Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Federal Court Denies Bifurcation of Contract Claims and Uberrimae Fidei and Late Notice Defenses in Reinsurance Dispute

by

A Michigan federal court declined to bifurcate a case involving a contract dispute between a ceding insurer, Amerisure, and its reinsurer, Transatlantic Re, in a case arising from underlying asbestos claims dating back to the early 1980’s.

Amerisure sued TransRe alleging that it failed to reimburse Amerisure under a facultative reinsurance agreement covering losses and loss expenses arising from underlying asbestos claim liabilities insured by Amerisure. For its part, TransRe alleged that Amerisure breached the “duty of utmost good faith” by failing to apprise TransRe of all relevant information in its underwriting of the facultative agreement, thereby voiding the agreement. TransRe also claimed that Amerisure’s claim is barred due to late notice.

Amerisure filed a motion to bifurcate the proceedings to address the contract issues first. TransRe opposed the motion arguing that even if the contract issues were resolved, the breach of duty of utmost good faith and late notice issues would remain to be addressed, and thus bifurcation would not result in a more efficient proceeding.

The trial judge referred the issue to a special master, who found that bifurcation was inappropriate, as a phased proceeding would not result in convenience to the parties or judicial efficiency. The report noted that much of the discovery involved on the contract issues would overlap with the issues involved in TransRe’s defense based on breach of the duty of utmost good faith, such as the underwriting intent and meaning of the applicable policy or reinsurance language. The report concluded, therefore, that phasing the proceedings might ultimately be less efficient, rather than more efficient, and recommended denial of the motion.

The judge accepted the special master’s recommendation and denied Amerisure’s motion.

Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., No. 2:18-cv-11966 (USDC E.D. Mich., Nov. 29, 2018 (Report and Recommendation of Special Master), Dec. 20, 2018 (adopting report)).

This post written by John Pitblado.

See our disclaimer.

Sixth Circuit Finds it Lacks Jurisdiction Over Dispute Regarding Proper Forum for Settlement of Fee Dispute

by

A dispute regarding attorney Steven Johnson’s right to fees from William Drake, an individual who hired Johnson to pursue a product liability claim, was made considerably more complicated by conflicting forum provisions in a contract with the attorney and the settlement agreement in the MDL that eventually resolved Drake’s product liability claim.

Drake received a hip implant that was later recalled. Drake hired Mr. Johnson to represent him in his claim against the manufacturer of the implant, signing a contract providing that fee disputes would be arbitrated in Texas. Drake later terminated Johnson and hired a new lawyer, who filed lawsuit against the manufacturer, which became part of an MDL. Drake’s claims were then settled by the manufacturer, and the settlement agreement specified the use of a special master to settle disputes regarding attorneys’ fees.

Johnson commenced an arbitration proceeding against Drake in Texas regarding his fees, and Drake initiated arbitration proceedings against Johnson before the special master regarding the same issues. The special master dismissed Drake’s arbitration proceeding because it was already pending in a different arbitral forum. The Texas arbitrator then issued an award in Johnson’s favor. Drake moved, in the Ohio federal district court handling the MDL, to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and vacate the Texas arbitration award. The court granted to motion to enforce the settlement but did not decide whether to vacate the apparently conflicting Texas arbitration award, and Johnson appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit started and ended its consideration of the matter with the question of jurisdiction, which Johnson argued existed because (1) the district court’s decision was a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and (2) it was appealable under section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court disagreed. First, the court found that the motion to vacate the Texas arbitration award was one of the main issues before the court, and the district court’s failure to rule on that motion meant that there was no final resolution of the litigation on the merits. Second, the court found that section 16 of the FAA did not apply because the district court did not address the Texas arbitration award, rejecting an argument that it was implicitly vacated by the ruling enforcing the settlement. Lacking jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions that it consider whether the Texas arbitration award should be confirmed or vacated.

Drake v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018)

Court Confirms Arbitration Award Rejecting Insurers’ Allocation of Losses to Multiple Policies for Reinsurance Purposes

by

A federal district court in Massachusetts has confirmed and entered as a judgment of the court an arbitration award in favor of Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London against Century Indemnity Company regarding reinsurance coverage they provided for a set of claims against Boy Scouts of America (BSA) for sexual molestation by individuals associated with BSA in the 1960s and 1970s.

