Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Ninth Circuit Dismisses Interlocutory Appeal, Finds Order Compelling Arbitration Not a “Final Decision” Under FAA

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The plaintiff filed a putative class action for alleged violations of California employment law, and the defendant moved to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion and stayed further proceedings pending a ruling by the arbitrators as to the arbitrability of the dispute. But before submitting the matter to arbitration, the plaintiff voluntarily discontinued the action without prejudice and immediately appealed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, however, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff’s “voluntary discontinuance and immediate appeal” was an impermissible attempt to sidestep the “final-judgment rule, the Federal Arbitration Act’s explicit bar on interlocutory appeals, and prevailing case law.” Because the order compelling arbitration was not a “final decision” under § 16(a) of the FAA, the plaintiff was required to seek the district court’s permission to pursue the appeal, but failed to do so. That he voluntarily discontinued the action before appealing was deemed irrelevant, particularly since the discontinuance was without prejudice.

Gonzalez v. Coverall North America, Inc., No. 17-55787 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019).

Trial Deadlines Continued in Collection Action Filed by Reinsurer Related to Fraudulent Transfer Scheme

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We have been tracking Odyssey Reinsurance’s action to collect a $3.2 million judgment against Richard and Diane Nagby, the owners of two companies involved in an alleged fraudulent transfer scheme. See https://www.reinsurancefocus.com/tax-counsel-ordered-to-produce-documents-related-to-odyssey-reinsurances-continuing-quest-to-collect-3-2-million-default-judgment-against-richard-and-diane-nagby/ and https://www.reinsurancefocus.com/post-judgment-collection-efforts-of-reinsurer-continue-in-california-federal-court/. On January 16, 2019, the court denied Diane Nagby’s motion for the court to reconsider its order continuing the pretrial hearing to May 30, 2019. Trial is currently set for July.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Nagby, No. 3:16-cv-03038 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2019).

English Court Enjoins Washington State Court Action in Favor of Arbitration in London

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In a dispute involving a complex, multilayered excess insurance policy, the Commercial Court of the Queen’s Bench Division enjoined Weyerhaeuser, a Washington company, from suing Catlin Syndicate Limited, a London-based insurer, in Washington based on the parties’ agreement to arbitrate in London.

The “Layer 4 Policy” at the heart of the lawsuit provided that the choice of law and jurisdiction governing disputes under the contract would be “as per Lead Underlying Policy.” Endorsement 7 of the Lead Underlying Policy provided for “any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the policy to be determined in London under the Arbitration Act 1996.” However, Endorsement 8 of the Lead Underlying Policy stated that Washington state law governed the policy, and Endorsement 9 provided that Catlin would “submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.” Significantly, however, Catlin’s submission to jurisdiction in the United States was “solely for the purpose of effectuating arbitration.” Therefore, the court held the result was dictated by Endorsement 7, which required the parties to arbitrate disputes in London.

The court gave great weight to the “commercial parties” involved in the dispute, finding that a conflict in drafting “could or should [not] lightly be attributed to commercial parties,” and “struggl[ing]” to see why “commercial parties” would provide for the “unusual” limits on arbitration advanced by Weyerhaeuser.

The court’s ruling was based on English law, but the court found the result would be the same under Washington law, as presented to the court via expert evidence. Although the court recognized that Washington’s adopted policy is “adverse to arbitration,” the court stated that an interpretation of the parties’ contract that “does not work commercially … weigh[s] strongly against” a finding that Washington state policy should alter the parties’ agreement.

Catlin Syndicate Limited v. Weyerhauser Company, No. CL-2018-000292, [2018] EWHC 3609 (Comm) (Dec. 21, 2018).

D.C. Circuit Court Affirms $1.2 Billion Arbitration Award to Gold-Mining Company

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Crystallex International Corporation (“Crystallex”) is a Canadian gold-mining company. Crystallex acquired the rights to explore gold deposits in Venezuela through a contract. To explore the mines, Crystallex completed all the permit requirements and posted a bond. The Venezuelan Ministry of Environment denied the permits based on environmental concerns.

Crystallex initiated international arbitration proceedings, alleging that the denial of the permits violated a bilateral treaty between Canada and Venezuela. The arbitration tribunal awarded Crystallex a little more than $1.2 billion in damages. Crystallex petitioned in federal district court for confirmation of the award, and Venezuela opposed and moved to vacate the award under the FAA.

The district court affirmed the award and denied the motion to vacate. Venezuela appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that: (1) the district court considered all of Venezuela’s FAA arguments and applied the correct standard of review drawn from FAA case law; (2) the district court did not err in applying a deferential standard to its review of the arbitral award’s method of calculating damages; and (3) the district court did not confirm the arbitral award based on misunderstandings of the arbitration tribunal’s reasoning.

Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 17-7068, 2019 WL 668270 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2019)

Tenth Circuit Affirms Partial Enforcement of Arbitration Clause

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The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s decision partially compelling arbitration. Jesse Romero took out three title loans with TitleMax of New Mexico, Inc. Romero used his third loan to pay off his second loan and his second loan to pay off his first loan. Each loan was related to the same car and each loan agreement contained an identical arbitration clause. The clause was broadly worded to cover “Disputes.” However, the clause stated it did not apply to “disputes about the validity, coverage, or scope of” the arbitration clause. The loan agreements also contained an opt-out provision allowing the party to opt out of the arbitration clause if the borrower provided notice to TitleMax within 60 days of taking out the loan. Romero did not opt out of the arbitration clause in his first or second loan agreements, but elected to opt out of the clause in his third agreement. He then filed a putative class action asserting that TitleMax’s practices violated various New Mexico consumer protection statutes.

TitleMax removed the case to federal court and sought to invoke the arbitration provision and compel all of Romero’s claims to be arbitrated. The district court agreed that arbitration was proper with respect to Romero’s first and second loan agreements because Romero had not opted out of the arbitration clauses in those agreements. The court concluded, however, that Romero had properly opted out of the arbitration clause in the third agreement and accordingly, declined to compel arbitration with respect to Romero’s claims based on that agreement. The district court declined to rule on arbitration with respect to putative class members who were not before the court.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It first noted that the provision covered disputes broadly but also that the clause gave the court broad authority to interpret the clause. The court rejected TitleMax’s argument that Romero did not properly opt out of the clause in the third agreement and that the third agreement was a refinancing of the second agreement, which Romero had not opted out of and therefore required an arbitrator to determine whether Romero’s claims regarding his third agreement were subject to arbitration. The court explained that the arbitration clause gave the court the authority to interpret the arbitration provision. The court noted that each agreement was separate and contained its own (identical) arbitration clause.

Romero v. TitleMax of New Mexico, Inc., No. 18-2077 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2019)