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NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS FINDS MCCARRAN FERGUSON ACT DOES NOT REVERSE PREEMPT THE FAA WITH RESPECT TO CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE § 11658

March 15, 2016 by John Pitblado

In an action to compel arbitration under payment agreements entered into between National Union and its insured, the New York Court of Appeals held the determination of arbitrability was not barred by the McCarran Ferguson Act, and would be decided by an arbitration panel, despite the fact National Union did not file copies of its workers’ compensation insurance policies in accordance with California Insurance Code § 11658. § 11658 requires workers’ compensation insurers to file copies of policies prior to issuance and at the time the payment agreements at issue were entered into. California law did not mandate a specific form or content of arbitration clauses, nor otherwise restrict their use. The law was later amended, requiring arbitration provisions in workers’ compensation policies or endorsements be disclosed to each potential insured, and failure to do so resulted in a default to California as the choice of law and forum (see § 11658.5).

Since California law did not prohibit arbitration in the insurance context, no law would be “invalidated, superceded or impaired” by application of the FAA, and thus the McCarran Ferguson Act does not reverse preempt the FAA with respect to § 11658. It was therefore up to the arbitrators – not the Court – to determine the question of whether the payment agreements’ arbitration provisions, and the agreements themselves, are enforceable under California law, despite the fact they were not filed in accordance with § 11658. The parties were required to arbitrate as they had clearly delegated the question of arbitrability and enforceability of the arbitration clauses to the arbitrators, and pursuant to the FAA, such arbitration provisions should be enforced as written.

Monarch Consulting, Inc., et al. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., et al., Case No. 8 (N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

UPDATE ON COVERED AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

March 14, 2016 by John Pitblado

As we previously reported, in November 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Trade Representative gave notice to Congress to initiate discussions with the European Union to enter into a Covered Agreement essentially addressing two major issues: (1) the equivalence of the U.S. insurance and reinsurance regulatory regime in the context of the EU’s Solvency II initiative; and (2) credit for reinsurance collateral requirements. Covered Agreements were introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act as a vehicle for limited federal intrusion into the regulation of the business of insurance and reinsurance by the states. We described the Covered Agreement process in a Special Focus article. On February 23, 2016, the United States and the European Union released a joint statement regarding the status of negotiations and advised that representatives met in Brussels on February 18-19, 2016, and that both sides agreed to move forward efficiently in pursuit of agreement and expressed their hope that such future Covered Agreement will improve regulatory and supervisory treatment for insurers and reinsurers operating on both sides of the Atlantic. The Joint Statement can be found here.

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation, Week's Best Posts

NEW HAMPSHIRE COURT APPROVES COMMUTATIONS CONCERNING THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY

March 10, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In various posts, the latest of which was September 2, 2015, Reinsurance Focus has covered developments in the liquidation of The Home Insurance Company. Recently, the liquidation court entered orders approving three commutations between Home and its counterparties to certain reinsurance contracts concerning liabilities arising under those agreements – one involving Westport Insurance Corporation, the second for R&Q Reinsurance Company, and the third involving CX Reinsurance Company Limited. Here are the motions to approve the commutation agreements for Westport Insurance Corporation, R&Q Reinsurance Company, and CX Reinsurance Company Limited.

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reorganization and Liquidation

MISSISSIPPI FEDERAL COURT DECISION SHOWS DEGREE OF BURDEN TO CHALLENGE ARBITRATION AWARD

March 9, 2016 by Carlton Fields

A decision of a Mississippi federal district court illustrates the weighty burden that a party must carry in order to vacate an arbitration award. The dispute was over an executive terminated from a company and whether his termination was with or without cause. The arbitrator found that it was done without cause and awarded the executive nearly $600,000. The terminating company moved to vacate based on seven arguments, including that the arbitrator shifted the burden from the employee to the company, that the arbitrator awarded a lump-sum damage award not contemplated by the agreement, that the arbitrator erred in awarding pre- and post-judgment interest, and that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding benefits in excess of the amounts sought in the filings. The terminated employee cross-moved for sanctions.

The court suggested that, although the terminating company may have had a point in its argument, the arbitrator miscalculated the damages, “the arbitration provision did not limit the arbitrator’s authority with respect to damages, other than to forbid him from awarding punitive damages.” It may have been that the arbitrator misconstrued the contract or the law, but the terminating company did not meet its burden of showing an unambiguous and undisputed mistake of fact. The court also analyzed whether sanctions were warranted, finding no evidence of bad faith. However, the court cautioned, “the bases for vacating an arbitration award are narrowly prescribed and motions to vacate should therefore be employed sparingly.” U-Save Auto Rental of America, Inc. v. Barton, Case No. 3:15-cv-00348 (USDC S.D. Miss. Feb. 12, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

FEDERAL COURT FINDS THAT THE MCCARRAN FERGUSON ACT BARS PLAINTIFF’S RICO CLAIMS ARISING FROM CERTAIN REINSURANCE TRANSACTIONS

March 8, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In a putative class action seeking damages for alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) arising from certain reinsurance transactions, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, granting defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Dale Ludwick and others purchased annuities from F&G Life Insurance Company, which was acquired by Harbinger Group, Inc. Plaintiff brought suit alleging that F&G, Harbinger and Harbinger’s chairman and CEO engineered a fraudulent accounting scheme to hide F&G’s liabilities, artificially inflate its reported assets, and create a false appearance of capital adequacy through reinsurance transactions with certain entities, including defendants Raven Reinsurance Company and Front Street Re (Cayman), Ltd, in violation of RICO.

Defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that plaintiff’s RICO claims impermissibly interfered with state statutory and regulatory insurance schemes, and were thus barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court granted defendants’ motion, finding that: (a) RICO does not specifically relate to the business of insurance, thus satisfying this prong of McCarran-Ferguson’s criteria; (b) the states relevant to the transactions at issue – Missouri and Iowa – have statutory schemes which regulate the business of insurance and governed said transactions; and (c) the application of RICO to the subject claims would intrude upon the insurance regulatory schemes in those states, and thus “invalidate, impair or supersede” the schemes in violation of McCarran-Ferguson. Moreover, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that its common law claims negated the effect of McCarran-Ferguson and that such claims were not barred by the statute, as the transactions at issue were subject to the states’ insurance codes. Ludwick v. Harbinger Group, Inc., No. 15-cv-00011 (USDC W.D.MO. Feb. 12, 2016).

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Accounting for Reinsurance, Jurisdiction Issues, Reinsurance Regulation, Week's Best Posts

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