• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar

Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

  • About
    • Events
  • Articles
    • Treaty Tips
    • Special Focus
    • Market
  • Contact
  • Exclusive Content
    • Blog Staff Picks
    • Cat Risks
    • Regulatory Modernization
    • Webinars
  • Subscribe

APPELLATE COURT UPHOLDS ARBITRATION AWARD IN FACE OF MANIFEST DISREGARD OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS

July 11, 2017 by Carlton Fields

An arbitration panel entered an award in a legal malpractice matter in favor of the claimant and the attorneys and law firm moved to vacate the award.  The district court denied the motion to vacate, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.   The court of appeals rejected two proffered bases for vacation: (1) that the panel’s finding that the claim was not barred by a one year statute of limitation amounted to manifest disregard of law; and (2) that the alleged perjury of a witness in an underlying action justified vacature on the basis that the award violated public policy.

The Court held that even if the panel had made an error of law in its finding that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitation, the record did not reflect a factual basis for a finding that it had manifestly disregarded the law by “intentionally” disregarding the law, and that the movants had failed to carry their burden to prove manifest disregard.  Without a reasoned award or a hearing transcript specifically providing a record on this issue proving manifest disregard may be a challenge.

With respect to the public policy ground for vacation, the Court found that the panel expressly considered the claim of perjury and questioned the witness concerning the allegedly perjured testimony.  The Court declined to vacate the award on this basis because doing so “would require the Court to revisit the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to Defendant’s perjury argument put forth to the arbitrator ….”

The court of appeal did partially vacate the district court’s ruling.  The arbitrator had awarded pre-judgment interest from June 30, 2011.  The defendants did not challenge that part of the award in the motion to vacate the award, but after the award was confirmed contended, in a FRCP 59(e) motion to amend the judgment, that pre-judgment interest should have run from a later date, July 30, 2014.  The district court granted that motion.  The court of appeals vacated that ruling, holding that the Rule 59(e) motion amounted to a late and improper attempt to circumvent the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Demartini v. Johns, Nos. 15-15205, 16-15078, 16-15134 (9th Cir. June 7, 2017).

This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Week's Best Posts

COURT CONFIRMS INTERIM ARBITRATION AWARD REQUIRING POSTING OF PRE-HEARING SECURITY

July 10, 2017 by Carlton Fields

Respondent moved for an immediate stay of an arbitration of claims relating to the purchase of insurance and to vacate the panel’s interim award requiring the posting of pre-hearing security.  Petitioner moved to confirm the interim award.

Respondent’s sole basis for vacating the interim award was that the panel issued its interim award without conducting a full hearing on the merits of its defenses.  It predicated this request upon 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), contending that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, relying on Home Indem. Co. v. Affiliated Food Distributors, Inc., 1997 WL 773712 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1997).  The panel distinguished Home Indemnity, in which the arbitration panel had “specifically conditioned . . . discovery on [the] posting of security,” and refused “even a threshold review of the underlying dispute,” finding instead that the panel in this matter had “expressly ordered that discovery proceed while the motion for pre-hearing security was litigated” and that Petitioner “produced over 40,000 pages of discovery… prior to the interim award… unlike the panel in Home Indemnity, the panel here provided [Respondent] with adequate opportunity to present its evidence and argument,” including “extensive briefing and oral argument.”

The court further commented that “[b]y its very nature, … a request for pre-hearing security is made on a limited record at an early stage of the arbitration proceedings and may be ordered before a full hearing on all defenses.” The court confirmed the panel’s interim award.  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Source One Staffing LLC, Case No. 16-6461 (USDC S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2017).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Interim or Preliminary Relief, Week's Best Posts

COURT COMPELS DISCOVERY OF REINSURANCE ALLOCATION INFORMATION

July 7, 2017 by Carlton Fields

In an action involving claims under facultative reinsurance for the reinsurance of asbestos risks, the reinsurer sought discovery of documents concerning the allocation of losses among the reinsurers on the program, and concerning other reinsurance.  The court, in a perfunctory Order, granted the motion to compel with respect to the allocation of asbestos losses to other reinsurers in the program at issue, but denied the motion to compel with respect to information regarding other reinsurance.  Lamorak Insurance Co. v. Everest Reinsurance Co., Case No. 15-13425 (USDC D. Mass. May 26, 2017).

This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Discovery

AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY SERVICES PROVIDER LOSES ON MOTION TO DISMISS DEALERSHIP’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

July 6, 2017 by Rob DiUbaldo

In a dispute between providers of automobile warranty services (“Plaintiffs” or “American Guardian”) and a Florida car dealership (“Defendants” or “JCR”), an Illinois federal district court recently dealt two blows to the Plaintiffs by refusing to dismiss the Defendants’ counterclaims and refusing to grant a requested preliminary injunction. The parties entered into an agreement in which American Guardian would provide warranties to JCR’s customers, as well as administer and approve payments for all claims under the American Guardian contracts sold by JCR, secure insurance policies indemnifying the parties against obligations, and administer reimbursement to JCR for the cost of repairs. The agreement contained a modification clause requiring amendments be supplemented by writing, which the parties utilized to make subsequent changes, including adding a production agreement requiring JCR to sell a minimum number of warranty and service contracts monthly for five-years and inserting an exclusivity provision.

