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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions / Jurisdiction Issues

Jurisdiction Issues

Sixth Circuit Finds it Lacks Jurisdiction Over Dispute Regarding Proper Forum for Settlement of Fee Dispute

January 3, 2019 by Carlton Fields

A dispute regarding attorney Steven Johnson’s right to fees from William Drake, an individual who hired Johnson to pursue a product liability claim, was made considerably more complicated by conflicting forum provisions in a contract with the attorney and the settlement agreement in the MDL that eventually resolved Drake’s product liability claim.

Drake received a hip implant that was later recalled. Drake hired Mr. Johnson to represent him in his claim against the manufacturer of the implant, signing a contract providing that fee disputes would be arbitrated in Texas. Drake later terminated Johnson and hired a new lawyer, who filed lawsuit against the manufacturer, which became part of an MDL. Drake’s claims were then settled by the manufacturer, and the settlement agreement specified the use of a special master to settle disputes regarding attorneys’ fees.

Johnson commenced an arbitration proceeding against Drake in Texas regarding his fees, and Drake initiated arbitration proceedings against Johnson before the special master regarding the same issues. The special master dismissed Drake’s arbitration proceeding because it was already pending in a different arbitral forum. The Texas arbitrator then issued an award in Johnson’s favor. Drake moved, in the Ohio federal district court handling the MDL, to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and vacate the Texas arbitration award. The court granted to motion to enforce the settlement but did not decide whether to vacate the apparently conflicting Texas arbitration award, and Johnson appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit.

The Sixth Circuit started and ended its consideration of the matter with the question of jurisdiction, which Johnson argued existed because (1) the district court’s decision was a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and (2) it was appealable under section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court disagreed. First, the court found that the motion to vacate the Texas arbitration award was one of the main issues before the court, and the district court’s failure to rule on that motion meant that there was no final resolution of the litigation on the merits. Second, the court found that section 16 of the FAA did not apply because the district court did not address the Texas arbitration award, rejecting an argument that it was implicitly vacated by the ruling enforcing the settlement. Lacking jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions that it consider whether the Texas arbitration award should be confirmed or vacated.

Drake v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018)

Filed Under: Jurisdiction Issues

California Appellate Court Holds Parties Cannot Contract Around Service Requirements of Hague Service Convention

December 19, 2018 by John Pitblado

Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co., Ltd. (“Changzhou”) is a Chinese company that develops fonts. Changzhou and Los Angeles-based investment firm Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII (“Rockefeller”), entertained the idea of a joint venture to create a Silicon Valley-based company to develop and market international fonts.

The parties signed what Rockefeller characterized as a memorandum of understanding, and which Rockefeller believed was binding. However, Changzhou characterized the document as a “bei wang lu,” a type of memorandum understood in Chinese to merely record the current state of negotiations, and that the signing of a “bei wang lu” “does not create a binding contract.

After negotiations ultimately broke off, Rockefeller initiated an arbitration, citing the memorandum’s arbitration provision. Changzhou did not respond to the demand for arbitration, nor did it appear or participate in the arbitration Rockefeller filed in California. The arbitrator entered a default award in excess of $414 million against Changzhou.

Rockefeller brought an action to confirm the award in California state court. It effected service on Changzhou in China via mail, as had been “agreed” in the memorandum. Changzhou did not appear in the action, and judgment confirming the award entered in Rockefeller’s favor.

Approximately 15 months later, Changzhou moved to set aside the judgment on the grounds that it had never entered into a binding contract with Rockefeller, had not agreed to contractual arbitration, and had not been served with the summons and petition to confirm the arbitration award in the manner required by the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”).

The court denied Changzhou’s petition to vacate, finding service was effective in the action to confirm the award, even though it had not complied with the Hague Service Convention, as the parties were free to contract around the Convention, and had done so.

Changzhou appealed and a California intermediate appellate court reversed, finding that parties may not ‘contract around’ the Hague Service Convention. “[T]he Hague Service Convention does not permit Chinese citizens to be served by mail, nor does it allow parties to set their own terms of service by contract. [Changzhou] therefore was never validly served with process.”

The Appellate Court also did not credit the argument that Changzhou waited too long to challenge service, finding that a lack of personal jurisdiction is not curable, and that “[t]here is a wealth of California authority for the proposition that a void judgment is vulnerable to direct or collateral attack ‘at any time.’” (emphasis added).

Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou Sinotype Technology Co., Ltd., No. B272170 (Cal. Ct. App. June 1, 2018)

This post written by John Pitblado.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

Fourth Circuit Reverses Dismissal, Finding Federal Question Jurisdiction for Review of Arbitral Award

December 17, 2018 by John Pitblado

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Virginia federal court’s dismissal of a challenge to an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose out of a lawsuit filed by Alvin Moore against his email service provider, America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), for divulging information about his account to law enforcement who sought the information as part of an investigation into a claimed imminent threat. Moore sued AOL in state court, alleging a claim under Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (known as the Stored Communications Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., for divulging the information about him without a warrant, a subpoena, or his consent. Moore also alleged that AOL had, without his consent, deleted all his emails, causing him damages in the amount of $74,999 (presumably just under the jurisdictional requirement for diversity jurisdiction in order to avoid removal to federal court).

