Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

€643 Million Arbitration Award Was Within Arbitration Panel’s Power to Award and Not a Result of Manifest Disregard of the Law

by

Precision Castparts Corp. purchased companies with manufacturing facilities in the United States and Germany for €800 million. After the sale closed, Precision discovered that the seller had “manipulated financial documents of the acquired companies to show that they were ‘high margin’ and ‘high cash flow’ businesses. In fact, the acquired companies were ‘functionally insolvent.'”

Precision instituted an arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, alleging claims for fraudulent inducement and breach of warranty. The tribunal found that the seller breached the contractual agreement and fraudulently induced Precision to purchase the acquired companies. The tribunal awarded damages of €643 million for the fraudulent inducement claim, and €100 million for the breach of contract claim, which was subject to a contractual cap of the same amount. The tribunal stated that the breach of contract award was subsumed within the €643 million fraudulent inducement award and was not in addition to that amount.

The Southern District of New York confirmed the award, finding that it was within the scope of the arbitrators’ power and that the arbitrators had not engaged in manifest disregard of the law. The seller argued that the tribunal disregarded two Delaware legal doctrines, the rehash doctrine and the bootstrapping doctrine, which are “intended to prevent taking contract breach and damages allegations and dressing them up as a fraud claim for the same damages where the contract and fraud allegations are materially identical.”

In rejecting the seller’s argument that the claim was subject to the rehashing or bootstrapping doctrines, the tribunal found that, although there was overlap between the two claims, the “fraudulent misconduct went well beyond breaches of the [contract].” “The broader and different nature of the conduct pleaded to support the fraudulent inducement claims, combined with the additional pleading of intent, which is an element of fraud but not contract breach, was enough to defeat [the seller’s] bootstrapping argument.”

With regard to the rehashing doctrine (which focuses on the claimed damages as opposed to the bootstrapping doctrine, which focuses on the claimed basis for liability), the court found that the rehashing doctrine did not apply because the contract breach claim was limited to €100 million by the contractual indemnity cap, but the fraudulent inducement claim was not subject to any cap. The court found that the tribunal’s determinations did not manifestly disregard the law but rather were well supported by the law. In addition, the issues were within the scope of the arbitrators’ powers as both claims arose from the acquisition that was the subject of the contract, and the contract provided for arbitration of any claim or controversy arising out of or related to it.

Precision Castparts Corp. v. Schulz Holding GmbH & Co. KG, No. 1:20-cv-03029 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2020).

Third Circuit Concludes Arbitration Agreement Is Unenforceable Under the Prospective Waiver Doctrine

by

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because it impermissibly limited claims to those available under tribal law at the expense of federal statutory claims. The court also concluded that the relevant clause could not be severed from the agreement.

Christina Williams and Michael Stermel entered into payday loan agreements that provided that they were subject to and governed by tribal law. The agreements also “limit[ed] disputes to tribal laws and to tribal courts.” The agreements also contained arbitration agreements.

Williams and Stermel sued in federal court on behalf of a putative class for violations of federal and Pennsylvania law, claiming that the agreements charged unlawfully high interest rates. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendants’ motion.

The Third Circuit affirmed. It explained “that arbitration is only appropriate so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum” and that “arbitration agreements that limit a party’s substantive claims to those under tribal law, and hence forbid federal claims from being brought, are unenforceable.”

Applying those principles to Williams’ and Stermel’s claims, the court evaluated the loan agreements and concluded that they impermissibly limited claims to tribal law claims. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the agreements were proper because they allowed borrowers to make claims under “such federal law as is applicable under the Indian Commerce Clause.” The court read the contract differently, as only allowing claims under tribal law, and also concluded that the restriction to the Indian Commerce Clause was improper because it precluded claims under other federal provisions, including a RICO claim asserted by the plaintiffs.

The Third Circuit also concluded that a severability clause did not save the balance of the arbitration agreement “because the prohibited waiver here [was] not severable.” The court concluded that clauses limiting claims to those available under tribal law was an essential term of the contract and that “the arbitration agreement’s clear reference to the exclusive application of tribal law is intertwined with the arbitration process and is central to it.” The court could not enforce arbitration without impermissibly rewriting the contract.

Williams v. Medley Opportunity Fund II, LP, No. 19-2058 (3d Cir. July 14, 2020).

Eighth Circuit Affirms Ruling That NLRB Retains Jurisdiction to Review Arbitration Decision on NRLA Charge, Not Court

by

An arbitrator resolved a dispute between the parties in favor of the union, deciding that Exide Technologies had violated the collective bargaining agreement and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by unilaterally changing its procedures for implementing the Family and Medical Leave Act without bargaining with the union. Exide sought to vacate the award and the union sought to confirm it. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas confirmed the arbitrator’s finding of a collective bargaining agreement violation but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the NLRA finding.

Procedurally, the union had filed a grievance, and then filed two unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB deferred pursuant to its policy that “the NLRB will conditionally dismiss a case when a set of facts may present not only an alleged violation of the NLRA but also an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement subject to arbitration. However, the NLRB retains limited jurisdiction to decide, among other things, whether an arbitrator has reached a result repugnant to the NLRA.” The parties proceeded to arbitration.