The parties’ relationship eventually broke down and JCR stopped selling American Guardian contracts, leading American Guardian to file suit. Defendants counterclaimed for fraud in the inducement as well as breach of contract and the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The fraudulent inducement counterclaim was based on an American Guardian agent’s alleged representation before the master agreement was signed to JCR’s owner that Plaintiffs would establish an “offshore reinsurance company” to allow JCR to retain the warrant payments paid by customers as well as earn investment income. The good faith and fair dealing claim was based on American Guardian’s alleged failure to monitor JCR’s loss ratio on claims made by its customers on American Guardian contracts. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss on each of these claims.

First, Plaintiffs challenged the fraud counterclaim’s sufficiency of pleadings regarding the elements of fraud and the specificity of pleadings in light of Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that JCR’s allegations regarding false statements were non-actionable as representations of intent regarding future conduct. The court read the claim as one for promissory fraud rather than fraudulent inducement, finding that JCR had sufficiently alleged that American Guardian’s agent made a fraudulent promise regarding the formation of a reinsurance company with no intent to fulfill it. Furthermore, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the agreement’s integration clause was a no-reliance clause which precluded a fraud suit. Finally, the court found that JCR had alleged its fraud claim with sufficient particularity as to “when” the fraudulent promise occurred.

Second, Plaintiffs challenged the good faith and fair dealing counterclaim only on damage grounds—that any excess payments on claims would harm Plaintiffs, and not Defendants, because only American Guardian was responsible for payment on claims. The court concluded this misread the agreement, which provided for both parties making payments for repairs and expenses incurred by JCR customers, and thus declined to dismiss the claim. Interestingly, the court did go on to note “a few of the intricacies at play” with the claim that Plaintiffs did not mention in their motion but which might affect the claim later in the litigation—a bone thrown by the court to counter Plaintiffs’ “misapprehension of many of the salient issues” in the case.

The district court also denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction blocking Defendants from selling vehicle service contracts and related warranty products on behalf of Plaintiffs’ competitors. The court held that Plaintiffs had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because they failed to adequately address the host of Defendants’ affirmative defenses that would preclude recovery. The court noted that for the defenses of estoppel and accord and satisfaction in particular, the Plaintiffs introduced inapposite evidence or no evidence at all, thus failing to show a likelihood of overcoming those defenses. Furthermore, the court noted, Plaintiffs’ requested injunction of preventing JCR’s sales of competitor warranties would do nothing to redress the alleged injury (denied profits on JCR’s warranty sales). Nor had Plaintiffs shown that loses could not be compensated for purely by monetary damages later at trial, that waiting for a final judgment would fail to redress their injury, or that their goodwill had been harmed in any way. Thus, the court refused to impose a preliminary injunction.

Am. Guardian Warranty Servs., Inc. v. JCR-Wesley Chapel, LLC, Case No. 16 C 11407 (USDC N.D. Ill. May 22, 2017)

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Transactions

COURT MUST RULE ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION FIRST

July 5, 2017 by Carlton Fields

Plaintiff sued his former employer in a putative class action alleging that a payroll practice violated Pennsylvania law. The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and a separate motion to dismiss. The district court opted to “delay ruling” on the motion to compel arbitration and proceeded to deny the motion to dismiss. The former employer appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the district court erred in not ruling on the motion to compel arbitration first, vacated, and remanded for the district court to consider the motion to compel arbitration in the first instance.

The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that the gateway issue of arbitrability must be addressed first. Therefore, once a motion to compel arbitration is filed the court must refrain from further action until it determines arbitrability.  The court noted that there is an exception if the record is unclear as to the agreement to arbitrate, in which case limited discovery should be permitted limited to the issue of arbitrability. Since the plaintiff did not deny receipt of and consent to the agreement to arbitrate, and did not seek discovery with respect to arbitrability, the district court should have proceeded to consider the motion to compel arbitration before considering the pending motion to dismiss. Silfee v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., No. 16-3725 (3rd Cir. June 13, 2017).

This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 177
  • Page 178
  • Page 179
  • Page 180
  • Page 181
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Page 678
  • Go to Next Page »

Primary Sidebar

Carlton Fields Logo

A blog focused on reinsurance and arbitration law and practice by the attorneys of Carlton Fields.

Focused Topics

Hot Topics

Read the results of Artemis’ latest survey of reinsurance market professionals concerning the state of the market and their intentions for 2019.

Recent Updates

Market (1/27/2019)
Articles (1/2/2019)

See our advanced search tips.

Subscribe

If you would like to receive updates to Reinsurance Focus® by email, visit our Subscription page.
© 2008–2025 Carlton Fields, P.A. · Carlton Fields practices law in California as Carlton Fields, LLP · Disclaimers and Conditions of Use

Reinsurance Focus® is a registered service mark of Carlton Fields. All Rights Reserved.

Please send comments and questions to the Reinsurance Focus Administrators

Carlton Fields publications should not be construed as legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general information and educational purposes only, and should not be relied on as if it were advice about a particular fact situation. The distribution of this publication is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship with Carlton Fields. This publication may not be quoted or referred to in any other publication or proceeding without the prior written consent of the firm, to be given or withheld at our discretion. To request reprint permission for any of our publications, please contact us. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm. This site may contain hypertext links to information created and maintained by other entities. Carlton Fields does not control or guarantee the accuracy or completeness of this outside information, nor is the inclusion of a link to be intended as an endorsement of those outside sites. This site may be considered attorney advertising in some jurisdictions.