New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields
Service of Suit provisions are standard in reinsurance agreements, but broad provisions viewed by many as “standard” may create unintended consequences. This issue is discussed by Rollie Goss in a Treaty Tip titled The Service of Suit Provision.
This post written by Rollie Goss.
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Basulto v. Hialeah Automotive, Case No. SC09-2358 (Fla. March 20, 2014) (reversing intermediate appellate court’s ruling compelling arbitration on monetary relief claims; intermediate court failed to limit its review to whether a valid arbitration agreement existed; no valid agreement due to substantive and procedural unconscionability);
Crawford Professional Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., Case No. 12-60922 (5th Cir. April 4, 2014) (affirming order compelling arbitration, notwithstanding argument by non-signatories that they were not subject to the arbitration clause; state law may allow an arbitration contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through state-contract-law theories, including equitable estoppel);
Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC, Case No. B244772 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2014) (reversing order denying motion to compel arbitration; arbitration agreement was not illusory, nor unenforceable for procedural unconscionability merely because it was an adhesion contract; arbitration agreement was not substantively unconscionable in that it had bi-lateral application, it did not overly limit discovery, and arbitration rules and procedures were not unfair);
Caplin Enterprises, Inc. v. Arrington, Case No. 2011-CT-01332-SCT (Miss. May 8, 2014) (reversing intermediate appellate court’s ruling that certain arbitration agreements were enforceable; all agreements were contracts of adhesion and so one-sided in their terms as to meet the standard for substantive unconscionability);
Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., Case No. A136675 (Cal. Ct. App. May 15, 2014) (reversing denial of petition to compel arbitration based on trial court’s finding of unconscionability; trial court lacked authority to rule on enforceability of the arbitration agreement where the parties delegated such authority to the arbitrator).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and a federal district court in Michigan have each issued opinions on motions to compel arbitration. In the Michigan opinion, the court granted a motion for summary judgment, in favor of the defendant, Consolidated Insurance Company, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff, the representative of the decedent’s estate, sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits under a commercial vehicle policy issued to decedent’s employer. Prior negotiations between the parties resulted in a written agreement to arbitrate the matter. Before arbitration commenced, the defendants canceled the process, arguing that the issue was not arbitral. The defendant’s cancellation was deemed valid based on intervening caselaw holding that coverage did not extend to individuals injured while outside a vehicle. Since the decedent was outside of his truck at the time he was killed, the issue of coverage could not be arbitrated. Johnston v. Indiana Insurance Co., Case No. 13-10797 (USDC E.D. Mich. Feb 11, 2014).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s denial to compel arbitration, finding that since none of the defendant board members signed an agreement with an arbitration clause, they could not be compelled to arbitrate. The court further held that the plaintiff’s alternative legal theories to compel arbitration were forfeited or waived. Genberg v. Porter, No. 13-1140 (10th Cir. May 12, 2014).
This post written by Rollie Goss.
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The Eleventh Circuit recently limited the authority by which an aggrieved party can obtain judicial review of arbitration awards outside of the four grounds enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, ruling that an insurance policy alone could not serve as “an independent basis for the enforcement of an arbitration award.” The plaintiff argued that its right to expanded judicial review was based on the policy’s express language that “[a]ny decision rendered in arbitration is binding on you and us unless judicial review is sought…you and we have the right to judicial review of any decision rendered in arbitration.” The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that if parties wish to allow for more avenues to judicial review, they must explicitly designate the “state statutory or common law alternatives to the FAA in their arbitration agreements.” Otherwise, the contract alone will not suffice as the sole basis for judicial review when the FAA itself does not apply. Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., No. 13-11896 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).
This post written by Rollie Goss.
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In a letter dated May 19, 2014, the Captive Insurance Companies Association (CICA) urged the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to reject proposed revisions to the definition of “multi-state reinsurer” in the Part A and Part B preambles of the standards for state accreditation. According to the CICA, the proposed new definition is overly broad and would bring a new regulatory burden for numerous alternative risk structures that have nothing to do with problem that is sought to be addressed by the change, i.e., the utilization of special purpose vehicles and captives as reinsurance mechanisms by life and annuity insurers regarding excess reserves. The CICA argues that the proposed definition would subject most captive reinsurers (including reinsurers in the property/casualty industry) to NAIC accreditation standards, and that there is no evidence that captives need this additional regulatory burden. The CICA argues that if the NAIC is concerned with the life and annuity reinsurance provided by the captive subsidiaries of large commercial insurers that may present “systemic risk” to the global financial system, then the definition should be properly tailored so as to avoid application for the thousands of captives that are not in this category.
Previously, the preamble had excluded “insurers that are licensed, accredited or operating in only their state of domicile but assuming business from insurers writing that business that is directly written in a different state.” The proposed revised definition removes that exclusion, defining a multi-state reinsurer as “an insurer assuming business that is directly written in more than one state and/or in any state other than its state of domicile. This includes but is not limited to captive insurers, special purpose vehicles and other entities assuming business.”
This post written by Catherine Acree.
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