Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

New York Court Discusses Qualifying and Disqualifying Conditions for Umpires

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A New York Supreme Court recently explained the conditions that qualify and disqualify a proposed umpire. National Union Fire Insurance and Enstar could not agree on an umpire for their asbestos-claim-related arbitration. Each felt the umpires proposed by the other’s arbitrator should be disqualified. They invoked a procedure allowing the court to select the umpire.

The court explained that umpires must be “impartial such that his/her decision will be based upon the merits of the dispute rather than the personal influence or identity of the disputants.” Applying that general standard, the court struck one proposed umpire (Chaplin) on the ground that he had previously testified for Enstar in another arbitration on an issue material to the present arbitration and was therefore “not entirely neutral as to this arbitration.” The court noted, however, that prior service as an expert is not always an automatic disqualification. The court then struck another proposed umpire (Maneval) because he had voted against Chaplin’s interpretation in a prior arbitration. The court explained that his service as an umpire in the instant arbitration could therefore create “an appearance of possible bias.” Another proposed umpire (Stern) was previously adverse to National Union’s arbitrator and, while not necessarily a problem, there was no reason to put that arbitrator in such an “untenable position” when there were other qualified candidates. Those candidates did not include an arbitrator (Gurevitz) who had previously worked for National Union’s counsel, which warranted disqualification, and another arbitrator (White) who was not a lawyer and who was therefore not ideal given the legal nature of the issues in the forthcoming arbitration. The court determined that another arbitrator (Bickford) with substantial industry experience was best suited to serve in this dispute.

Enstar EU Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No 654089/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2019).

Tenth Circuit Finds No Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal of District Court Stay Order While Motion to Compel Arbitration Is Pending in Parallel Federal Court Proceeding

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The plaintiff sued the defendants (collectively, DAL) in Colorado federal court after they denied his application for a Subway restaurant franchise. Because an arbitration clause in the franchise application required that any arbitration be held in Connecticut, DAL filed a motion to compel arbitration in Connecticut federal court. All proceedings in Colorado were stayed pending that motion. After DAL’s motion was denied, DAL appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. That appeal is currently pending. Meanwhile, the plaintiff asked the Colorado court to dissolve the stay and resume proceedings. The plaintiff lost that motion and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. DAL moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The Tenth Circuit granted DAL’s motion, agreeing that the stay order issued in Colorado did not “end the litigation,” and thus was not a “final decision” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While there is an exception for stay orders that effectively put a party out of federal court, the exception was deemed inapplicable here, where one federal court deferred decisional authority to another federal court — the Second Circuit. The court also held that the stay order did not fall within the “small class” of collateral rulings that may be treated as “final” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. It rejected the plaintiff’s contention that delaying review here until the entry of a final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.”

Alemayehu v. Gemignani, No. 18-1340 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2019)

Supreme Court’s Lamp Plus Brings Ambiguity in Classwide Arbitration to Light

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In 2016, a hacker tricked an employee of petitioner Lamps Plus Inc. into disclosing tax information of about 1,300 company employees. After a fraudulent federal income tax return was filed in the name of respondent Frank Varela, a Lamps Plus employee, Varela filed a pu­tative class action against Lamps Plus in federal district court on behalf of employees whose information had been compromised. Rely­ing on the arbitration agreement in Varela’s employment contract, Lamps Plus sought to compel arbitration — on an individual rather than a classwide basis — and to dismiss the suit. The district court rejected the individual arbitration request, but authorized class arbi­tration and dismissed Varela’s claims. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that the district court erred by compelling class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on the issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) bars an order requiring class arbitration when an agreement is not silent, but rather “ambiguous,” about the availability of such arbitration. First, the Court held that it had jurisdiction because an order that both compels arbitra­tion and dismisses the underlying claims qualifies as “a final decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(3). Next, the Court held that under the FAA, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to arbitration. The Court explained that pursuant to the FAA, arbitration is a matter of consent. Previously, the Supreme Court held that “courts may not infer consent to participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so,” and that silence is not enough. The Court explained that this reasoning controlled here and, like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties consented to arbitration.

Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988, 2019 WL 1780275 (2019)

Court Holds That Arbitration Award Was Final and Definite and Arbitrator Did Not Manifestly Disregard the Law

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In Ballinasmalla Holdings Ltd. v. FCStone Merchant Services, LLC, petitioners Ballinasmalla Holdings Ltd. (BHL) and Corrib Oil Biofuels LLC (Corrib Oil) brought an action seeking vacatur of a final arbitration award (“Final Award”) issued in favor of the respondents for approximately $5 million. The respondents, FCStone Merchant Services LLC (FCStone) and INTL FCStone Markets LLC (INTL FCStone), counter-claimed for confirmation of the Final Award and an earlier Partial Final Award.

Corrib Oil is a company that distributes and manufactures oil and petrol products. Corrib Oil entered into a contract with FCStone to purchase soybean oil. BHL agreed to act as a guarantor for Corrib Oil on the contract. BHL also acted as a guarantor on payments owed by Corrib Oil Company Ltd. (Corrib Ltd.), who was not a party to the litigation, to INTL FCStone on swap transactions pursuant to an International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) agreement. Both contracts had arbitration clauses. FCStone and INTL FCStone demanded arbitration after a dispute over soybean deliveries and payment on the ISDA agreement. INTL FCStone concurrently filed an action in New York state court against Corrib Ltd. seeking to collect on the debt from its ISDA agreement.

The arbitrator granted a partial award on the soybean contract dispute and dismissed the ISDA guaranty claim. FCStone and INTL FCStone asked the arbitrator to reinstate their ISDA guaranty claim and hold a hearing, and the arbitrator agreed. The arbitrator thereafter issued the Final Award, and the petitioners then filed their petition to vacate.

The court denied the petitioners’ motion to vacate the Final Award and granted the respondents’ motion to confirm. The court held that the arbitration award was final and definite. The court explained that for an arbitration award to be final and definite “the arbitrators must have decided not only the issue of liability … but also the issue of damages.” This was true here, despite the related case that was on appeal in the New York state court regarding a separate entity. The court also held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing stays. The court explained that a decision to stay the arbitration is a procedural matter governed under the procedural rules of the arbitration, i.e., the Commercial Rules of the AAA, and BHL did not make an argument that the arbitrator applied the wrong procedural rules or did so intentionally. Further, the court held that the petitioners did not demonstrate that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law on attorneys’ fees. There was no assertion that the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle and refused to apply it or intentionally ignored it. Last, the court held that post-award statutory interest, costs, and fees were warranted.

Ballinasmalla Holdings Ltd. v. FCStone Merch. Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-12254-PKC, 2019 WL 1569802 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019)

Second Circuit Vacates SDNY Order Enforcing Arbitration Award Against Reinsurer

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In the latest iteration of a complex reinsurance dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a 2018 district court order enforcing an arbitration award against IRB Brasil Resseguros S.A. (IRB). We previously blogged about the district court order here. The arbitration award required IRB to indemnify National Indemnity Co. (NICO) against a claim by Companhia Siderurgica Nacional S.A. (CSN). NICO and CSN settled CSN’s claim in a settlement agreement to which IRB was not a party. The agreement provided that CSN would receive $5 million of the $9 million NICO owed, but that the funds would come from IRB through a lawsuit that NICO would commence against it, i.e., this action.

IRB appealed the 2018 district court order, arguing that the NICO/CSN settlement agreement could not have established its liability. The Second Circuit agreed. It held that IRB cannot be responsible for paying an amount determined by a contract to which it was not a signatory.

IRB next went a step further, arguing that the NICO/CSN settlement extinguished any obligation IRB had to indemnify NICO pursuant to the arbitration award. But the Second Circuit found IRB went too far in this regard. The court held that IRB is still potentially liable for the $5 million based on the arbitration award, which had already been confirmed in 2016, and affirmed in 2017. The court rejected IRB’s suggestion that a private contract between NICO and CSN could override obligations established by the arbitration award. The court strongly implied that a judgment determining NICO’s liability to CSN could trigger IRB’s indemnity obligations to NICO.

Nat’l Indem. Co. v. IRB Brasil Ressegurous S.A., No. 18-534-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2019)