Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

FIRST CIRCUIT TO DISTRICT COURT: CLARIFY YOUR POSITION ON HOW THE ARBITRATION SHOULD PROCEED

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In this dispute, the First Circuit previously reversed the confirmation of an arbitration award concluding that the award was in manifest disregard of law and remanded the case for the entry of an order vacating the award. Without addressing whether the arbitration panel should be reconstituted or not, the district court entered an order vacating the award and remanding the matter to FINRA. The Defendants argued against the remand to FINRA because the First Circuit did not specify such a remand. Treating the Defendants’ motion as a Rule 60(b) motion, the Plaintiffs argued that the motion did not demonstrate entitlement to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)’s requirements. The district court denied the Defendants’ motion in a brief electronic order “[e]ssentially for the reasons stated in [the Plaintiffs’] Opposition.” The Defendants appealed both the district court’s remand order and electronic order denying the Rule 60(b) motion.

Before addressing the Appellants’ arguments, the First Circuit addressed the Appellees’ request to recall the earlier mandate in light of Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Denying this request, the First Circuit noted that it had not yet determined whether Hall Street could be reconciled with the circuit’s manifest disregard case law and found that the court was not faced with such circumstances to warrant a recall of the mandate. In response to the Appellants’ argument that the remand order contravened the mandate, the First Circuit disagreed, stating that the district court was not limited to perform only those actions specifically listed in the mandate and finding that the mandate did not explicitly or implicitly prohibit the district court from remanding the matter to FINRA. The First Circuit then noted that the Appellants’ Rule 60(b) argument was mostly a reformulation of their argument against the remand order and affirmed the district court’s remand order. However, the First Circuit did address an issue with the brief electronic order by remanding the matter to the district court so that the court, after considering the parties’ arguments, could specify whether: (1) the original panel should be reconstituted; (2) a new panel should be constituted; or (3) FINRA should rule on this issue in the first instance, in accordance with FINRA’s practices and procedures. Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, No. 09-1356 (1st Cir. Apr. 1, 2010).
This post written by Dan Crisp.

A HORSE RACE TO JUDGMENT

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Continental Casualty Corporation sued its reinsurer, AXA Global Risks (UK) Ltd., in Missouri federal court seeking, among other things, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent AXA from proceeding with a similar action AXA filed against Continental in a British court. The parties dispute AXA’s obligation to reinsure a portion of a $23,072,979 judgment against Continental in a coverage action between Continental and its insured, a construction company, under a certain reinsurance slip between Continental and AXA. In response, AXA moved to dismiss or stay the Missouri action in favor of the British lawsuit, which was filed approximately six weeks earlier than Continental’s suit. The Court rejected both parties’ arguments, refusing to enjoin prosecution of the British action, and refusing to stay or dismiss the case on its own docket. The court stated, citing Third Circuit precedent, that “when related cases are before two different sovereigns, the appropriate procedure is to permit both jurisdictions to proceed, with any decision of one becoming res judicata on the other.” Continental Cas. Corp. v. AXA Global Risks (UK) Ltd., Case No 09-00335 (USDC W.D. Mo. April 2, 2010).

This post written by John Pitblado.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: COVERED UNDER REINSURANCE POLICY; POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST: NOT SUBJECT TO INDEMNIFICATION

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OHIC Insurance sued to recover payment of statutory interest and legal expenses incurred in a 1998 Wisconsin medical malpractice lawsuit pursuant to a clause in a reinsurance agreement with ERC indemnifying OHIC for certain “losses” and “claim expenses.” Both parties moved for summary judgment, leaving the Court to decide two primary issues: (1) whether the “prejudgment” interest imposed pursuant to a Wisconsin statute is covered by the reinsurance agreement; and (2) whether a portion of the “postjudgment” interest imposed by statute and the legal expenses incurred by OHIC in defending the malpractice suit are covered by the reinsurance agreement.

Resolving question 1, the Court concluded that OHIC’s payment of the prejudgment interest constituted a “loss” under the reinsurance agreement. Thus, ERC was obligated to reimburse OHIC as to this loss. Conversely, the Court determined that OHIC was not entitled to indemnification for a portion of the legal expenses and postjudgment interest incurred in defending the malpractice suit. In addition to these determinations, the Court also granted ERC’s request to exclude OHIC’s expert’s opinion and granted ERC’s motion to file sur-reply briefs. OHIC Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., Case No. 08-cv-93 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010).

This post written by John Black.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS LAWSUIT ALLEGING INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE FRAUD

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The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit alleging that the Republic of Indonesia and its state-owned social security insurer, P.T. Jamsostek, negligently supervised Jamsostek employees who perpetrated an international commercial reinsurance fraud scheme against plaintiff Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Company. Indonesia and Jamsostek moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, arguing the defendants were not engaged in “commercial activity” under FSIA. FSIA abrogates sovereign immunity where a foreign state has engaged in commercial activity; a foreign state engages in commercial activity when it acts not as a regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it. In ruling on the motion, the district court found, and the Second Circuit later agreed, that Jamsostek does not sell insurance to workers or employers “in any traditional sense,” and does not compete in the marketplace like a private insurer. Rather, as the default health insurer under Indonesia’s national social security program, Jamsostek provides a “floor” for health insurance, and ensures that certain Indonesian employers comply with the governmental mandate that they provide basic health insurance coverage to their workers. Thus, FSIA barred the suit. Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Co. v. P.T. Jamsostek (Persero), Case No. 08-2666 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 2010).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO CONFIRMS FINRA ARBITRATION AWARD

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Following a FINRA arbitration award in favor of defendant Carlos Reisen, plaintiff J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, LLC (“Hilliard Lyons”) filed a complaint (treated by the court as a motion to vacate) before the US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking to vacate the award. Reisen filed a cross motion to confirm the award and to enter judgment in his favor. The Court, applying the Sixth Circuit’s “manifest disregard of the law” test, confirmed the arbitration panel’s determination that Hilliard Lyons had made defamatory statements in its Form U5/Uniform Termination Notice. The Court concluded that it could not vacate the award on the basis that the panel had acted recklessly, as claimed by Hilliard Lyons. Likewise, the Court confirmed the award of attorneys fees and the post-award interest, finding that the panel did not act in manifest disregard of the law because there were statutory bases for the decisions. Hilliard Lyons has since filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Hilliard v. Reisen, Case No. 09-cv-535 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2010, Mar. 5, 2010).

This post written by John Black.