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Ninth Circuit Concludes Defendant Waived Right to Seek Arbitration of Class Action

August 26, 2019 by Brendan Gooley

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a defendant in a putative class action waived its right to compel arbitration after sitting on that right for nearly a year while it sought adjudication of a merits-based dispositive motion to dismiss in the Northern District of California.

June Newirth and several other named plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Aegis Senior Communities LLC, the operator of the senior living communities in which they resided. The plaintiffs claimed that Aegis defrauded seniors by falsely representing that staffing levels were based on the needs of residents when staffing was in fact determined by budget considerations.

The agreements between the plaintiffs and Aegis contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties to arbitrate “any legal claim or civil action arising out of or relating to care or services provided” by Aegis. Aegis removed the plaintiffs’ action to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and a motion to dismiss. Aegis subsequently withdrew its motion to compel arbitration, however. Over the course of the next year, the parties engaged in discovery, mediation, and litigated a motion to dismiss filed by Aegis on the merits of several of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The district court denied Aegis’ motion to dismiss. Aegis then filed a new motion to compel arbitration. By then, nearly a year had passed since Aegis’ original motion to compel.

The district court denied Aegis’ new motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Aegis had waived its right to seek to compel arbitration. Aegis appealed that decision.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that arbitration agreements are subject to general contract principles, including waiver, but that waiver of an arbitration clause is not favored and a party seeking to establish such a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof. The court also explained that the question whether a right to arbitrate has been waived is subject to a federal law standard that requires the party claiming waiver to establish: “(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the person opposing arbitration from such inconsistent acts.”

The first requirement — knowledge of a right to compel arbitration — was not at issue in this case. Aegis had moved to compel arbitration when the case was filed; it knew it had a right.

With respect to the second requirement — that Aegis had to engage in acts inconsistent with its right to compel — the Ninth Circuit looked to the totality of Aegis’ actions to determine whether Aegis “(1) ma[de] an intentional decision not to move to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigate[d] the merits of a case for a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.” After surveying its case law applying that test, the court concluded that “Aegis took actions inconsistent with its known right to arbitrate” by filing and withdrawing its initial motion to compel and actively litigated the case by filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which sought dismissal with prejudice on a key merits issue. (The court noted, however, that seeking to avoid or frustrate litigation, by, for example, opposing discovery or filing a motion to dismiss on a non-merits issue, is insufficient to avail oneself of the judicial forum.) (Aegis did not argue that the factual issue regarding one of the named plaintiffs affected Aegis’ knowledge of its ability to compel arbitration under the first factor described above. Aegis clearly knew it could compel arbitration with respect to the other plaintiffs, but it apparently elected not to do so at least in part because it originally mistakenly believed it would still have had to litigate the class action in federal court because of the named plaintiff who it thought had not agreed to arbitrate.)

The Ninth Circuit rejected Aegis’ various arguments regarding its acts that were inconsistent with its right to arbitrate, including: (1) Aegis never expressly waived its right to compel arbitration (a party can impliedly waive a right); (2) Aegis filed a motion to compel (but Aegis withdrew that motion); (3) Aegis engaged in the minimum amount of litigation necessary to comply with court rules and orders (Aegis failed to renew its motion until after an adverse judgment, had sought a judgment on a merits issue, and failed to avail itself of rules allowing relief from case management and discovery obligations); and (4) Aegis mistakenly believed that one of the named plaintiffs had not signed an arbitration agreement (the record established that Aegis had learned that the plaintiff in question had signed such an agreement more than seven months before Aegis ultimately renewed its motion to compel arbitration).

Turning to the third and final requirement — prejudice to the opposing party — the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had been prejudiced by having to defend against Aegis’ motion to dismiss. That was a merits-based issue that the plaintiffs had been forced to address by Aegis’ decision to file a dispositive merits-based motion. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs had not been prejudiced by issues directly related to their decision to file an action instead of seeking arbitration, including participating in discovery and conferring about mediation, etc.

While the court recognized that a party seeking to establish waiver of an arbitration clause faces a heavy burden, the Ninth Circuit concluded that burden was satisfied in this case.

Newirth v. Aegis Senior Cmtys., LLC, 931 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. July 24, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions

NDNY Unable to Resolve Ambiguity in Umbrella Policies and Sets Trial

August 25, 2019 by Nora Valenza-Frost

On remand from the Second Circuit, the Northern District of New York was asked to determine whether Utica Mutual Insurance Co. (the cedent) had a defense obligation under its umbrella policies. If it did, then Utica would be entitled to recover defense costs from Clearwater Insurance Co. (the reinsurer).

