Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Maryland District Court Finds Damages Award, Not Liability Award Was “Final” Decision Triggering Time to Challenge Award Under FAA

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The plaintiff moved to vacate an arbitration award and the defendant moved to dismiss and confirm. The defendant’s dismissal motion challenged confirmation of an arbitration award, arguing that the matter was filed in violation of the arbitration agreement’s confidentiality clause, was prohibited by the defense of arbitration and award, failed to comply with the Federal Arbitration Act, was untimely, and failed to include any legal authority.

The court dispensed with the defendant’s first argument, as the arbitration agreement expressly preserved the parties’ statutory right to judicial review of arbitration proceedings. As to the second argument – that confirmation is prohibited by the defense of arbitration and award – the court noted that the plaintiff was not attempting to re-litigate the claims that were resolved by the arbitration but rather “exercise its statutory right to request that a district court vacate the arbitration award.”

As to the third argument, timeliness, the FAA requires that a party challenging an arbitration award serve notice on the adverse part “within three months after the award is filed or delivered,” which period begins to run once the arbitrator issues its final award. Here, the liability award was issued on July 9, 2018, and the damages award on January 3, 2019. Thus, the plaintiff’s complaint, filed on January 25, 2019, was within the three-month period. Additionally, “[a]lthough the FAA provides that the sole method for challenging an arbitration award is by serving a motion to vacate within three months of the final award and does not expressly permit a party to initiate a challenge to an arbitration award by filing a complaint, a court may construe a complaint challenging an arbitration decision as a motion to vacate when doing so would not prejudice the opposing party.” Finding no prejudice, the court rejected the defendant’s third argument.

As to the fourth argument – that the plaintiff failed to include any legal authority to support vacating the arbitration award – the court noted that, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, its “role is not to determine whether a party has proven its case” but rather “to determine whether a party has stated a claim for which relief can be granted.” Finding that the complaint met this requirement, the court rejected the defendant’s argument.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded her legal authority and manifestly disregarded the law, and confirmed the award.

Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. Myers, No. 8:19-cv-00242 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2019).

Court Holds Former Director in Contempt Following Wild Reinsurance Dispute

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Recovering returns from reinsurance commissions can be a costly and time-consuming endeavor, at least when a former director of the agency that received the provisional commissions allegedly engages in a slew of activity to transfer and comingle the funds from the commissions.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. knows that lesson all too well: Recovering funds from the director of an underwriter has been quite the odyssey for Odyssey Reinsurance Co.

Diana Dostalik and her husband were the officers, directors, managers, and shareholders of Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp. Cal-Regent underwrote certain risks on behalf of State National Insurance Co. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. reinsured State National. Pursuant to the reinsurance agreements between Odyssey and State National, Cal-Regent received a provisional commission paid in part by Odyssey for the policies it underwrote for State National. The provisional commissions were subsequently adjusted depending on the profitability of the business Cal-Regent underwrote. Thus, Cal-Regent was sometimes required to return portions of the provisional commissions.

In 2013, Ms. Dostalik and her husband allegedly realized that they would be obligated to return a significant portion of the commissions they had received from, among others, Odyssey, due to a settlement in a lawsuit against State National. As a result, Ms. Dostalik and her husband allegedly “embarked on a plan to strip Cal-Regent of assets” by forming Pacific Brokers Insurance Services” and transferring substantially all of Cal-Regents assets to Pacific Brokers.

Odyssey sued in the District of Connecticut. While that suit was pending, Ms. Dostalik and her husband allegedly sold substantially all the assets of Pacific Brokers to AmTrust North America Inc. Ms. Dostalik and her husband then agreed that Ms. Dostalik would receive $2,500,000 from AmTrust’s initial payment to Pacific Brokers as part of the couple’s divorce.

After obtaining a $3,200,000 judgment in the District of Connecticut against Cal-Regent, Odyssey brought suit in the Southern District of California against Pacific Brokers, Cal-Regent, Ms. Dostalik and her former husband, and others in a continued effort to recover the returns it was owed from the provisional commissions it paid to Cal-Regent. The court issued temporary restraining orders and injunctions that, in short, prohibited Ms. Dostalik from transferring, assigning, disposing of, or comingling any of the funds she received from the sale of Pacific Brokers’ assets to AmTrust and ordering Ms. Dostalik to deposit into the court’s registry all the funds she had received from AmTrust.

Ms. Dostalik apparently not only failed to deposit funds into the court’s registry despite having several accounts that consisted of more than 99% funds from AmTrust totaling hundreds of thousands of dollars, but also then comingled AmTrust funds with proceeds from the sale of real estate and continued to engage in efforts to shield the AmTrust funds from the court.

The court, however, had had enough. It held Ms. Dostalik in contempt of several of its temporary restraining orders and gave her 14 days to, among other things, deposit nearly $700,000 in the court registry or ordered that she would “be committed to the custody of the U.S. Marshal.” The court also awarded Odyssey its attorneys’ fees and entered additional injunctions.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Nagby, No. 3:16-cv-03038 (S.D. Cal. 2019).

Without Jurisdiction or Authority to Review, California Appellate Court Dismisses Appeal of Trial Court’s Statement of Decision

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Finding that a California trial court’s statement of decision was not a judgment or appealable order, the California Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, having no jurisdiction or authority to review it.

