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NAIC CONSIDERS PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT EXPAND THE MARKET FOR CAT BONDS AMONG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES

March 10, 2015 by Carlton Fields

At the November 17, 2014 meeting of the Valuation of Securities Task Force of the NAIC’s Financial Condition (E) Committee, a proposal was received from the North American CRO [Chief Risk Officers] Council to modify the capital treatment for catastrophe bonds held by life insurance companies, to encourage life insurance companies to purchase cat bonds.  A slide presentation accompanied the proposal.  The proposal contended that a revised RBC treatment for cat bonds might have the following benefits:

  • property and casualty insurers would benefit from a larger and more stable source of capital, thereby reducing their cost of capital;
  • life insurers would benefit from improved risk-adjusted asset returns as natural catastrophe risk and systemic investment risk are largely uncorrelated and, as a result, can provide a diversification benefit;
  • a lower cost of capital for property and casualty insurers could improve the availability and affordability of insurance products, thereby benefiting property and casualty customers;
  • life insurance customers would benefit from improved risk-adjusted returns; and
  • regulators’ solvency concerns would diminish as greater diversification is introduced into the system.

The task force exposed this proposal for comment for a sixty day period expiring January 16, 2015.  It is not clear whether the Task Force will revisit this proposal at its March meeting.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Alternative Risk Transfers, Reinsurance Regulation, Week's Best Posts

SEVENTH CIRCUIT DENIES REHEARING IN FAILED ATTEMPT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO REQUIRE PRE-PLEADING SECURITY FROM URUGUAY STATE-OWNED REINSURER

March 9, 2015 by Carlton Fields

On November 18, 2014, we reported on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, in which Pine Top claimed that Banco de Seguros owed it $2,352,464.08 under certain reinsurance contracts.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Pine Top’s motion to compel arbitration, agreeing that Pine Top’s assigned rights under the reinsurance contracts were limited to the collections of certain debts and did not include the right to arbitrate.  The Seventh Circuit also had affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike Banco Seguros’s pleading for failure to post security, holding that such pre-judgment security is a form of attachment that violates the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  On December 22, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied Pine Top’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, as no judge requested a vote on the petition, and the judges on the prior panel voted to deny rehearing.  Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, No. 13–1364 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues, Reinsurance Claims, Reorganization and Liquidation, Week's Best Posts

FIRST CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES UBERRIMAE FIDEI IN ADMIRALTY CONTEXT

March 5, 2015 by Carlton Fields

The First Circuit recently examined, in the admiralty context, the doctrine of uberrimae fidei, a legal doctrine requiring that all parties to an insurance contract deal in good faith and fully disclose all material facts. The case involved a maritime insurance policy in which the insured failed to disclose that its dry dock had substantial, preexisting damage and failed to disclose the dry dock’s actual value. When the insured later made a claim and the facts were revealed, the insurer denied the claim. In subsequent coverage litigation, the district court decided in favor of the insurer, finding that the insurance policy was void ab initio because the insured failed to disclose the true value of the dry dock, its level of deterioration, and other material facts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that uberrimae fidei is an established admiralty rule within the first circuit. The First Circuit, however, modified the district court’s ruling to reflect that the contract was merely voidable, not void ab initio.

Catlin at Lloyd’s v. San Juan Towing & Marine, No. 13-2491, 2015 WL 500744 (1st Cir. Feb. 6, 2015).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Contract Interpretation, Reinsurance Avoidance

FEDERAL OFFICE OF INSURANCE REQUESTS COMMENTS FOR TRIA CERTIFICATION STUDY

March 4, 2015 by Carlton Fields

Section 107 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 (the “Reauthorization Act”) requires the Secretary of the Treasury (“Secretary”) to conduct a study of the certification process required under in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, as amended (“TRIA”) and submit a report of the study results to Congress. To assist the Secretary in conducting the study and formulating the report, the Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) issued a request for public comment, on the following items:

  • The establishment of a reasonable timeline by which the Secretary must make an accurate determination on whether to certify an act as an act of terrorism;
  • The impact that the length of any timeline proposed to be established may have on the insurance industry, policyholders, consumers, and taxpayers as a whole;
  • The factors the Secretary would evaluate and monitor during the certification process, including the ability of the Secretary to obtain the required information regarding the amount of projected and incurred losses resulting from an act which the Secretary would need in determining whether to certify the act as an act of terrorism;
  • The appropriateness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the consultation process required under section 102(1)(A) of TRIA and any recommendations on changes to the consultation process;
  • The ability of the Secretary to provide guidance and updates to the public regarding any act that may reasonably be certified as an act of terrorism;
  • The manner and extent to which the certification timeline and the Secretary’s ability to make an accurate determination on whether to certify an act as an act of terrorism may be influenced by domestic or international law enforcement processes; and,
  • The implications for insurers or policyholders if one or more events are certified as acts of terrorism but the aggregate, calendar-year insured losses do not exceed the amount required for Treasury to make payments for insured losses.

The written comments should also include: 1) the data or rationale, including examples, supporting any opinions or conclusions; 2) approaches and options respecting improvement of the certification process, if any; and, 3) any specific legislative, administrative, or regulatory proposals for carrying out such approaches or options.
Comments are due on or before March 6, 2015 and may be submitted electronically through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov.

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation

THIRD CIRCUIT EVALUATES THE DEFINITION OF “MATERIALITY” IN RESCISSION CLAIMS

March 3, 2015 by Carlton Fields

In a case on which we previously reported, the Third Circuit recently evaluated the legal standard for determining materiality in a claim for rescission of an insurance contract.  The case involved a dispute between two reinsurers in which a federal court awarded the plaintiff $5.6 million based on breaches of the parties’ retrocession agreements.  The district court also entered summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the rescission counterclaim.  The Third Circuit affirmed, ruling that the information plaintiff withheld was not material so as to amount to a breach of the duty of utmost good faith, approving the following definition of materiality under New York law: “A fact is material . . . if, had it been revealed, the insurer or reinsurer would either have not issued the policy or would have only at a higher premium.”  The Third Circuit rejected the other party’s broader definition of materiality – that information is material if it “likely” would have influenced the decision.

Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 14-2045 (3rd Cir. Feb. 3, 2015)

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Contract Interpretation, Reinsurance Avoidance, Reinsurance Claims, Week's Best Posts

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