In a personal injury action brought by a casino employee against the property owner in the Virgin Islands, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction pursuant to section 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Arbitration Act, that the issue of whether a party seeking arbitration has waived its right to arbitrate by litigating the case in court remains a question for the trial court to decide, rather than an arbitrator, and that the defendant had waived any right it had to arbitrate by actively litigating the case for nearly four years before seeking to compel arbitration. Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Case No. 06-2542 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2007).
Arbitration / Court Decisions
UK HIGH COURT ORDERS “FURTHER REASONS” IN EXPERT DETERMINATION
In March, the United Kingdom’s High Court ruled that courts have the authority to order further explanations from the umpire in an expert determination. The parties in this case entered into an agreement whereby the claimant, Halifax Life Limited (“Halifax”) agreed to reinsure the defendant’s business. A dispute arouse as to the precise balance of premium payable for the reinsurance. Pursuant to the agreement, an umpire was appointed, who would act as an expert, not an arbitrator, whose decision would be binding on the parties. In September, 2006, the umpire issued a ruling. The claimants, unsatisfied with the ruling, challenged the umpire’s determination on several grounds.
Mr. Justice Cresswell found that the reasons given by the umpire for arriving at his decision were inadequate under the circumstances. Although Justice Cresswell declined to make a declaration that the expert determination was not binding, he referred to section 70(4) of the Arbitration Act of 1996, which allows a court to order the tribunal to state the reasons in detail where it appears that the award does not contain sufficient detail to enable the matter to be properly considered. Justice Cresswell stated that “[i]t would be highly anomalous if an expert’s failure to give reasons caused the determination not to be binding, when this is not the position in the case of arbitration awards.” Instead, he adjourned the hearing and directed the umpire to state further reasons for his ruling. Halifax v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, [2007] EWHC 503 (Mar. 13, 2007).
Court dismisses RICO and antitrust claims (again) in insurance brokerage litigation
The District Court Judge in the Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation MDL action has again dismissed the RICO and Sherman Act claims asserted by the Plaintiffs. Separate opinions were issued with respect to the antitrust claims and the RICO claims. Both types of claims have been dismissed, before, and in both of the recent opinions, the Court stated that it would give the Plaintiffs “one final opportunity” to amend their claims. In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1663 (USDC D.N.J. April 5, 2007). There are prior posts to this blog with respect to this action, dated September 14, 2006 and October 16, 2006.
PRIVILEGE DISPUTES CONTINUE IN “RENT-A-CAPTIVE” CASE
Diane Koken, the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, is the Statutory Liquidator for Legion Insurance Company and Villanova Insurance Company. In this case, Koken, as Liquidator, sought to recover more than $4 million in premiums and commissions allegedly due to the insurance companies pursuant to a Limited Agency Agreement between Legion and American Patriot Insurance Agency (“Patriot”). Patriot denied liability, alleging Legion perpetrated a fraud upon Patriot in relation to a “Rent-a-Captive” workers’ compensation program. During depositions of two of Legion’s former executives, Defendants’ counsel attempted to inquire into this fraud issue, but counsel for the Liquidator objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege. Defendants filed a motion to overrule the Liquidator’s claim of privilege pursuant to the crime/fraud exception, which the court denied in May 2006. That decision was affirmed in December 2006.
The defendants recently asked the court to overrule the Liquidator’s claim of privilege as to conversations between Legion’s Executive Vice President, Glenn Partridge, and Legion’s General Counsel, Andrew Walsh. While the court agreed that conversations with Mr. Walsh were not per se privileged, the court stated it was not in a position to determine whether the privilege applied because Mr. Partridge has not been deposed. The court agreed to postpone Mr. Partridge’s deposition pending a ruling on the Liquidator’s motion for summary judgment. Koken v. American Patriot Ins. Agency, Inc., Case No. 05-C-1049 (N.D.Ill. March 23, 2007).
SOCIETY OF LLOYDS’ ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENT SURVIVES MOTION TO DISMISS
In September 2006, the Society of Lloyds filed an Amended Complaint in a Florida District Court seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign country judgment under Florida Statutes. The Defendant, Robert Sumerel, moved to dismiss the case as barred by the statute of limitations, asserting that the Amended Complaint is a common law civil action, not a statutory cause of action. The court disagreed, finding that the Amended Complaint did plead a statutory cause of action, and therefore the statute of limitations argument failed. Society of Lloyds v. Robert Sumerel, Case No. 2:06-cv-329-FtM-29DNF (USDC M.D. Fla. April 10, 2007).