Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

New York Court Finds the Term “Exhaustion” in Excess Policy Was Ambiguous, Rules That Full Limits of Underlying Insurance Need Not Be Paid for Excess Policy to Attach

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Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. sued OneBeacon Insurance Co. for breach of a facultative reinsurance certificate. Fireman’s Fund settled claims with its insured and allocated a portion of the settlement to a Fireman’s Fund excess policy reinsured by OneBeacon. OneBeacon denied Fireman’s Fund’s claim, arguing that its reinsurance obligations did not attach until all insurance underlying the Fireman’s Fund policy were exhausted in payment of the full limits of the underlying policies. The Fireman’s Fund policy stated that it applies “only after all underlying insurance has been exhausted,” but did not define “exhaustion.” The reinsurance certificate provided that OneBeacon’s liability shall follow Fireman’s Fund’s, that the terms of the certificate shall be subject “in all respects” to the Fireman’s Fund policy, except as stated in the certificate, and that “all claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by [Fireman’s Fund], shall be binding on [OneBeacon].”

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court agreed with Fireman’s Fund that the term “exhaustion” was ambiguous as used in the Fireman’s Fund policy, as the policy did not specify whether the full limits of underlying insurance must actually be paid before the Fireman’s Fund policy attaches. Applying Second Circuit precedent established in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928), the court held that once the underlying insurer settled and discharged the claims against the insured, Fireman’s Fund was within its right to treat the underlying limits as “exhausted,” even though the underlying insurer did not actually pay the full limits of its policy. In addition, based on the follow-the-fortunes and follow-the-settlements doctrines, the court found it was barred from second-guessing Fireman’s Fund’s post-settlement allocation decisions. The court therefore granted Fireman’s Fund’s motion for summary judgment and denied OneBeacon’s cross-motion.

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. OneBeacon Insurance Co., No. 1:14-cv-04718 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2020).

District Court Transfers Consideration of Motion to Quash Pursuant to Rule 45(f)

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An Ohio district court invoked Rule 45(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in response to a motion to quash by the Ohio Department of Insurance (ODI). The subpoena was issued in connection with a reinsurance-related litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. ODI had produced documents in response to the subpoena, but objected to further compliance. While noting it was questionable whether the information sought was relevant to the New York action in the first instance, the court found “exceptional circumstances” warranted transferring the issue to the SDNY pursuant to Rule 45(f). Aside from the SDNY being in a better position to assess relevancy, the court also noted that discovery in the New York action already closed, and the judge was reluctant to extend the discovery period. The court also found transferring under Rule 45(f) has been deemed appropriate under similar circumstances, such as where ruling on a discovery motion would disrupt the issuing court’s case schedule.

Ohio Dept. of Insurance V. RPM Mortgage, Inc., No. 2:20-mc-00043 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2020).

Second Circuit Declines to Vacate Foreign Arbitral Award Under New York Convention Absent Valid Reason

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In this case, plaintiff Rodrigo Pagaduan was injured while serving as a motorman on a Carnival Cruise Line ship. The Second Circuit previously affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s order compelling arbitration, and the case was ordered to be arbitrated in the Philippines. The Philippine labor arbiter’s decision granted Pagaduan $5,100 in “sickness allowance,” plus attorneys’ fees of 10% of the award, but declined to provide other relief. Pagaduan filed a motion seeking nonenforcement and/or vacatur of the award, which was denied by the district court.

Pagaduan appealed the district court’s denial, invoking the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), which provides that a court “shall confirm [a foreign arbitral] award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.” Pagaduan argued that the award should not be confirmed based on two grounds of the New York Convention.

First, Pagaduan argued that article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention applied, which allows for nonenforcement where “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.” Pagaduan argued that he had not been given proper notice of the proceedings and was unable to present his case. The Second Circuit rejected Pagaduan’s argument, finding that Pagaduan submitted multiple lengthy briefs, medical records, and affidavits before the labor arbiter, but chose to focus his arguments almost entirely on whether the arbiter had jurisdiction over the case, which left him limited room to argue the merits of his case (such as how the Jones Act or Philippine law would provide a greater recovery). Although Pagaduan pointed to errors in the arbitration proceedings, the Second Circuit found that none of them suggested that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time or manner. Therefore, the Second Circuit did not believe that the first ground applied.

