Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

MASSACHUSETTS COURT OF APPEALS MAINTAINS “SEVERELY LIMITED” DE NOVO REVIEW OF REINSURANCE-RELATED ARBITRATION AWARD

by

Collective defendants, Nationwide, appealed from a Massachusetts superior court judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of collective plaintiffs, Liberty Mutual. The underlying dispute involved a 1972 reinsurance treaty wherein Nationwide, the reinsurer, indemnified Liberty Mutual, the cedant, for a portion of the losses paid on Liberty Mutual’s general liability and worker’s compensation policies. At issue was a provision in the treaty granting Nationwide a right of access to Liberty Mutual’s documents concerning the covered policies. The dispute arose when Liberty Mutual refused to produce documents it claimed were protected by attorney-client and work product privileges. At arbitration, the panel dismissed Nationwide’s argument that it was entitled to any and all documents relating to the covered policies, reasoning that the right of access provision excluded privileged documents. Liberty Mutual thereafter submitted an application to the superior court to confirm the award and Nationwide submitted a cross-application to vacate the access to records portion of the judgment.

Despite a de novo review, the court’s discretion was limited as it was bound by the arbitrators’ findings and legal conclusions, even if they appeared erroneous, inconsistent, or unsupported by the record. Through this lens, the court of appeals upheld the arbitrators’ decision, dismissing Nationwide’s argument that the arbitrators exceeded their powers in interpreting the access to records provision in the reinsurance treaty. The appellate court reasoned that where the parties do not dispute the scope of the arbitrators’ powers and where the claimed error is in the interpretation of the terms of the parties’ underlying contract and not in the agreement to arbitrate in the first place, it must apply a severely limited review of arbitration awards. Liberty Mutual v. Nationwide, No. 14-1129 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

See our disclaimer.

DELAWARE ENACTS THE “DELAWARE RAPID ARBITRATION ACT”

by

The purpose of the Act is to provide Delaware businesses with the ability to resolve disputes within 120 days in a “cost-effective, and efficient manner, through voluntary arbitration conducted by expert arbitrators.” The Act streamlines the process for seeking court assistance with appointing arbitrators, if necessary, which may occur only in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Act gives the arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction to determine the scope of the arbitration and to determine the type of relief, “including any legal or equitable remedy appropriate in the sole judgment of the arbitrator.” Only one direct challenge to the Delaware Supreme Court is authorized, and only the standards of the FAA are utilized on appeal. Among other limiting measures, the Act may not be used in controversies between businesses and consumers, in controversies in which parties have not expressly consented in writing to arbitration, and in controversies in which choice of Delaware law has not been expressly selected. To ensure rapid resolution of arbitrations, the Act contains a schedule for the reduction of the arbitrator’s fees depending upon the lateness of the award: (1) between 0 to 30 days late, the reduction is 25%; (2) between 30 to 60 days late, the reduction is 75%; and (3) greater than 60 days late, the reduction is 100%. While the arbitrator is required to issue a written award, there is no requirement that it be a reasoned award. Thus, the award can be as simple as “plaintiff wins.” Delaware House Bill No. 49 (eff. May 4, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

See our disclaimer.

LMRA ARBITRATION AWARD UPHELD BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT

by

The Third Circuit affirmed an arbitration award under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) as the decision reached by the arbitrator comported with the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the parties. Washington Hospital (“WH”) employed Deborah Holden, an LPN, before terminating her employment pursuant to the CBA’s absenteeism policy. Holden’s union filed a grievance protesting Holden’s discharge. An arbitrator decided that the termination was improper and reinstated Holden, because WH failed to follow contractually agreed upon discipline procedures. The arbitrator made this decision despite noting that Holden’s ten absences in a 12-month time period would be sufficient grounds on which to terminate an employee. WH sought to vacate the award, but the district court upheld the award.

On appeal, WH argued that the court abused its discretion by denying WH’s request for discovery based on remarks by Holden that put her honesty at issue. However, the court found that Holden’s testimony was not fraudulent, and further, that Holden’s testimony was “immaterial” to the arbitration decision. Instead, the court upheld the district court’s decision because WH did not follow the CBA’s procedures, specifically—WH failed to give two warning notices before terminating Holden. Washington Hosp. v. SEIU Health Care Inc. Penn., Case No. 14-3951 (3d Cir. June 12, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

DRAFT AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING PAYMENT OF CONTRACTUAL DEPOSIT

by

The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that LoRoad, LLC (“LoRoad”) failed to accept an agreement with Global Expedition Vehicles, L.L.C. (“Global”) that would allow LoRoad to enforce the arbitration contained within.

LoRoad negotiated with Global to build a custom expedition vehicle. The terms of the “Assembly Agreement” called for a nonrefundable $120,000 deposit. During the exchange of agreement drafts, LoRoad sent Global $120,000 along with a modified—allegedly signed—agreement shortly thereafter. As the relationship soured, Global stopped work on the expedition vehicle. LoRoad alleged that it did not have a final set of documents, as prior draft exchanges were simply contract negotiations. LoRoad sought to compel arbitration to handle the dispute per the agreement, asserting that the arbitration provision was enforceable because the parties exhibited the requisite intent to form a binding contract. In addition, LoRoad alleged that the arbitration provision was enforceable because that particular provision remained the same throughout multiple agreement draft iterations. The court focused on LoRoad’s intent. LoRoad’s only conduct to indicate an agreement was its payment of $120,000. However, it also argued that this sum was only a “good faith deposit” and not a payment per the agreement. Further, LoRoad sent emails to Global indicating that the agreement was “not yet executed.” Without an executed agreement or a free-standing agreement to arbitrate, arbitration could not be compelled. LoRoad, LLC v. Expedition Vehicles, LLC, Case No. 14-2636 (8th Cir. June 1, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.

See our disclaimer.

FEDERAL COURT DISMISSES PUTATIVE CLASS ACTION ACCUSING LIFE INSURER OF FAILING TO DISCLOSE “SHADOW INSURANCE”

by

Plaintiffs alleged that AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company violated New York insurance law prohibiting misrepresentations by insurers of their financial condition, because AXA had not disclosed “shadow transactions” in its filings with the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”). NYDFS defines “shadow insurance” as the use of captive reinsurers in foreign jurisdictions with lower reserve requirements to do an “end-run around higher reserve requirements.” Plaintiffs contended that AXA was not as financially sound as it had represented because in failing to disclose “shadow transactions,” AXA received higher ratings from rating agencies and was able to post fewer reserves thus selling a product that had undisclosed risks and created an “increased risk to the insurance system as a whole. . . .”

The court denied class certification and granted AXA’s motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs did not allege that their premiums were higher because of the alleged “shadow transactions” nor that they had relied upon AXA’s representations in filings with the NYDFS. Violation of rights created by state law (as opposed to federal law), standing alone, does not allege an “injury” sufficient to establish Article III standing. Plaintiffs needed to have established that at least one of them had suffered an “invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The Court also explained that since plaintiffs never alleged that they would not have purchased the policies had the disclosures been made or that they had suffered any financial harm because of the misrepresentations, the alleged risk of harm was only in the future and was a very tenuous risk at that. Jonathan Ross v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., Case No. 14-CV-2904 (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

See our disclaimer.