Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

COURT COMPELS DISCOVERY, AWARDS SANCTIONS IN DISPUTE OVER WHETHER REINSURANCE ARBITRATION CLAUSE APPLIES

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In 2011, Top’s Personnel entered into a reinsurance agreement with Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company (“AUCRA”), and several years later executed a promissory note (“the Note”) in favor of a related entity, Applied Underwriters. Applied Underwriters (“Plaintiff”) sued Top’s Personnel (“Defendant”) for breach of its obligations under the Note, and Defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the reinsurance agreement. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration because, on the evidence before it, Plaintiff was not subject to the arbitration clause. However, the court acknowledged the possibility that discovery might show circumstances that justify binding Plaintiff to the arbitration clause in AUCRA’s reinsurance agreement.

Defendant sought discovery as to the relationship between the two entities, the reinsurance agreement, and the Note’s connection to that agreement. Defendant moved to compel complete responses to its interrogatories and document requests, as well as sought to depose Plaintiff’s counsel. The court granted that motion in part, requiring revised responses to discovery requests, but denied the request to depose Plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant subsequently filed another motion to compel to remediate what Defendant argued were continued deficiencies in Plaintiff’s discovery responses.

The court granted Defendant’s motion to compel in full, including allowing the deposition of Plaintiff’s counsel and imposing sanctions for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s first order. The court addressed each disputed response in a piecemeal fashion, issuing specific directives for Plaintiff to cure its deficient responses by answering completely interrogatories regarding the negotiations of the Note and why different entities signed the Note and the reinsurance agreement, producing any correspondence or communications regarding the Note or reinsurance agreement, and supplementing its initial disclosures to include relevant information about all individuals with discoverable information.

Furthermore, the court granted the motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff’s counsel. Whereas before the court ordered Defendant to attempt to first depose another individual who allegedly had the same information as Plaintiff’s counsel, this time the court determined the deposition was necessary because some of Plaintiff’s revised discovery responses and other communications indicated the attorney was the only individual involved in negotiating the Note on behalf his client.

Finally, the court granted Defendant’s request for sanctions, including attorney’s fees, for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court concluded that the majority of the second motion was previously addressed during Defendant’s first motion to compel and the resulting order, and moreover it was Plaintiff’s failure to fully comply with the previous order that necessitated the second motion. Thus, an award of sanctions and attorney’s fees was just and sufficient to address Plaintiff’s discovery failures.

Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Top’s Personnel, Inc., Case No. 15-90 (USDC D. Neb. Aug. 7, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .
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SECOND CIRCUIT ENFORCES ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OR NON-PARTY WHOSE AGENT ENTERED INTO THAT AGREEMENT

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The Second Circuit has affirmed an order compelling a plaintiff-employee to arbitrate his employment related claims against Carnival Cruise Lines, despite the fact that the one page employment agreement that he signed did not contain an arbitration clause and did not mention Carnival.

The plaintiff sued Carnival in connection with injuries allegedly suffered while working on one of their ships, and Carnival moved to compel arbitration. The plaintiff argued that he should not be required to arbitrate his claims because his employment contract did not contain an arbitration clause or expressly incorporate any other document, and Carnival was not a party to or even mentioned in that agreement. The Court disagreed.

First, the Court noted that incorporation by reference was a matter of law and thus for the court to decide. Second, it found that the language – stating that the “herein terms and conditions in accordance with POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 09 and Memorandum Circular No. 10 … shall be strictly and faithfully observed,” was sufficient to incorporate those documents, which contained an arbitration clause. Third, the Court found that it did not matter that the plaintiff was unaware of the arbitration clause, as he was bound by the terms of his contract and the incorporated documents, regardless of whether he had actually read them. Finally, the court held that the company with which the plaintiff had entered into a contract was acting as an agent for Carnival, and that Carnival had the power to enforce an arbitration agreement made by its agent.

Pagaduan v. Carnival Corporation et al., No. 16-465 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2017)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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BANKRUPTCY COURT GRANTS MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER DECISION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IN BERMUDA, BUT REACHES SAME RESULT

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On September 6, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued the latest order in the ongoing coverage battle between MF Global Holdings (“MF Global”) and Allied World Assurance Company regarding the former’s bankruptcy. The decision stemmed from MF Global’s motion to reconsider the court’s August 24, 2017 order compelling arbitration in Bermuda. While the court initially granted the motion to reconsider, it reached the same result and granted Allied World’s motion to compel arbitration.

MF Global’s request for reconsideration was based on the court’s alleged failure to address its argument that the global bankruptcy plan explicitly retained jurisdiction over adversary proceedings, a provision which should have superseded the underlying insurance contract’s arbitration provision which formed the basis of the court’s decision to compel arbitration. The court noted that while its decision mentioned the argument, it did not address the merits of the argument, so the court granted the motion to reconsider.