Second, Pagaduan argued that article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention applied, which allows for nonenforcement where “[t]he recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Pagaduan argued that the lesser remedies available under Philippine law contravene U.S. policy to provide special solicitude to seamen under the Jones Act. The Second Circuit again rejected Pagaduan’s argument, finding the fact that the award was arguably smaller than Pagaduan might have recovered under the Jones Act was not so contrary to public policy as to “violate our most basic notions of morality and justice.” As federal public policy is not violated “merely because foreign law would provide a lesser or different remedy in a particular area of the law,” the Second Circuit declined to set aside the award and affirmed the order of the district court.

Pagaduan v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-3400 (2d Cir. Nov. 25, 2020).

Federal Court Refuses To Compel Arbitration or Appoint Arbitrators Where No Party Had Refused To Arbitrate and Both Parties Were Working on Selecting Arbitrators

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A federal court recently refused to compel arbitration after it concluded that there had been no refusal to arbitrate. The court also refused to appoint arbitrators for the parties.

Linda L. Allen claimed Horter Investment Management, LLC’s “representatives sold fraudulent and unregistered investments.” She claimed those claims were subject to arbitration pursuant to a clause in a client agreement that provided that “[c]lient and [a]dvisor both agree that all controversies which may arise between them concerning any transaction or construction, performance or breach of this agreement that cannot be settled, be submitted to binding arbitration.”

Allen and her fellow plaintiffs moved to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, for the appointment of arbitrators. Horter responded that the plaintiffs lacked standing because it had not refused to arbitrate and was participating in the selection of arbitrators.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Western Division) agreed with Horter. Although the plaintiffs “initiated arbitration with the AAA, but the AAA declined to administer the clams because of [Horter’s] past actions,” the court did “not find that [Horter’s] acts amount to an unequivocal refusal to arbitrate. Instead, Defendant has expressly acknowledged the agreement to arbitrate. The parties have been working together in the Bruns case and this case to reach an agreement regarding the selection of arbitrators. The Court notes that some of the delay in this process is attributable to Plaintiffs’ change in position regarding consolidated arbitration.” The court also declined to appoint arbitrators because “[b]oth parties are amenable to private arbitration and the names of specific arbitrators have been exchanged.”

Linda L. Allen, et al. v. Horter Investment Management, LLC (S.D. Oh. Sept. 30 2020).

Southern District of New York Rejects Reinsurer’s Claim that Exhaustion Provision Was Not Met; Concludes Indemnification Was Required Under Follow-the-Settlement Clause

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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected a reinsurer’s denial of a claim. The court disagreed with the reinsurer’s position than exhaustion language had not been satisfied, and found the exhaustion language ambiguous and concluded that payment was required under a “follow-the-settlement” clause in the reinsurance certificate.

Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company issued three excess liability policies to Asarco. The third policy (“Policy 3”) provided “coverage of $20 million for losses in excess of $75 million in excess of a $3 million self-insured retention for the period March 15, 1983 to March 15, 1984.”

General Accident Insurance Company reinsured Policy 3 under a facultative reinsurance contract in which it assumed “15% . . . of the risk assumed in Policy 3.”  OneBeacon Insurance Company subsequently became the successor-in-interest to General Accident.

Asarco filed an action against Fireman’s seeking coverage for asbestos exposure. Fireman’s estimated its exposure at $50.3 million. It settled with Asarco for $35 million and allocated a portion of that settlement to Policy 3 in accordance with its exposure analysis.

Fireman’s then billed OneBeacon pursuant to the reinsurance agreement. OneBeacon denied Fireman’s claim, asserting that the policies underlying Policy 3 had not been exhausted.

The court granted summary judgment to Fireman’s. In short, the court explained that the reinsurance certificate contained a “follow-the-settlements” provision that required OneBeacon to make payments in accordance with Fireman’s good-faith settlement, which was reasonable. That clause was not trumped by any exhaustion clause in Fireman’s policies because the term exhaustion was ambiguous within the meaning of Fireman’s policies.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., No. 14-civ-4718 (PGG) (Oct. 19, 2020).