raising it before the arbitrator. The court nevertheless also explained that the facts did not show improper partiality and rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator’s small ownership interest was material in any event.

Turning to Pacelli’s next argument — that the arbitrator’s delays warranted vacatur — the court noted that Pacelli had not pointed to any “authority to support his position that the arbitrator’s extension requests amounted to ‘misbehavior’ by the arbitrator such that Pacelli’s rights were prejudiced.” That was especially true because Pacelli had consented to the extensions.

Finally, the court rejected Pacelli’s contention that it should vacate the award because the arbitrator had not awarded prejudgment interest. Although the court acknowledged that it would have been proper for the arbitrator to award prejudgment interest, the court noted that Pacelli had failed “to point the Court to any case in which a district court vacated an arbitration award for failure to award prejudgment interest” and noted that courts had declined to do any such thing.

The court then went on to confirm the arbitration award.

Pacelli v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-09431 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Eleventh Circuit Declines to Compel Arbitration in Suit Against Rental Car Company Under Arbitration Clause in Orbitz’s Terms of Service

August 4, 2021 by Brendan Gooley

The Eleventh Circuit recently declined a rental car company’s attempt to invoke an arbitration clause in Orbitz.com’s terms of use in a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled customer who booked his rental car through Orbitz despite the seemingly broad language of the clause.

Ancizar Marin used Orbitz.com to book a rental car from Sixt Rent A Car. When Marin booked his rental car, he agreed to Orbitz’s terms of use, which included an arbitration clause requiring Marin to arbitrate “[a]ny and all claims.” Orbitz’s terms defined “claims” as:

[A]ny disputes or claims relating in any way to [1] the Services, [2] any dealings with our customer service agents, [3] any services or products provided, [4] any representations made by us, or [5] our Privacy Policy.

Marin subsequently picked up his car from Sixt and returned it. A few weeks later, however, he received an email from Sixt claiming that he had damaged the car and seeking $700 related to that damage. Marin sued Sixt in a putative class action. He did not sue Orbitz.

Sixt moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause in Orbitz’s terms. The district court denied Sixt’s motion and Sixt appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that whether Marin’s claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in Orbitz’s terms required the court to determine whether Marin’s suit was a “claim” within the meaning of Orbitz’s arbitration clause. That in turn required the court to determine whether Marin’s suit was a “dispute[] or claim[] relating in any way to … any services or products provided.” Although the court concluded that the answer to that question was not entirely clear, the court determined that Marin’s suit was not within the scope of Orbitz’s arbitration clause because the phrase in question related to Orbitz’s services or products, not the services or products of third parties that partnered with Orbitz. The court noted that the surrounding clauses all related “to services or products provided by Orbitz.” It also explained that Orbitz’s terms required customers asserting “claim[s]” to give written notice to Orbitz and that it would be strange to require customers to inform Orbitz about grievances they had with third parties. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that Orbitz’s terms recognized that customers would have agreements with the third-party vendors whose services they booked on Orbitz’s website. That further suggested that the phrase “services or products provided” in Orbitz’s terms referred to Orbitz’s services or products. The court also explained that “common sense” suggested that Orbitz was referring to its services and products, not third-party services or products.

The court next rejected Sixt’s argument that the Moses H. Cone canon that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration” applied. The court explained that the canon applied “only if Marin’s lawsuit against Sixt was an immediate, foreseeable result of the performance of [Marin] accepting Orbitz’s Terms” because the canon only applied if “the FAA governs the arbitration agreement at issue.” But Marin’s lawsuit was not an immediate, foreseeable result of accepting Orbitz’s terms; his dispute was with Sixt. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Sixt’s argument that Florida law incorporated the canon.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Sixt’s motion.

Calderon v. Sixt Rent A Car, LLC, No. 20-10989 (11th Cir. July 14, 2021).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

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