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Arbitration / Court Decisions

Fifth Circuit Holds “Tacit Acquiescence” Insufficient to Create Valid Contract to Arbitrate

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This appeal concerns the validity of arbitration proceedings in a dispute between a seller of a power generator, Imperial Industrial Supply Company, and its buyer, Quintina Maria Thomas. In October 2018, Thomas’s home in Hawaii caught on fire, which she claimed was caused by a power generator purchased from Imperial.

Thomas initiated arbitration proceedings against Imperial. She began by sending Imperial an alleged agreement that purported to be a “binding self-executing irrevocable contractual agreement” evidencing Thomas’s acceptance of Imperial’s offer. The alleged agreement did not define what Imperial offered but stated that “a product sale-purchase agreement and warranty for the [generator] creat[ed] an ongoing contractual relationship between [Imperial] and [Thomas].” The alleged agreement further provided that Imperial would need to propound 15 different “Proofs of Claim” to Thomas in order to avoid (1) breaching the alleged agreement; (2) admitting, by “tacit acquiescence,” that the generator caused the fire; and (3) participating in arbitration proceedings.

Thereafter, Imperial received a notice of arbitration hearing and timely objected. Without responding to Imperial’s objections, the arbitration association sent Imperial the final arbitration award, which awarded Thomas $1.5 million for breach of the alleged agreement on the basis that Imperial consented to the arbitration by “tacit acquiescence.”

Imperial sued Thomas seeking to vacate the arbitration award. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi vacated the award, and Thomas appealed.

Applying Mississippi law, the Fifth Circuit panel held “tacit acquiescence” to the alleged agreement is insufficient to constitute a valid contract. The panel noted that tacit acquiescence between relative strangers ignores the basic tenets of contract law because, absent a long-standing relationship between the parties, silence or inaction does not constitute acceptance of an offer. “If Thomas’s argument was valid, it would turn the notion of mutual assent on its head in ordinary purchase cases like this one: buy an item from a dealer or manufacturer, then mail a letter saying ‘you agree if you don’t object,’ and you can have whatever deal you want if the dealer/manufacturer doesn’t respond,” the panel wrote.

Because Thomas offered no evidence of previous dealings with Imperial, the panel found that the conspicuous lack of mutual assent means that a valid contract was never formed. The panel did not address Thomas’ other challenges, finding them to be without merit, and affirmed the district court’s judgment vacating the arbitration award.

Imperial Indus. Supply Co. v. Thomas, No. 20-60121 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020)

Washington Supreme Court Declines To Intervene in Ongoing Arbitration, Finding Judicial Authority Under FAA Limited To “Gateway” Disputes and Review of Final Awards

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Evette Burgess and Lithia Motors were arbitrating an employment dispute when, during the proceedings, Burgess filed a motion with the court seeking to terminate the arbitration and to rescind the arbitration agreement. The motion alleged that Lithia breached the agreement by failing to comply with discovery deadlines and that the arbitrator did so by failing to enforce applicable procedural rules. The superior court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction and certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Washington. The Court affirmed the order, concluding that judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is limited to disputes over “gateway” issues (i.e., enforceability of the arbitration clause in the first instance), and to the review of final awards.

Burgess argued that interlocutory challenges during arbitration proceedings is permitted by section 2 of the FAA. Lithia disagreed, arguing judicial review under the FAA is limited to the “bookends” of the arbitration: initial enforceability and review of the final award. The Court noted that the majority of federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue have agreed with Lithia, and that Burgess cited no case in which a court provided relief once the arbitration commenced. The Court also agreed with Lithia in this regard, explaining that sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA authorize courts to decide gateway arbitrability disputes, while sections 9, 10, and 11 allow courts to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct a final arbitration award at the conclusion of proceedings. The Court relied on a Sixth Circuit decision involving similar facts, where the court found it significant that the FAA is silent on judicial review between gateway disputes and review of final awards. Finding other circuit courts have likewise interpreted this silence as precluding interlocutory review, the Court affirmed the superior court decision declining to intervene and rescind the arbitration agreement while the subject arbitration was ongoing.

Evette Burgess v. Lithia Motors, Inc., et al., No. 98083-7 (Wash. Sept. 3, 2020)

Seventh Circuit Adds to Circuit Split, Holds Section 1782 Does Not Authorize Federal Courts to Compel Discovery for Use in Private Foreign Arbitration

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On a question of first impression in the Seventh Circuit regarding whether U.S. law allows federal courts to compel discovery for use in a private foreign arbitration, the Seventh Circuit joins the Second and Fifth Circuits in ruling that Section 1782 of the U.S. Code does not apply to private international arbitrations. This decision departs from recent rulings in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which concluded that Section 1782 applies to private commercial arbitrations.

This case arises out of an indemnification dispute over losses incurred when an aircraft engine caught fire during testing in South Carolina. Rolls-Royce PLC manufactured and sold a Trent 1000 engine to the Boeing Company for incorporation into a 787 Dreamliner aircraft. In January 2016, Boeing tested the new aircraft at its facility near the Charleston International Airport. A piece of metal became lodged in an engine valve, restricting the flow of fuel to the engine. As Boeing employees attempted to fix the problem, the engine caught fire, damaging the aircraft. Boeing demanded compensation from Rolls-Royce, and in 2017 the companies settled for $12 million. Rolls-Royce then sought indemnification from Servotronics, Inc., the manufacturer of the valve.

The relevant agreement between Rolls-Royce and Servotronics required any dispute not resolved through negotiation or mediation be submitted to binding arbitration in Birmingham, England, under the rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbiters. After failed negotiations, Rolls-Royce initiated arbitration with the Charted Institute of Arbiters in London.