However, AOL successfully compelled arbitration under its service provider agreement with Moore, and prevailed in the arbitration. Moore filed a petition to vacate the award in Virginia federal court, alleging both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The court granted AOL’s motion to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction, finding it did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement to sustain diversity jurisdiction. It did not address the issue of whether it had federal question jurisdiction due to the fact that the subject of the arbitration included a claim under the federal Stored Communications Act.

The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, for a merits consideration of Moore’s petition, given its finding that the district court has jurisdiction. It sided with the First and Second Circuits in a circuit split about whether the enforcement mechanisms under the FAA §§ 10 and 11 required the court to “look through” the petition to determine if the underlying dispute could have been brought in federal court, absent the arbitration agreement. Other Circuits have held in favor of an approach treating petitions to vacate or confirm as strictly matters of contract under an arbitration agreement, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute, and thus governed by state law, providing no independent basis for federal question jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected that approach, based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent adopting the “look through” approach with respect to petitions to compel arbitration under FAA § 4, and finding no reason that this approach should not also apply to the FAA’s enforcement mechanisms under §§ 10 and 11.

McCormick v. America Online, Inc., No. 17-1542 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 2018).

This post written by John Pitblado.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

Federal District Court Declines to Rule on Arbitration Award, Finding No Independent Basis for Jurisdiction

December 4, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

Following arbitration, the parties filed cross-motions to confirm and vacate the arbitration award. The District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the FAA does not independently confer jurisdiction, and the parties did not adequately plead a jurisdictional basis that would permit the court to rule. Golub, moving that the award be vacated, argued that the court had jurisdiction because (1) she was denied a fair arbitral hearing, and (2) the award was in manifest disregard of federal law. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that federal question jurisdiction to enforce or vacate an arbitration award exists only when ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law, such as when the petition alleges that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded federal substantive law. The court went on to warn that “even in those cases where the arbitrator manifestly disregarded federal substantive law, courts are reluctant to find jurisdiction.” Last, the court stated that the allegation that the arbitrator denied a party a fair opportunity to present its case by refusing to compel production of documents, does not raise a “substantial question of federal law.” The court was “aware of no case … stating that failure to follow federal procedure in an arbitration can give rise to federal question jurisdiction.” BOFI Fed. Bank v. Golub, Case No. 3:18-cv-00816 (USDC S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

District Court Finds that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is Not Preempted By State Law Prohibiting Arbitration of Insurance Disputes

November 20, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

A district court judge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has issued an order attempting to resolve the apparent tension created by Louisiana law barring compulsory arbitration provisions in insurance contracts, a contract containing both an arbitration provision and a “conformity to statute” clause, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention), and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

The matter arose out of the defendant’s refusal to pay claims under an insurance policy covering hail and wind damage. Plaintiffs sued in Louisiana state court, but defendant, which is a citizen of the United Kingdom, removed the matter to federal court pursuant to the Convention. Plaintiff Pannagl then moved to remand on several grounds.

First, plaintiff argued that the removal was untimely, as it was not filed within 30 days after service of the complaint, as is required for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. The court found that the timeliness argument would not apply if the Convention applied, as removal under the Convention may occur at any time before trial. The court further found that the basic requirements for application of the convention— (1) an agreement arising out of a commercial legal relationship, (2) a written agreement to arbitrate in the territory of a Convention signatory, and (3) a party that is not an American citizen—were all met.

Second, plaintiff argued that the Convention only applies to the recognition of arbitral awards, but the court held that the plain language of the statute implementing the Convention requires its application to attempts to enforce covered arbitration agreements.
Third, plaintiff argued that the policy’s “conformity to statute” clause required the policy to be amended to remove the arbitration provision in order to comply with Louisiana law barring compulsory arbitration provisions in insurance contracts. The court held, however, that the Convention preempts state law, such that the policy could not be amended to remove an arbitration provision covered by the Convention.

Finally, plaintiff argued that Louisiana’s prohibition of arbitration in insurance disputes reverse-preempts the Convention under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as the Convention as applied is contrary to a Louisiana public policy enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. But the court held that while the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies generally to federal statutes, it does not apply to treaties such as the Convention. As a result, the court denied the motion to remand.

Plaintiff immediately appealed this ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied the appeal on the basis that denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not appealable unless the district court certifies the issue, which had not occurred in this case.

Gulledge and Pannagl v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, Case No. 18-6657 (USDC E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

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