Century had provided insurance to BSA under 8 policies between 1963 and 1971, and the Underwriters had agreed to reinsure those policies. In the late 1990s, BSA submitted dozens of claims regarding BSA’s alleged liability for sexual molestation claims, and Century settled these claims. The dispute with the reinsurer’s at Lloyd’s of London arose out of the manner in which Century, per an agreement with BSA, chose to allocate these settlement payments among the BSA policies, such that all payments to a particular claimant were allocated to the policy of the first year of the alleged conduct against that individual. Century also combined all claims from a particular year into a single loss for reinsurance purposes.
The Underwriters refused to pay Century’s reinsurance claim, arguing that the manner of allocating losses to the first year of the alleged conduct “was counterfactual” and the agreement with BSA to do it that way “was not the product of a reasonable and business-like investigation.” Century took the dispute to arbitration, and the panel issued an award in the Underwriters’ favor.

The Underwriters then moved to have the court confirm the award and enter it as a judgment of the court. Century did not oppose this motion, which the court then granted without comment.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Century Indemnity Company, Civil Action No. 18-12041 (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 2018)

Covered Agreements: Covered Agreement Reached With UK; Implementation of Covered Agreement With EU Slows

by

On December 11, 2018, the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Trade Representative sent the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee  on Financial Services, and the House Committee on Ways and Means the text of a new Covered Agreement agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the business of reinsurance, with the notification letters required for such agreements by the Dodd-Frank Act.  A press release also was issued describing the new US-UK Covered Agreement.

The substantive terms of the US-UK Covered Agreement appear to be materially the same as the terms of the previously existing US-EU Covered Agreement.  The implementation provisions of the US-EU Covered Agreement were a bit complicated, and the provisions of Article 9 (“Implementation of the Agreement”) and Article 10 (“Application of the Agreement”) of the new US-UK Covered Agreement also are complicated.  For example, the agreement becomes applicable the later of the date it enters into force or 60 months from September 22, 2017.  September 22, 2017 was the date that the US-EU Covered Agreement was officially signed.  More curious is the provision of Article 9 paragraph 3.(a) of the new US-UK Covered Agreement that “[f]rom the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the United States shall encourage each U.S. State to promptly adopt the following measures: (a) the reduction, in each year following 7 November 2017, of the amount of collateral required by each State to allow full credit for reinsurance by 20 percent of the collateral that the U.S. State required as of 1 January 2017 ….”  Perhaps these provisions reflect a desire that the two covered agreements become applicable at the same time, with no resulting advantage or disadvantage to reinsurers domiciled in either the EU or the UK post-Brexit.

Meanwhile, the implementation of the US-EU Covered Agreement has slowed somewhat.  Consideration of final approval of the proposed amendments to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Act and Model Regulation, which is part of the implementation process, was on the agenda for the December 19, 2018 telephonic meeting of the NAIC Executive Committee and Plenary, but at the end of the meeting NAIC President McPeak, who was moderating the meeting, announced without comment that the consideration of the revisions to the Models was being deferred to a later date to allow for the consideration of late comments on the proposed Model revisions received from the US Treasury and the US Trade Representative.  Neither the substance of those comments nor a revised timeline for consideration of the proposed Model revisions was provided during that meeting.  It remains to be seen what the next step will be in the consideration of the proposed amendments to the Models.

Ninth Circuit Finds That Party was a Third-Party Beneficiary of Arbitration Agreement, and Affirms Order Compelling Arbitration of Putative Class Action

by

Three delivery drivers sued a transportation broker for failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, failure to provide rest and meal breaks, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, and willful refusal to pay wages on behalf of a proposed class of current and former drivers. The transportation broker moved to dismiss or stay the proceedings and compel arbitration, asserting that the plaintiffs were required to submit their claims to arbitration because the broker was a third-party beneficiary to arbitration agreements between the delivery drivers and a third party administrator. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the broker was a third-party beneficiary, that the claims were arbitrable, and that arbitration was the proper forum. The individual plaintiffs appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the applicable state law, the agreements containing the arbitration provisions intended to create a third-party beneficiary contract for the benefit of the broker. The drivers’ “work under the agreement–delivering parcels–was an integral part of [the broker’s] business, and the agreements obligated [the drivers] to indemnify logistics company customers, grant customers the right to subrogate claims and notify customers within four hours of any accidents.” The Ninth Circuit rejected the drivers’ argument that the agreements contained substantively unconscionable provisions, since they were not raised below. Ege v. Express Messenger Systems Inc., Case No. 17-35123 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

See our disclaimer.