The umbrella policies required Utica to defend any occurrence “not covered by the policies listed in the schedule of underlying insurance … but covered by the terms and conditions of this policy.” Both parties argued different interpretations of the meaning of “not covered by.” Finding the language ambiguous, and having not been provided extrinsic evidence allowing the court to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of law, summary judgment was denied and the case set for trial.

Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 6:13-cv-01178 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

Court Remands Arbitration Award to Arbitrator for Clarification

August 23, 2019 by Carlton Fields

Three Brothers Trading LLC d/b/a Alternative Execution Group (AEXG) and Generex Biotechnology Corp. entered into a contract whereby AEXG would secure investors for Generex’s business and, in exchange, Generex would pay AEXG a percentage of the funds received by any investor AEXG had referred. The contract included a “sixty-day ‘No Shop’ exclusivity provision,” which barred Generex from entering “into any financing transaction other than with existing shareholders” or with investors referred by AEXG. The contract required any disputes to be resolved through arbitration. Generex allegedly breached the contract by entering into a financial transaction with a party who was not referred by AEXG. AEXG commenced an arbitration.

The arbitrator determined that Generex violated the no-shop provision and awarded four separate awards to AEXG. AEXG brought a petition to confirm the award, and Generex in turn brought a motion to modify, vacate, and remand the award.

The court explained that it “uses an extremely deferential standard of review for arbitral awards.” However, an award may be remanded to the arbitrator if the “award is incomplete or ambiguous” and the court “is unable to discern how to enforce it.” Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 11, remand should not be granted when the court can resolve any alleged ambiguities in the award by modification. The court held that the terms of the second award were ambiguous as there were several interpretations of the award that yielded very different outcomes for the parties. As such, the court was unable to modify the award and remanded the case to the arbitrator for clarification.

Three Bros. Trading, LLC v. Generex Biotechnology Corp., No. 1:18-cv-11585 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions

Court Denies Reinsurer’s Motion to Compel, Finding No Basis to Decide Issues Concerning Costs for Which Cedent Has Not Requested Payment

August 21, 2019 by Alex Silverman

Lamorak Insurance Co. issued excess policies to Olin Corp. and also reinsured those policies with the defendants, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London. After Lamorak and Olin settled a declaratory judgment action concerning coverage for underlying environmental property damage suits against Olin, Lamorak sought payment from Lloyd’s under the relevant reinsurance contracts. Lloyd’s disputed the reinsurance billings, and Lamorak commenced the instant action. In response, Lloyd’s sought a declaration that it is not obligated to pay expenses that Lamorak incurred in connection with its declaratory judgment action against Olin, even though Lamorak never asked to be reimbursed for such costs. Lloyd’s moved to compel discovery regarding the declaratory judgment costs, for an order setting a deadline for Lamorak to request reimbursement of such costs, or, alternatively, for an order barring Lamorak from ever making such a request. The court denied the motion in its entirety, finding no basis for compelling Lamorak to produce documents about costs it had not asked Lloyd’s to reimburse, nor for setting an arbitrary deadline for Lamorak to assert such a claim in the future. The court also refused to affirmatively bar Lamorak from pursuing a claim for the declaratory judgment costs, as doing so would be to decide a hypothetical legal question before it is arises.

Lamorak Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, No. 1884CV00200BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 19, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Reinsurance Claims

Third Circuit Holds That Statute of Limitations Was Not Extended for Class Action Lawsuit

August 20, 2019 by Carlton Fields

In 2005 and 2006, Christopher Blake and James Orkis took out mortgages from JP Morgan to buy homes. Then in 2013, they filed a class action against JP Morgan under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging a scheme to refer homeowners to mortgage insurers/reinsurers in exchange for streams of kickbacks. RESPA has a one-year statute of limitations that runs from the date of the violation. 12 U.S.C. § 2614.

Blake and Orkis argued that each kickback separately violates the Act and has its own limitations period. The court disagreed and held that the kickbacks ended more than a year before they sued, so the Act’s one-year limitations period would still bar their claims.

Blake and Orkis further argued that the statute of limitations had also been extended by a 2011 lawsuit filed over the same conduct in a California federal court, Samp v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. The Third Circuit again disagreed and held that a pending class action tolls the time only for putative class members’ individual claims, not their class claims. The court explained that tolling class actions would cause problems in three ways. First, it would encourage duplicative lawsuits instead of reducing them. Second, tolling new class actions would be inequitable. Third, it would encourage repetitive claims and allow class claimants to stack their claims forever.

Blake v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 927 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. June 19, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Reinsurance Claims

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