Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

SNDY Clears the Air, Finds Arbitrators Applied UAE Law in Determining Award in Aircraft Lease Agreement Dispute

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Cessna Finance Corp. entered into contracts with Al Ghaith Holding Co. PJSC for purposes of guaranteeing aircraft lease agreements. Cessna filed a request for arbitration against Al Ghaith seeking payment under the guaranty agreements. Al Ghaith argued that the guaranty agreements were unenforceable because the vice president who signed the agreement did not have authority to do so. The arbitrators issued an award in favor of Cessna holding the guarantee agreements were valid under both Kansas and Dubai law. Cessna moved to confirm the award. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award. The court explained that arbitration awards will only be vacated under limited circumstances, one being “manifest disregard” of the law. An award will be in “manifest disregard” of the law where: (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it; and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case. Al Ghaith argued that the award was in violation of a UAE law. However, the court explained that the arbitrators explicitly applied UAE law in confirming the award, and Al Ghaith did not meet its heavy burden to demonstrate the arbitrators acted in “manifest disregard” of the law.

Cessna Finance Corp. v. Al Ghaith Holding Co. PJSC, No. 1:15-cv-09857 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019)

Second Circuit Adopts Standard for Determining Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Motions to Confirm Arbitration Awards Under FAA Section 9

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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held as a matter of first impression that a district court properly looked to the substance of an underlying dispute in determining whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over a motion to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The parties are members of the Bobov Hasidic Jewish community in Brooklyn. The petitioners claimed to own trademark rights in the word “Bobov” and commenced arbitration to prevent the respondents from using the mark in connection with a new Hasidic community. The parties agreed to arbitrate before a rabbinical tribunal, which issued an award in the petitioners’ favor. The petitioners sought confirmation of the award in federal district court under Section 9 of the FAA. After concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter, the district court confirmed the award, and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Although the Second Circuit had not previously addressed whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over motions to confirm under Section 9, it had addressed the issue in the context of a petition to vacate under Section 10. In that case, the court adopted the “look-through” approach used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether a district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a petition to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA. The Supreme Court instructed district courts to “look through” the petition to the substance of the underlying controversy to assess whether it implicated federal law. The Second Circuit in the current case found no reason not to apply the same standard to a motion to confirm under Section 9. Applying that standard here, it held that because the underlying controversy raised questions of federal trademark law, the district court “unquestionably” had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. The court then concluded that the district court properly confirmed the arbitration award, particularly given the extreme deference that courts must afford such awards.

Landau v. Eisenberg, 922 F.3d 495 (2d Cir. 2019)

West Virginia Supreme Court Reverses, Finds “Delegation Clause” in Employment Arbitration Agreement Neither Ambiguous nor Unconscionable

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Petitioners, two Rent-A-Center entities, moved to compel arbitration of a lawsuit by Anita Ellis alleging that Rent-A-Center unlawfully terminated her employment for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. At the time she was hired, Ellis signed an arbitration agreement stating that she agreed to arbitrate any claims arising out of her employment and/or termination. In seeking to compel arbitration, Rent-A-Center specifically relied on a “delegation clause” in the arbitration agreement stating that the arbitrator — not any court — shall have exclusive authority to resolve any challenge to the applicability, enforceability, or formation of the arbitration agreement, including on the grounds that it was void, voidable, ambiguous, unconscionable, or in violation of state law. Ellis argued that the delegation clause was: (1) ambiguous and failed to reflect an unmistakable intent to delegate arbitrability issues to the arbitrator; (2) unconscionable under state common law; and (3) invalid for violating a West Virginia statute. The lower court held that the delegation clause was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and that there was no mutual agreement to arbitrate. It therefore denied Rent-A-Center’s motion to compel arbitration, but the Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed.

With respect to Ellis’ first argument, the court noted that it had previously considered the exact delegation clause at issue here and held that it clearly and unmistakably expressed an intent to delegate arbitrability issues to the arbitrator. It thus rejected Ellis’ contrary argument. The court next rejected Ellis’ argument that the delegation clause was unconscionable or otherwise invalid under common law contract principles and West Virginia statute. Ellis claimed the provision suffered from various “contract of adhesion” characteristics often associated with procedural unconscionability (e.g., unequal bargaining power, “take-it-or-leave-it” terms, and others). The court disagreed, however, finding the failure to read a contract does not relieve a party of its binding effect. And while an arbitration clause generally will not be deemed “unconscionable” absent proof of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the court found Ellis failed to prove substantive unconscionability nonetheless. The court noted that in order for it to consider Ellis’ delegation clause challenge, 9 U.S.C. § 2 and the “severability doctrine” required her to specifically object to the delegation clause, rather than the arbitration agreement as a whole. Because Ellis’ “statutory violation” argument was directed to the arbitration agreement as a whole, it could not serve as a basis for invalidating the delegation clause on unconscionability grounds.

Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Ellis, 827 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va. 2019)

Court Finds Panel Did Not Manifestly Disregard Law When It Entered FINRA Award in Favor of Investment Firm and Advisors in Dispute over Fraud Committed by Late NFL Player’s Agent

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The widow of a former NFL football player sued the player’s sports agent and financial adviser, alleging that the former player was defrauded by the agent in connection with the loss of the proceeds of the player’s life insurance policy. The plaintiff alleged that upon the player’s death, the insurance proceeds were paid to a trust, for which the agent acted as trustee without authorization. The funds were depleted by the agent, and the plaintiff asserted claims of breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and fraud against the agent and the agent’s investment firm and financial advisors.

The matter went to FINRA arbitration, and the panel concluded that the investment firm and the financial advisors were not legally responsible for the harm. The plaintiff moved to vacate the award on the ground that the panel manifestly disregarded the law when it reached the conclusion that “the Investment Firm and Investment Advisors were not required to conduct any investigation into the obviously suspicious and fraudulent behavior.” The firm and advisors moved to confirm the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award was untimely beyond the three-month limitation period. They relied upon the early issuance of the award, which contained two out of three signatures of the panel. The plaintiff relied upon a later date on which the third signature on the award was issued.

The court avoided ruling on the issue of timeliness, noting that some case law did support raising grounds for vacatur as a defense to a motion to confirm, even after the limitations period has expired. Turning to whether the panel manifestly disregarded the law, the court explained that, assuming “manifest disregard” is even a valid ground for vacatur in the Fifth Circuit, the panel did not disregard the existence of a clearly governing legal principle. The panel determined that “the Trustee of the trust was the person solely responsible for the asset destruction of the trust” and that the plaintiff failed to present any breach of a fiduciary duty “under any law or regulation.” The court concluded that “the Panel considered the existence of governing law, but found that a fiduciary duty did not exist under this law. Plaintiff’s issue with the arbitration decision is not that the Panel ignored the law entirely, but that the Panel did not reach Plaintiff’s desired outcome when applying the law. Therefore, even under the ‘manifest disregard of the law’ standard, Plaintiff’s motion for vacatur fails.” The court therefore denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award.

Warren v. Geller, No. 2:11-cv-02282 (E.D. La. May 3, 2019).

Confidential Reinsurance Agreement Made Public After Party Failed to Show Good Cause for Maintaining Confidentiality

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A reinsurance agreement and attachments filed in a court proceeding and purportedly containing “all manner of confidential and proprietary business information,” including “product design,” “service standards,” “pricing,” and “acquisition expenses and claim administration expenses,” were made public after the filing party failed to demonstrate “good cause” for keeping the documents secret.

“The court’s operation is of ‘utmost public concern.'” “Its business is ‘presumptively public.'” Furthermore, the public has both a limited First Amendment right of access to civil trial proceedings and a separate common law right to inspect and copy judicial records. While material filed with discovery motions is not subject to the common law right of access, material filed in conjunction with pretrial motions that require judicial resolution is subject to the common law right. In addition, the existence of a protective order does not automatically override the public’s right of access. Rather, the party seeking to maintain secrecy of the documents “must establish good cause for continued protection under Rule 26.” “An agreed or stipulated protective order merely postpones the need to litigate good cause document by document.”

To maintain confidentiality, a movant must “make a particularized showing of ‘good cause’ and a specific demonstration of fact by affidavit or testimony of a witness with personal knowledge, of the specific harm that would result from disclosure or loss of confidentiality; generalities, conclusory statements, and unsupported contentions do not suffice.” In this case, the movant “provided no specific explanations, evidence, or declarations that demonstrate why the exhibits should be sealed.” Instead, the movant only made “general, unsupported contentions” that the documents were confidential and that their disclosure would be harmful. Because there was no “particularized showing of good cause,” the court denied the motion to uphold confidentiality.

Theriot v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-00688 (M.D. Ala. May 17, 2019).