The district court confirmed the arbitrator’s collective bargaining agreement ruling, because it drew its essence from the parties’ agreement. However, the district court decided it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s NLRA ruling and that Exide should have moved the NLRB to reopen the deferred unfair labor practice charges so that the NLRB can review the arbitrator’s findings. The Eighth Circuit ruled that when a court possesses jurisdiction to decide a collective bargaining agreement issue under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, it is not preempted from exercising its jurisdiction by the fact that the employer’s conduct may also violate the NLRA. However, section 301 does not provide the court with original jurisdiction to decide whether Exide violated the NLRA, and the NLRA had retained jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator’s actions were appropriate.

Exide Technologies v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 700, No. 19-2317 (8th Cir. July 10, 2020).

First Circuit Vacates Order Compelling Arbitration Over Arbitrator Selection Clause

by

The First Circuit vacated an order compelling arbitration after finding that the arbitrator selection clause was unconscionable. The court nevertheless remanded the case to the district court to determine if the selection clause was severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement and whether arbitration could therefore proceed. The court also rejected several other challenges to the district court’s arbitration order, including claims based on a forum selection clause, a claim of waiver, and an argument that a statutory claim was not subject to arbitration.

Austin Trout, a boxer from New Mexico, sued the World Boxing Organization (WBO), which is based in Puerto Rico, in New Mexico state court for removing him from the rankings for a certain weight class. The WBO successfully removed the case and had it transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The WBO then moved to compel arbitration. While its motion was pending, Trout engaged in discovery, which prompted the WBO to do the same. The district court granted the WBO’s motion. It then denied Trout’s motion for reconsideration, which asserted for the first time that the WBO’s discovery precluded arbitration.

Trout appealed, and the First Circuit vacated and remanded.

The court first rejected Trout’s argument that the WBO’s championship regulations precluded arbitration because of a clause allowing claims to be brought in Puerto Rico state or federal court. The regulations contained two clauses. The first, a forum selection clause, provided that claims could only be maintained in Puerto Rico’s state or federal courts. The second, an arbitration clause, provided that “the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim” was an arbitration proceeding through the WBO’s Appeals and Grievance Committee. Trout claimed the former clause rendered the latter clause a nullity. The First Circuit disagreed, concluding that the former clause was more expansive than the latter and that the regulations read as a whole provided that only Puerto Rico courts could hear claims not subject to the arbitration clause.

The court also rejected Trout’s claim that the WBO waived its right to seek arbitration by (1) removing and transferring the case; and (2) engaging in discovery. The First Circuit explained that (1) the WBO did not waive its rights under the forum selection clause to select the forum to have its motion to compel decided; and (2) Trout’s discovery argument was improperly raised because it was first raised in a motion for reconsideration and it was meritless in any event because the WBO’s discovery “was not of a kind or of a scope that made it an abuse of discretion for a district court not to find an implicit waiver based on litigation conduct.”

The First Circuit then rejected Trout’s contention that his claim under the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act was not subject to arbitration. Although the court recognized that Congress can provide that certain statutory claims are not subject to arbitration, the act’s text did not “explicitly preclude[] arbitration” and Trout’s claim therefore failed.

The First Circuit agreed with Trout’s final claim that the WBO’s arbitrator selection provision was unconscionable under Puerto Rico contract law, however. That clause allowed the WBO’s president to designate three arbitrators. Even though the arbitrators could not be members of the WBO’s executive committee, they could, for example, be the president’s “direct aides.” Nevertheless, the First Circuit noted that the WBO’s regulations contained a savings clause that provided that “[i]f any of these Rules are determined to be unenforceable, the balance of these Rules shall remain in full force and effect.” Thus, the court left it to the district court to determine whether that clause allowed arbitration to proceed under a different selection process.

Trout v. Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc., No. 19-1068 (1st Cir. July 10, 2020).

SDNY Grants 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Application for Discovery in Dispute Involving Republic of Lithuania

by

The applicant sought to require documents and deposition testimony from an individual located in, and a corporation headquartered in, New York for use in an international arbitration initiated against the Republic of Lithuania arising out of Lithuania’s nationalization of a bank. The court found all three statutory requirements of the application were met, which provided the court with the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to order the discovery sought by the applicant: (1) the individual and corporation are located in New York; (2) the discovery is for use in an international arbitration; and (3) the application is made by the complaining party – and thus an “interested party” in the arbitration.

As to the court’s discretion, looking at the factors set forth in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), the court found the factors weighed in favor of granting the application: (1) the individual and corporation were not participants in the international arbitration; (2) there is no reason to doubt that the foreign tribunal would be receptive to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance because, while the tribunal did not address the question of admissibility of evidence obtained by the applicant, it did not preclude the applicant from pursuing this proceeding; (3) granting the applicant’s request would not allow it to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies, as the discovery is to be used in an international proceeding, with its own rules governing discovery and admissibility of evidence; and (4) the applicant’s request is not unduly intrusive or burdensome, as its requests “go to the heart of their case in the arbitration, and appear to be proportionate to their needs.” The individual and corporation were free to apply to the court for a protective order or for other relief as necessary to appropriately limit discovery consistent with federal law. The court permitted the applicant to issue subpoenas for documents in substantially the same form as those filed in support of its application.

In re Application of the Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for an Order Granting Leave to Obtain Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No. 1:19-mc-00401 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2020).