Jurisdiction Issues

Connecticut Supreme Court Finds State Law Statutory Limitation Period to Vacate Arbitration Award Confers Jurisdiction on State Courts and Not Preempted by FAA

May 17, 2021 by Alex Silverman

Plaintiff A Better Way Wholesale Autos Inc. filed an application in Connecticut state court seeking to vacate an arbitration award issued in favor of the defendants, James Saint Paul and Julie J. Saint Paul. The defendants filed motions to confirm the award and for attorneys’ fees, and to dismiss the plaintiff’s application. The defendants argued that the application was untimely under Connecticut Statutes section 52-420 (b) and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court order granting the defendant’s motions and dismissing the plaintiff’s application was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court of Connecticut framed the issues as: (1) whether Connecticut’s 30-day statutory limitation for seeking to vacate an arbitration award is “jurisdictional” in that it implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts; and (2) whether the Connecticut statute is preempted by the FAA, which has a three-month limitation period for seeking to vacate.

With regard to the jurisdictional issue, the plaintiff claimed that section 52-420 (b) did not confer jurisdiction because the arbitration clause between the parties explicitly provided that any arbitration “shall be governed by the [FAA] … and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” But the Supreme Court agreed with the courts below that parties cannot privately agree to have the FAA’s three-month limitation period apply to a vacatur action filed in Connecticut state court, so as to override the limitation period in section 52-420 (b). The Supreme Court also found it is “hornbook law” that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by consent or agreement. The Supreme Court was similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s preemption argument, finding the time limitation in section 52-420 (b) does not impede the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.

A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, No. SC 20386 (Conn. Apr. 15, 2021).

Third Circuit Affirms District Court’s Vacatur of Arbitration Award Where There Was No Agreement To Arbitrate, Leaving the Arbitrator Without Power To Act

December 1, 2020 by Christina Gallo

In early 2017, Transco received authorization from the federal government to construct a natural gas pipeline that required rights-of-way over several tracts of private property, including property owned by Regec. After failed negotiations as to how much money Regec should be paid for Transco’s use of his property, Transco brought a condemnation action, under the Natural Gas Act 15 U.S.C. § 717, against Regec in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Regec filed a copy of a “foreign final judgment via arbitration award,” which described an alleged breach by Transco of a “contract” it entered into with Regec via “tacit acquiescence.” Transco did not participate in the arbitration, yet the arbitrator awarded Regec approximately $55 million and mailed a copy of the arbitration award to Transco’s office in Texas.

Even though the filing containing the arbitration award was struck by the district court, Regec nevertheless requested confirmation of the award under the Federal Arbitration Act. Transco responded with a motion to vacate the award under § 10(a) of the FAA, claiming that the award is “null and void.” The district court granted Transco’s motion by order entered October 8, 2019. Regec appealed.

On appeal, the Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the FAA to review the October 8 order because the FAA provides grounds for immediate appeal distinct from principles of “finality” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, certain grounds which were present in this case.

Addressing the merits of the October 8 order, the panel affirmed the district court’s vacatur of the arbitration award.

The panel rejected Regec’s jurisdictional challenge, finding that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to rule on Transco’s motion to vacate because the subject of the arbitration award was “so related” to the claims in the condemnation action, such that the contract giving rise to the arbitration award was formed as a result of litigation events in the condemnation action.

The panel also rejected Regec’s service-related challenge, holding that the district court did not err in finding Transco used a proper method to serve the motion to vacate, since service of a motion to confirm the arbitration award by a U.S. Marshal is unnecessary where a party is already before the court. Because service was proper, the panel also concluded that the motion to vacate was timely under the FAA.

Most significantly, the panel held that the district court did not err in granting Transco’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, which was based primarily on its conclusions that “the parties never agreed to arbitrate and so the arbitrator here had no jurisdiction,” and that “Transco received no notice of the ex parte arbitration proceeding or opportunity to be heard, and … suffered prejudice as a result.” The panel found that arbitrator acted outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority—issuing an award that simply reflects his own notions of economic justice rather than drawing its essence from the contract—because there is no discernable agreement between the parties to arbitrate the dispute described by Regec. The panel made clear that absent an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator was without power to act.

Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co LLC v. Permanent Easement for 2.59 Acres, Temp. Easements for 5.45 Acres & Temp. Access Easement for 2.12 Acres in Pine Grove Twp., Schuylkill Cty., PA, Tax Parcel No. 21-04-0016.000 361, Chapel Drive, Pine Grove, Pine Grove Twp., Schuylkill Cty. PA, No. 19-2738 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2020).

