The Second Circuit has held that a federal district court reached the correct result but for the wrong reason when it dismissed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff was not subject to a contract containing an arbitration clause.
The complaint, filed by KIPP Academy Charter School, arose out of a dispute between KIPP and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) regarding whether KIPP teachers were represented by the UFT. In an attempt to settle this dispute, UFT served KIPP with a demand for arbitration under the provisions of the UFT’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the New York City Department of Education. KIPP filed a complaint in New York state court seeking a stay of arbitration on the basis that it was not subject to the CBA, and the court dismissed that complaint. KIPP then filed a complaint in federal district court in which it sought a declaratory judgment that it was not subject to the CBA. The UFT moved to dismiss on the basis that the action was barred by res judicata and by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which, broadly speaking, prevents parties from using federal suits to reverse state court judgments. The district court dismissed KIPP’s complaint based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine without deciding whether res judicata would also bar the suit.
On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment; and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.” The court found that the second factor was not satisfied, because KIPP’s alleged injury was caused by the UFT’s arbitration demand, not by the state court judgment, which merely ratified the UFT’s allegedly injurious conduct. However, the court found that the suit was barred by res judicata. While KIPP argued that its claim for declaratory relief was unique to the federal court action, the Second Circuit found that the state court action was a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same cause of action, while the claim for declaratory relief was “unique in name only,” based on substantially identical facts, and thus duplicative for res judicata purposes.
KIPP Acad. Charter Sch. v. United Fed’n of Teachers, AFT NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 17-1905-CV (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2018)
This post written by Jason Brost.
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