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New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Alex Silverman

Federal Court Dismisses Policyholder’s Third-Party Action Against Reinsurers

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A Puerto Rico district court dismissed a third-party action by defendant-policyholder Puma Energy Caribe LLC against the reinsurers of an insurance policy issued by plaintiff Integrand Assurance Co. Puma claimed that the reinsurers breached the reinsurance agreements with Integrand, prejudiced Puma’s rights as a third-party beneficiary of those agreements, and negligently handled reinsurance claims that Integrand submitted in connection with a claim Puma had made under the Integrand policy. The reinsurers sought dismissal based on lack of privity, lack of standing, arbitration clauses in the reinsurance treaties with Integrand, and on the ground that Puma improperly sought to implead them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), which allows a party to implead a nonparty “who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”

While recognizing the reinsurers’ arguments were “powerful,” the court dismissed Puma’s third-party claims on procedural grounds. Because Puma was not seeking “indemnity” from the reinsurers, the court found that Rule 14(a) was not the proper vehicle for obtaining the relief Puma had requested. The court also considered other procedural mechanisms, including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13(h), 19, and 20, but found each was inappropriate here as well. The court declined to award the reinsurers’ attorneys’ fees, although it agreed that Puma’s filings “come close to obstinance or frivolity.”

Integrand Assurance Co. v. Puma Energy Caribe, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-01195 (D.P.R. Dec. 27, 2019).

Third Circuit Affirms Order Declining to Consolidate Reinsurance Dispute, but Vacates Order Denying Motion to Unseal

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Everest Reinsurance Co. appealed from two district court orders. It claimed that this dispute with Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. was the same as a prior dispute that Penn National had arbitrated with two other reinsurers. It, therefore, sought to have this matter consolidated with and heard by the same panel as the prior dispute. The parties agreed that whether this dispute and the prior dispute were actually the same was to be decided by the arbitrators, not the court. The issue was which arbitrators: a new panel, or the panel that heard the prior dispute. The district court ordered that the question goes to a new panel, and the Third Circuit agreed, citing language in the Everest/Penn National arbitration agreement stating that consolidation is only permitted “[i]f more than one reinsurer is involved in the same dispute.” By sending the present dispute to the same panel as the prior dispute at this juncture, the Third Circuit held, Everest was essentially asking the court to prejudge the question of whether the two disputes were “the same,” and thus disregard the express language of the agreement.

Everest separately appealed an order denying its motion to unseal records from the prior dispute. The Third Circuit agreed with Everest that the district did not apply the “more rigorous common law right of access” standard. It therefore vacated and remanded for the district court to apply the legal standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Avandia Marketing.

Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. New England Reinsurance Corp., No. 19-1805 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2019).

District Court Confirms $220 Million Award, Finds No Manifest Disregard of Law

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The Seneca Nation of Indians moved under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to vacate certain arbitration awards issued in favor of the state of New York, finding that Seneca must pay the state millions in revenue-sharing pursuant to an exclusive gaming compact. The issue before the Western District of New York was whether the awards “manifestly disregarded” the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The state cross-moved to confirm.

At the outset, Seneca’s petition to vacate was deemed timely. The court ruled that a partial award issued by the panel regarding liability only was not “final” and thus did not trigger the three-month filing period for a petition to vacate an arbitral award, as the partial award did not “definitively resolve” all the issues submitted to arbitration. The state relied on a Second Circuit decision finding a partial award to be “final” under the FAA, but the court found the case to be factually distinguishable here. Nonetheless, both the partial and final awards were confirmed. First, the court found no statutory basis for vacatur pursuant to Section 10 of the FAA. It also found no basis for vacating the awards based on a manifest disregard of the law, noting that the extreme deference afforded to arbitration awards “essentially bars review of whether an arbitrator misconstrued a contract.” Citing a recent decision by the Second Circuit and applying a two-step analysis, the court agreed with the state that this is not one of the “exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrator is apparent,” as is required for a finding of “manifest disregard.” As such, Seneca’s petition to vacate was denied, and the state’s cross-petition to confirm was granted.

Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of N.Y., No. 1:19-cv-00735 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2019).

New York Appellate Division Declines to Enjoin Baltimore Orioles’ Arbitration Against Washington Nationals

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Two professional baseball teams — the Washington Nationals and the Baltimore Orioles — were parties to a partnership agreement granting exclusive broadcast rights to their baseball games to a third entity. The agreement had a multistep dispute resolution process. After an unsuccessful mediation, the parties were required to arbitrate before the commissioner of Major League Baseball, unless MLB had an ownership or financial interest in one of the parties to the dispute when it arose. In that event, any dispute was required to be arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association (AAA), pursuant to AAA rules.

The question on appeal was whether the MLB commissioner, the AAA, or a court should decide the gateway issue of whether MLB had a financial interest at the time the dispute arose between the parties. The Appellate Division, First Department, acknowledged that AAA rules were expressly incorporated in the relevant agreement by reference. Under AAA rules, threshold arbitrability questions are clearly and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator. For this reason, the court held that it possessed “no power” to override the arbitration agreement between the parties. It also emphasized that the arbitration clause here broadly encompassed “any dispute” and expressly stated that if MLB has a potential interest in a dispute, AAA rules shall apply, notwithstanding any powers MLB may ordinarily grant the commissioner in the dispute resolution process. The court therefore vacated an interim stay of arbitration instituted pending appeal and denied the Nationals’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining a AAA proceeding commenced by the Orioles.

In re WN Partner, LLC v. Baltimore Orioles Ltd. P’ship, No. 652052/2019 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 19, 2019).

Southern District of New York Holds That Arbitrator’s Refusal to Postpone Hearing and Consider Witnesses Not “Misconduct” Requiring Vacatur

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The petitioner moved to confirm an arbitration award, and the respondent cross-moved to vacate, claiming the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon the unexpected passing of a witness’ father, then refusing to consider testimony of a different witness, and for showing manifest disregard of the law. The court explained that litigants carry a heavy burden when seeking to vacate an award based on arbitrator misconduct, noting that not every failure to consider relevant evidence requires vacatur. Only when an arbitrator refuses to accept evidence from a “key witness,” such that the opposition’s critical arguments would go unopposed, would the misconduct rise to the level ordinarily required for vacatur. Here, the respondent essentially admitted that one of the excluded witnesses was not “key” and that the other was meant only to corroborate the respondent’s own evidence, rather than rebut the petitioner’s. For these and other reasons, the court held that the arbitrator’s refusal to consider these witnesses was not improper, much less misconduct requiring vacatur. The court also found no evidence to suggest that this was one of the “exceedingly rare” instances in which an award may be vacated for manifest disregard of the law. The court therefore granted the petitioner’s motion to confirm the award, and denied the respondent’s cross-motion.

Eaton Partners, LLC v. Azimuth Capital Mgmt. IV, Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-11112 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019),