Fifth Circuit Affirms That District Court in Texas Lacks Jurisdiction to Vacate Arbitration Award in Florida

October 22, 2020 by Nora Valenza-Frost

Defendants-appellees picked up work orders from the plaintiff-appellant in its Florida offices, performed field work in Florida, and sent invoices to the plaintiff-appellant in Texas, who eventually stopped paying the invoices. The defendants-appellees commenced a AAA arbitration, and a Florida arbitrator eventually found in their favor. The plaintiff-appellant filed suit in Texas seeking to vacate the arbitration award under state law, which defendants-appellees opposed under FRCP 12(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) and under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. The Western District of Texas dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The circuit court focused on whether the defendants-appellees had “minimum contacts” in Texas, such that a Texas court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over them. Looking at the parties’ contract, the place of performance was Florida. The circuit court dismissed the remainder of the plaintiff-appellant’s arguments in favor of jurisdiction, notably the argument that the parties’ agreement contained a Texas choice-of-law clause. “While such clauses can be probative of purposeful availment, they’re never dispositive.” Here, despite the Texas choice-of-law clause, the parties’ agreement does not suggest that they expected to resolve their disputes in Texas. In fact, the agreement required arbitration take place in accordance with the AAA’s venue-selection rules, i.e., as close as possible to the project in Florida. Finding no jurisdiction, the circuit court concluded that, “[i]n short, this is Florida’s problem. Not Texas’s.”

Sayers Const., LLC v. Timberline Const., Inc., et al., No. 19-51099 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020)

Washington Supreme Court Declines To Intervene in Ongoing Arbitration, Finding Judicial Authority Under FAA Limited To “Gateway” Disputes and Review of Final Awards

October 13, 2020 by Alex Silverman

Evette Burgess and Lithia Motors were arbitrating an employment dispute when, during the proceedings, Burgess filed a motion with the court seeking to terminate the arbitration and to rescind the arbitration agreement. The motion alleged that Lithia breached the agreement by failing to comply with discovery deadlines and that the arbitrator did so by failing to enforce applicable procedural rules. The superior court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction and certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Washington. The Court affirmed the order, concluding that judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is limited to disputes over “gateway” issues (i.e., enforceability of the arbitration clause in the first instance), and to the review of final awards.

Burgess argued that interlocutory challenges during arbitration proceedings is permitted by section 2 of the FAA. Lithia disagreed, arguing judicial review under the FAA is limited to the “bookends” of the arbitration: initial enforceability and review of the final award. The Court noted that the majority of federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue have agreed with Lithia, and that Burgess cited no case in which a court provided relief once the arbitration commenced. The Court also agreed with Lithia in this regard, explaining that sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA authorize courts to decide gateway arbitrability disputes, while sections 9, 10, and 11 allow courts to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct a final arbitration award at the conclusion of proceedings. The Court relied on a Sixth Circuit decision involving similar facts, where the court found it significant that the FAA is silent on judicial review between gateway disputes and review of final awards. Finding other circuit courts have likewise interpreted this silence as precluding interlocutory review, the Court affirmed the superior court decision declining to intervene and rescind the arbitration agreement while the subject arbitration was ongoing.

Evette Burgess v. Lithia Motors, Inc., et al., No. 98083-7 (Wash. Sept. 3, 2020)

Eighth Circuit Affirms Ruling That NLRB Retains Jurisdiction to Review Arbitration Decision on NRLA Charge, Not Court

July 29, 2020 by Nora Valenza-Frost

An arbitrator resolved a dispute between the parties in favor of the union, deciding that Exide Technologies had violated the collective bargaining agreement and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by unilaterally changing its procedures for implementing the Family and Medical Leave Act without bargaining with the union. Exide sought to vacate the award and the union sought to confirm it. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas confirmed the arbitrator’s finding of a collective bargaining agreement violation but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the NLRA finding.

Procedurally, the union had filed a grievance, and then filed two unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB deferred pursuant to its policy that “the NLRB will conditionally dismiss a case when a set of facts may present not only an alleged violation of the NLRA but also an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement subject to arbitration. However, the NLRB retains limited jurisdiction to decide, among other things, whether an arbitrator has reached a result repugnant to the NLRA.” The parties proceeded to arbitration.

The district court confirmed the arbitrator’s collective bargaining agreement ruling, because it drew its essence from the parties’ agreement. However, the district court decided it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s NLRA ruling and that Exide should have moved the NLRB to reopen the deferred unfair labor practice charges so that the NLRB can review the arbitrator’s findings. The Eighth Circuit ruled that when a court possesses jurisdiction to decide a collective bargaining agreement issue under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, it is not preempted from exercising its jurisdiction by the fact that the employer’s conduct may also violate the NLRA. However, section 301 does not provide the court with original jurisdiction to decide whether Exide violated the NLRA, and the NLRA had retained jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator’s actions were appropriate.

Exide Technologies v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 700, No. 19-2317 (8th Cir. July 10, 2020).