Servotronics filed an ex parte application in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois asking the court to issue a subpoena compelling Boeing to produce documents for use in the London arbitration pursuant to Section 1782(a). The judge initially granted it and issued the requested subpoena. Rolls-Royce intervened and moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that Section 1782(a) does not permit a district court to order discovery for use in a private foreign commercial arbitration. Boeing intervened and joined the motion to quash. The judge reversed course and quashed the subpoena, agreeing with Rolls-Royce and Boeing that Section 1782(a) does not authorize the court to provide discovery assistance in private foreign arbitrations. Servotronics appealed.

Focusing on the statutory phrase “foreign or international tribunal” – or more particularly, the word “tribunal” – the Seventh Circuit held that the London arbitration does not qualify as a “foreign tribunal” under Section 1782. The panel concluded that a “foreign tribunal” as written in the statute means a governmental, administrative, or quasi-governmental tribunal operating under a foreign country’s practices and procedures. “Private foreign arbitrations, in other words, are not included.”

The panel also noted that a narrower interpretation of the word “tribunal” would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act, which allows only the arbitration panel (and not the parties) to summon witnesses before the panel to testify and produce documents and to petition the district court to enforce the summons. Section 1782, however, permits both foreign tribunals and litigants to obtain discovery orders from district courts. “If § 1782(a) were construed to permit federal courts to provide discovery assistance in private foreign arbitrations, then litigants in foreign arbitrations would have access to much more expansive discovery than litigants in domestic arbitrations,” the panel wrote.

The panel found it difficult to “conjure a rationale” for giving parties to private foreign arbitrations such broad access to federal court discovery assistance in the United States while precluding such discovery assistance for litigants in domestic arbitrations.

Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC and the Boeing Company, No. 19-1847 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2020)

Arbitration Award In Favor Of Major League Baseball Confirmed As Southern District Of New York Bats Telemicro’s Challenges Away

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The dispute involved Telemicro’s breach of a contract with Major League Baseball Properties for the rights to broadcast MLB games in the Dominican Republic. Telemicro failed to make payments under the contract, prompting MLB to terminate the contract and demand arbitration. In response to the arbitration demand, Telemicro sought a stay of the arbitration proceedings in a New York state court, and failed to submit an arbitrator ranking list to the American Arbitration Association. As a result, the AAA deemed Telemicro to have accepted the entire list of proposed arbitrators and made an appointment from it. Shortly thereafter, Telemicro’s request for a stay was denied. After a six-month proceeding, the arbitrator issued a final award to MLB, including an award for attorneys’ fees.

On the motion to confirm the award before the Southern District of New York, Telemicro argued that the decision to proceed with the appointment of an arbitrator despite the pendency of its motion for stay in New York state court constituted a due process violation. Telemicro argued that it would not have been able to participate in the selection of the arbitrator without waiving its challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitration. The court was not persuaded, noting that Telemicro failed to explain why it waited until the last day the list was due to seek a stay, and further that Telemicro took no action to challenge the appointment of the arbitrator within the arbitration process after the stay was denied. Furthermore, MLB made “a credible argument” that Telemicro’s submission of the list of potential arbitrators would not have waived its right to seek a stay.

Telemicro also argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law when making the award of attorney’s fees. The parties’ contract, however, stated that Telemicro would “reimburse MLB for any attorney’s fees and all costs and other expenses incurred by MLB in connection with the breach” of the agreement. Lastly, the court found Telemicro’s argument that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law because he viewed the MLB’s invoices in camera to be baseless, stating that such reviews are frequently performed in camera.

Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Corporacion de Television y Microonda Rafa, S.A., Case No. 1:19-cv-8669-MKV (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020).

Fifth Circuit Affirms Significant Arbitration Award of Attorney’s Fees, Clarifying the Limited Scope of Review and Ruling That the Panel Did Not Exceed Its Authority

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Beyond International, Inc. and an individual (“Beyond”) appealed the district court’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion to confirm an arbitration award in favor of Diverse Enterprises, Ltd., Co., LLC and other parties (“plaintiffs”). The dispute arose out of an alleged failure to meet minimum sales requirements under a distribution agreement (“Agreement”), which contained an arbitration clause. The arbitration panel entered an award in favor of the plaintiffs, which included $432,135.60 in attorneys’ fees. Beyond moved to modify the fee award, contending, in pertinent part, that one of the plaintiffs’ law firms charged only $225 an hour instead of the $400 hourly rate to which the parties had stipulated. The panel denied Beyond’s motion.

In the district court, Beyond sought vacatur or modification of the award of attorney’s fees, contending that the panel exceeded its authority. The district court rejected Beyond’s argument and confirmed the arbitration award, concluding that there was no limiting language concerning the arbitrator’s authority in the Agreement, and that there was no “evident material miscalculation” or “mistake” in the award. The court also found that the panel “reasonably relied on the parties’ stipulation that attorneys’ fees ranging from $200 to $400 would be reasonable.”

On appeal, Beyond argued that the panel was limited to awarding “reasonable fees” and not “multiples” of fees, and that the panel violated Texas law by “awarding fees not actually incurred.” The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments, explaining that the scope of its review would address only the question of whether the award was “rationally inferable” from the Agreement. Here, the court held, the Agreement broadly authorized the panel to settle “any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to” the Agreement, and granted the prevailing party “reasonable attorneys’ fees … and related costs and expenses.” The court held that this language did “not necessarily limit the parties to fees actually incurred.” The court then affirmed the district court’s denial of vacatur of the panel’s fee award, noting that it would not reach “the merits of Beyond’s excessive fee claim because that argument goes beyond our power to review the arbitration decision.”

Diverse Enterprises, Limited Company, L.L.C. v. Beyond International, Inc., Case No. 19-51121 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2020).