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FIFTH CIRCUIT FINDS PAYDAY LENDER’S SUBMISSION OF FALSE WORTHLESS CHECK AFFIDAVITS EQUATES TO WAIVER OF ARBITRATION

June 14, 2017 by Rob DiUbaldo

Plaintiffs-Appellees brought suit against short-term lender PLS Financial Services, Inc., and PLS Loan Store of Texas, Inc. (collectively “PLS”), alleging the following scheme. First, as part of the application process, PLS would require customers to provide a blank or post-dated check for the amount borrowed plus fees. PLS assured its customers that the checks would only be used to verify checking accounts and would not be cashed. However, PLS did cash the checks of customers who defaulted, and, if the check bounced, PLS would submit worthless check affidavits to the local district attorney. As a consequence, those customers were notified that they would face criminal charges if they did not pay PLS for the outstanding balance.

Plaintiffs alleged that they fell victim to this scheme and asserted several causes of action against PLS, including malicious prosecution, fraud, and related violations of Texas’s Financial Code. PLS moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The District Court for the Western District of Texas denied PLS’s motion to dismiss, finding that PLS had waived its right to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims when it submitted affidavits regarding their checks in the context of the litigation. PLS appealed and this decision followed.

Reviewing de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. PLS first argued that the district court erred by deciding whether PLS waived its right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation conduct when it submitted the affidavits. On this issue, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position that the court, not the arbitrator, is in the best position to decide whether certain conduct amounts to a waiver under applicable law. The panel rejected PLS’s argument that this position was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, and further stressed that unlike other types of waiver, litigation-conduct waiver implicates courts’ authority to control judicial procedures or to resolve issues arising from judicial conduct.

The panel also rejected PLS’s second argument – that the district court erred by ignoring the parties’ express agreement to arbitrate all disputes, including any litigation-conduct waiver claims. Here, the panel found that PLS had waived this issue by raising it for the first time in its motion to reconsider, and in any event, the arbitration did not contain “clear and unmistakable evidence” of an intent to arbitrate the instant litigation-conduct waiver issue.

Last, regarding PLS’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that PLS waived its right to arbitrate by submitting the subject affidavits to the court, the panel found plausible Plaintiffs’ allegation that PLS waived arbitration through such conduct. In so finding, the panel determined that Plaintiffs had demonstrated prejudice from PLS’s submission of the worthless check affidavits, and that by submitting those affidavits, PLS “invoke[d] the judicial process to the extent it litigate[d] a specific claim it subsequently [sought] to arbitrate.”

Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 16-50847 (5th Cir. May 19, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

COURT REJECTS MOTION TO SEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT EXHIBITS WHEN MOVING PARTY FAILS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH SEALING

June 13, 2017 by Rob DiUbaldo

Utica Mutual Insurance Company’s request that numerous exhibits filed in support of summary judgment be sealed has been rejected by a federal district court, which found that Utica’s general statements about the documents were insufficient to allow the court to “make the ‘specific, on-the-record findings’ required to seal judicial documents.”

Utica and Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. are on opposing sides of two related lawsuits regarding Utica’s attempt to seek reimbursement for asbestos claims under two reinsurance contracts. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and Utica moved to have numerous exhibits in support of these motions filed under seal on the basis that they contained privileged communications with in-house and/or outside attorneys, referred to such privileged information, or contained attorney’s handwritten notes protected by the work product doctrine.

The court began by describing the standards for such a sealing motion, noting the “strong presumption of access” that attaches to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion and that overcoming this presumption requires a party to provide facts sufficient to allow the court to make “specific, on-the-record findings . . . demonstrating the closure is essential to preserve higher values and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Utica’s explanations, the court found, were not specific enough to meet this standard. In its descriptions of attorney-client communications, the court found that Utica did not explain who all of the recipients were or show that the communications were intended to be or were kept confidential. Regarding attorney notes, the court found that Utica did not indicate whether they were fact or opinion work product. Similarly, the court found that Utica did not specify whether other documents it wished to file under seal were protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and otherwise failed to provide information sufficiently specific for the court to determine which documents contained protected information or to narrowly tailor a sealing order to protect that information. However, the court allowed Utica to file as exhibits certain briefs from prior litigation in the same redacted form that they were previously filed.

Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00196 (BKS/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. April 26, 2016)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Filed Under: Interim or Preliminary Relief, Week's Best Posts

IAIS PROPOSES REVISIONS TO INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLE 13 ON REINSURANCE

June 12, 2017 by Rob DiUbaldo

The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”) recently released proposed revisions to the existing version of its Insurance Core Principle 13 regarding “Reinsurance and Other Forms of Risk Transfer.” The proposal involves a fairly significant re-working of the structure of certain ICP 13 sections, as well as important substantive updates. At the outset, the proposal would revise the description of what ICP covers, from supervisors “set[ting] standards” for the use of reinsurance and other forms of risk transfer in order to ensure that insurers adequately control and transparently report their risk transfer programs, to supervisors “requir[ing] the insurer to manage effectively” its use of reinsurance and other forms of risk transfer. Other noteworthy changes include (but are not limited to):

  • inserting a list of factors to inform a supervisor’s assessment of a ceding insurer’s reinsurance program;
  • recommending the group-wide supervisor of an insurance group require the reinsurance strategy of the insurance group to address a designated set of issues;
  • specifying supervisors require ceding insurers to establish effective internal controls over the implementation of their reinsurance program;
  • including credit risk posed by a reinsurer (and ways for ceding insurer to mitigate reinsurer credit risk), as well as operational risk related to contract documentation, as characteristics of the reinsurance program that should be included in a ceding insurer’s capital assessment;
  • requiring ceding insurers to demonstrate the economic impact of risk transfers originating from reinsurance contracts (as opposed to requiring transparency to allow the supervisor to understand the economic impact);
  • eliminating statement that binding documentation requirements are questions of jurisdictional contract law;
  • requiring ceding insurers to consider the impact of their reinsurance programs in liquidity management (as opposed to the supervisor assessing whether cedants control their liquidity position to take account of risk transfers); and
  • inserting a section regarding considerations for supervisors of insurers ceding risks to SPEs.

