Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

English Court Rules on Request for Transfer of Assets in International Insolvency Case

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The English Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Australian liquidators of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (“HIH”). The question before the court was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a request under the Insolvency Act for directions to the liquidators in England to transfer assets collected by them to the liquidators in an Australian liquidation. The court considered whether such a transfer would interfere with the statutory scheme imposed on those assets by the Insolvency Act and whether or not the court should exercise its discretion in favor of such a transfer. The Court found that if the companies were in liquidation in England, the court would have jurisdiction to entertain a request under section 426 of the Insolvency Act for directions to the liquidators in England to transfer the assets collected by them to the liquidators in the principal liquidation, even though the result would interfere with the statutory scheme imposed on those assets by the Insolvency Act.

The Court held that if section 426 could authorize a transfer then the only question would be whether the court should exercise its discretion to do so. In exercising its discretion, the court had to consider the prejudice to the interests of some creditors of such a transfer. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that it would not direct a transfer of the English assets by the English provisional liquidators to the Australian liquidators because to do so would prejudice the interests of many of the creditors. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd & Ors v. McMahon, [2006] EWCA Civ 732 (June 9, 2006).

Court Grants Reinsurer’s Motion To Compel Arbitration

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Century Indemnity Company (“Century”) sued Clearwater Insurance Company (“Clearwater”) seeking payment under a facultative reinsurance certificate which contained an arbitration clause. Clearwater moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration.

A New York district court granted Clearwater’s motion finding that the parties’ dispute, which involved differences of opinion with respect to the interpretation of the contract provisions, clearly fell within the purview of the arbitration clause. Additionally, the court concluded that Clearwater did not waive its right to arbitrate its dispute by waiting five months after the commencement of the litigation to demand arbitration. To the contrary, the court considered the five month period a “relatively short period of time.” Century Indemnity Company v. Clearwater Insurance Company, Case No. 06-0424 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007).

Two Courts rule on Arbitrator Appointment Disputes

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After the parties had appointed arbitrators in a reinsurance dispute, and proposed several names to the party-appointed arbitrators for their consideration as umpire, a dispute arose as to whether the parties had agreed to extend the time to provide additional names for consideration as umpire. A motion was filed to resolve the issue. The Court determined that one of the persons already selected should be appointed due to his connections with the parties or counsel on both sides of the dispute. Glacier Reinsurance AG v. Odyssey American Reinsurance Corp., Case No. 07-583 (USDC D. Conn. June 27, 2007).

An unusual situation was presented in Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. GE Group Life Assur. Co., Case No. 06-103 (USDC N.D. Tex. June 12, 2007), which had one Plaintiff and multiple Defendants. The arbitration was governed by the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The agreement stated that each party would appoint an arbitrator. The AAA interpreted this to require that the three Defendants jointly agree upon and appoint one arbitrator. Some of the Defendants disagreed with this interpretation. The Court decided that since the parties had consented to the authority of the AAA, that the AAA’s interpretation of the agreement controlled. The Court appointed one arbitrator on behalf of all of the Defendants.

Court Rejects Argument That Custom Implies “Follow The Fortunes” Clause Into Reinsurance Contract

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This controversy involved a reinsurance dispute between ERC, a reinsurer, and Laurier, an insurer incorporated in Bermuda. ERC declined to indemnify Laurier for the settlement costs of a wrongful death suit. The present matter came before the court on the parties’ motions for reconsideration of a magistrate’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

ERC moved for summary judgment based on Laurier’s failure to provide prompt notice of the claim, and contended that the delay was unreasonable as a matter of law and that it suffered prejudice as a result. ERC also claimed entitlement to partial summary judgment because “follow the fortunes” clauses are not implied in reinsurance contracts.

The reinsurance contracts at issue did not contain a “follow-the fortunes” clause. Laurier argued that the absence of the clause constituted an ambiguity in the contract and that the Court should allow custom to imply the clause into the reinsurance contract. The court disagreed, concluding that it could not “go outside the laws of contract construction and outside the four corners of an unambiguous contract to add a clause that was not bargained for.” As such, the court granted partial summary judgment for ERC on the issue of the “follow the fortunes” clause.

The court denied summary judgment on the remaining issues, including allocation of loss, waiver of the late notice defense, and the timeliness of the notice, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to those issues. ERC v. Laurier Indemnity Co., Case No. 8:03-cv-1650 (M.D. Fla. June 25, 2007). [The choice of law dispute in this case was addressed in an earlier posting on this blog on June 16, 2006.]

England Court of Appeals Denies Request to Reopen Case Upon Allegation of Fraud, Asserting Lack of Jurisdiction

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This case involves claims by Lloyds names against Lloyds, alleging that they had been misled by misrepresentations by Lloyds of its syndicate auditing and operational controls into becoming members of Lloyds syndicates. The names later suffered serious financial losses with respect to asbestos claims. The names lost the case, but then discovered additional evidence which they contended demonstrated that the judge had been misled by Lloyds. The issue before the court was whether the England and Wales Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to reopen a case upon an allegation that the Court had been misled by a party’s evidence and by fraud. The applicants, who were names at the Society of Lloyds, asserted that under the jurisprudence of Taylor v. Lawrence, 2003 QB 528, the Court had authority to reopen the case.

The Court disagreed, noting that, unlike the present case, Taylor v. Lawrence concerned misconduct by a court in that the judge was said to have been biased. Taylor v. Lawrence did not contain authority for extending the recognition of jurisdiction to reopen an appeal on the grounds of bias to a case where the allegation was not that the court had misbehaved, but that the court had been misled by one of the parties. The court cited authority directly denying the existence of jurisdiction in the latter case, providing that the proper remedy was to bring a collateral action to set aside the judgment allegedly obtained by fraud. Jaffray v. The Society of Lloyds, [2007] EWCA Civ 586 (June 20, 2007).