The appellant argued that the statement of decision was a final judgment within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(1). The court disagreed, as a judgment is final “when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.” Thus, a statement of decision will be appealable only when it is “signed and filed and does, in fact, constitute the court’s final decision on the merits.” The court found that the statement of decision was a limited ruling on a discrete issue that did “not finally resolve the dispute alleged in the operative pleadings.”

The appellant argued, in the alternative, that its opening brief should be treated as a petition for a writ of mandate. The court noted, “Although we have the power to treat the purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, we should not exercise that power expect under unusual circumstances.” Seeing no justification for such relief, the court held that “[u]nder the circumstances presented here, treating the instant appeal as a writ application would … encourage parties to knowingly appeal from nonappealable orders, safe in the knowledge that their appeal will be saved by the appellate courts. We cannot condone or encourage such practice.”

Warwick Cal. Corp. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., No. A155523 (Cal. Ct. Ap. Jan. 7, 2020).

Ninth Circuit Affirms Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration in Smartphone App Case Based on Obscure “Browsewrap” Arbitration Clause

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The Ninth Circuit recently denied a motion to compel arbitration after concluding that an arbitration agreement “buried” in difficult to access terms for a smartphone app did not put users on constructive notice that they were agreeing to arbitration (and a class action waiver).

Huuuge Inc. operated a smartphone application that allowed users to play casino games. Sean Wilson downloaded and played that app for more than a year. Wilson then filed a putative class action alleging that Huuuge violated the state of Washington’s gambling and consumer protection laws by charging users for chips to play the casino games.

Huuuge moved to compel arbitration. It relied on an arbitration agreement and class action waiver in the terms and conditions for the app. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied Huuuge’s motion to compel arbitration.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. The court explained that a “user would need Sherlock Holmes’s instincts to discover the [t]erms” containing the arbitration agreement. A user could access the terms in two ways. First, before downloading the app, the user could click on a “more” button in the app store, which took the user to a page that discussed the app. The user would then need to scroll down and see a paragraph that began with: “Read our Terms of Use.” Although a “link” was in that paragraph, the user could not click on it. Instead, the user had to copy and paste it into a web browser to access the terms. Second, after downloading the app, the user could click a “three dot ‘kebob’ menu button in the upper right-hand corner of the home page,” which took them to a pop-up menu. The fifth option down on that menu read: “Terms & Policy.” Clicking on that option opened the terms, including the arbitration agreement.

Users were not required to view or assent to the terms and conditions. Thus, the agreement was a classic “browsewrap” agreement, which does “not require the user to take any affirmative action to assent to the website terms.” (In contrast, a “clickwrap” agreement “require[s] users to affirmatively assent to the terms of use before they can access the website and its services.”)

Applying traditional contract law of the state of Washington, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the manner in which Huuuge displayed the arbitration agreement and class action waiver did not put Wilson on constructive notice that he was agreeing to arbitration and a class action waiver. It explained: “Users are put on constructive notice based on the conspicuousness and placement of the terms and conditions, as well as the content and overall design of the app.” Constructive notice did not exist where terms are “buried” or “in obscure corners,” particularly where scrolling to such areas was not required to use the app. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[e]ven where the terms are accessible via a conspicuous hyperlink in close proximity to a button necessary to the function of the website, courts have declined to enforce such agreements.”

Huuuge’s terms were not anywhere close to meeting the constructive notice standard.

The court also rejected Huuuge’s claim that Wilson was on actual notice of the arbitration agreement merely because he was “likely” to have viewed the terms at some point because he played the game so much. The court also concluded that Huuuge had waived its request for discovery regarding actual knowledge, noting that Huuuge chose not to pursue such discovery at the outset, instead moved to compel arbitration, and only then sought discovery (and did so insufficiently in a footnote in its reply brief) after moving to compel arbitration.

Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., No. 18-36017 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2019).

Second Circuit Affirms District Court’s Order as It Addressed Party’s Argument on Appeal

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This case arises out of an underlying arbitration between First Capital Real Estate Investments LLC and SDDCO Brokerage Advisors LLC. First Capital appealed from an order of the district court denying First Capital’s petition to vacate an arbitration award, granting SDDCO’s petition to confirm the award, and granting SDDCO attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.

First Capital argued that the district court’s opinion and order failed to address First Capital’s argument that the award should be vacated because one of the arbitrators was not selected properly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the order of the district court. The Second Circuit explained that the district court did address First Capital’s argument in that it specifically stated in its opinion that “it had ‘considered all of the arguments raised by the parties’ and that as to any arguments ‘not specifically addressed, the arguments are either moot or without merit.'” Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that the district court opinion explained that “First Capital waived its objection to the arbitrator in question by failing to seek disqualification before the arbitration began.”

The Second Circuit also raised the issue of whether this was properly brought on appeal and noted that “if First Capital genuinely believed that the District Court overlooked one of its arguments, it did not attempt to bring the matter to the District Court’s attention through a motion for reconsideration.”

Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the district court did not improperly fail to address First Capital’s argument and affirmed the award.

First Capital Real Estate Invs., LLC v. SDDCO Brokerage Advisors, LLC, No. 19-670 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2019).