The IAIS held a public background call on June 5, 2017 to introduce the public consultation package and to receive initial feedback. Interested parties may submit feedback on the proposed revisions to the IAIS online through July 31, 2017.

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation, Week's Best Posts

COURT COMPELS ARBITRATION, REJECTING CLAIM THAT CONTRACT IS VOID FOR LACK OF MUTUAL ASSENT

June 8, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

A New York court compelled the arbitration of a claim under a reinsurance agreement, rejecting the plaintiff reinsurer’s claim that the reinsurance policy is void because the reinsured issued an underlying insurance policy which did not comply with the requirements stated in the reinsurance contract. In doing so, the court held that the plaintiff raised an issue of the interpretation of the reinsurance contract, rather than the formation of the contract.

The plaintiff reinsurer and the defendant reinsured agreed to a reinsurance policy which contained a following form provision which provided that the reinsurance covered risks written by the ceding insurer on a specifically named policy form, “Form LEX CM PL 7.” Despite the defendant’s representation that it issued Form LEX CM PL 7, it turned out not to be the case. Instead, the defendant had issued an insurance policy called “2002 Sound Transit Policy” which provided broader coverage than the form referenced in the reinsurance contract. The ceding insurer settled and paid a claim which allegedly was not within the scope of coverage of the form specified in the reinsurance contract. A dispute arose and the ceding insurer demanded arbitration. The reinsurer filed suit, asking the court to stay the arbitration and declare the reinsurance policy void, and the ceding insurer moved to compel arbitration. The court rejected the reinsurer’s motions and granted the ceding insurer’s motion to compel arbitration.

The reinsurer argued that the case calls for the court’s determination on the existence of the reinsurance policy because the ceding insurer’s use of the wrong insurance policy form constituted a lack of mutual assent. The court rejected that position, noting that it is undisputed that the two parties signed and agreed to the reinsurance contract. The court stated that, instead, the issue is whether the loss reported by the ceding insurer is covered by the terms of the reinsurance contract. Because the reinsurance contract included a valid arbitration clause, the question was reserved for an arbitrator. While acknowledging the limited exception to the requirement of arbitration where a party questions whether a contract was ever made, the court held that the reinsurance contract at issue was clearly entered into and there remains no question as to its “formation.” HDI Global SE v. Lexington Ins. Co., Case No. 16-07241 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2017)

This post written by Rollie Goss.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

NLRB ORDERS DISH NETWORK TO RESCIND OR REVISE ITS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WITH EMPLOYEES

June 7, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

Recently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ordered Dish Network, LLC to rescind or revise its arbitration agreement, finding that provisions in the agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

Beginning in October 2013, Dish required all applicants for employment to sign an arbitration agreement, which required that any claim, controversy or dispute arising out of the employee’s application for employment, employment, or termination of employment shall be resolved by arbitration (the “Arbitration Agreement”). The Arbitration Agreement also required that the arbitration shall be kept confidential. There was no procedure in the Arbitration Agreement for the employee to opt out. In this particular case, the charging party, employee Brett Denney, signed the Arbitration Agreement. He was later suspended for an alleged violation of a workplace policy. Denney was directed to not discuss his suspension with his coworkers. Denney then filed a complaint with the NLRB, alleging a violation by Dish of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by prohibiting him from discussing the suspension with coworkers and for maintaining and enforcing the Arbitration Agreement.

In addressing the Arbitration Agreement, the NLRB noted that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA if it maintains an arbitration policy that employees would reasonably believe interferes with their ability to file a charge with the NLRB or access the NLRB’s processes. The NLRB found that Dish’s Arbitration Agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) because the employees would reasonably construe it from prohibiting them from filing NLRB charges or accessing the NLRB’s processes. The NLRB noted that the Arbitration Agreement was very broad in that it applied to “any claim, controversy, and/or dispute between them, arising out of and/or in any way related” to the employee’s application, employment or termination. Further, the NLRB found that the confidentiality requirement of the Arbitration Agreement independently violated Section 8(a)(1) because a workplace rule that prohibits discussion of terms and conditions of employment is unlawfully broad. As to Dish’s instruction to Denney to not discuss the suspension with his coworkers, the NLRB also found that the instruction violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.

Under the NLRB’s order, Dish must cease and desist from using the Arbitration Agreement and must take affirmative actions to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. It also required that Dish rescind the Arbitration Agreement or revise it, making clear that it does not restrict the employee’s right to file NLRB charges or access NLRB’s processes and that it does not require confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. The NLRB also ordered Dish to notify current and former employees of the action, and post and distribute electronically notices at certain Dish locations of the action and order. Dish Network LLC and Brett Denney, No. 27-CA-158916 (NLRB April 13, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues

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