On reconsideration, the court was unpersuaded by MF Global’s argument that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction pursuant to the global bankruptcy plan. In a short opinion, the court distinguished the principal authority upon which MF Global relied: Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc., 304 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2002). That case addressed an adversary proceeding that commenced before the bankruptcy plan and a plan provision which retained jurisdiction over pending adversary proceedings. Here, the adversary proceeding was not filed until after the plan was confirmed, and, the court concluded, the plan language retaining jurisdiction of pending adversary proceedings should not be interpreted to supersede the contractual arbitration provision in the pre-petition contract without explicit instruction in the plan as to that interpretation. Furthermore, Allied World had not waived its right to demand arbitration at any point in the proceedings.

Thus, even though the court granted MF Global’s motion to reconsider, it ultimately reached the same conclusion and granted Allied World’s motion to compel arbitration and denied MF Global’s motion to stay the arbitration.

In re: MF Global Holdings Ltd., Case No. 11-15059 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY QUESTIONS ARE FOR THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE JUDGE, UNLIKE SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRABILITY QUESTIONS

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Allegations of failure to follow the contractually-required dispute resolution procedure raise “procedural questions,” which must be asked of the arbitrator. In contrast, “substantive arbitrability questions,” also referred to as “gateway questions” of arbitrability, are for the court to decide. Questions of substantive arbitrability address two issues: whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement, and whether the issue is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

In determining whether an issue is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, the court must initially decide whether the arbitration clause is “broad” or “narrow.” Clauses that provide for arbitrating “any claim arising out of or relating to the contract” are considered broad as a matter of law. When answering questions of scope, courts “must liberally construe a valid arbitration clause, ‘resolving doubts in favor of arbitration. . . .” As a result, even where claims sound in tort, rather than contract, they will be determined to be within the scope of a broad arbitration clause if the claims “touch matters covered by the arbitration clause.”

Finding that plaintiff’s claims against defendant were within the scope of the parties’ agreement, and that questions raised about arbitrability were procedural, and thus for the arbitrator to decide, the Court granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Dlorah, Inc. v. KLE Constr., Inc., Civ. 16-5102-JLV (W.D.S.D. July 17, 2017).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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ILLINOIS DISTRICT COURT DISMISSES CASE FILED BY INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AS REHABILITATOR, AGAINST REINSURER

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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a complaint filed by Plaintiff-Rehabilitator, the Illinois Director of Insurance, against Defendant-Reinsurer, Twin Rivers, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).

The underlying reinsurance agreement stemmed from a previous “rehabilitation” proceeding under which the Illinois Department of Insurance was appointed as the rehabilitator for a now-defunct insurer, Triad, and as such was authorized to “bring any action, claim, suit or proceeding against any person with respect to that person’s dealings with Triad.” The present dispute concerns a reinsurance arrangement by which Twin Rivers agreed to reinsure certain private mortgage insurance (PMI) policies issued by Triad on mortgages originated by banks affiliated with Twin Rivers. In exchange for the reinsurance, Triad would pay a certain percentage of each referred borrower’s PMI premiums to Twin Rivers. These so-called “ceded” premiums were deposited into a trust account and invested and used to fund any payments due to Twin Rivers under the reinsurance agreement. Twin Rivers would periodically receive dividends out of the trust account for the benefit of itself and its affiliated banks. A balance of approximately $1,741,655 remained in the trust account as of the filing of the original complaint in this action.

With regard to the breach of contract claim, the Illinois Director of Insurance alleged that Twin Rivers breached its agreement by failing to provide certain disclosures to borrowers whose PMI policies it would be reinsuring consistent with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations requiring the disclosure of the benefits that Twin Rivers was receiving through the captive reinsurance arrangement. In its motion to dismiss, Twin Rivers argued that no provision in the agreement obligated it to provide HUD disclosures to borrowers and, in any event, the Illinois Department of Insurance was not harmed by the absence of disclosures. The Director argued that language in the agreement requiring that Twin Rivers not violate any “agreement with, or condition imposed by, or consent required by… any governmental… body” imposed a continuing commitment on the part of Twin Rivers to provide the HUD disclosures. Ultimately, the Court found the language “fairly susceptible to Defendant’s interpretation, but not [to] Plaintiff’s.” In so finding, the Court found more plausible the meaning attributed by Twin Rivers, that the language was merely a representation that, at the time of contracting, it was not specifically and individually subject to any legal constraints that would preclude it from agreeing to and fulfilling its obligations under the agreement.

The Court also dismissed the good faith and fair dealing claim, citing the Director’s failure to allege that Twin Rivers exercised its discretion in bad faith, unreasonably, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. The RESPA claims were also dismissed on account of statute of limitations, and the unjust enrichment claim was dismissed in light of the express contract governing the relationship between the parties.

State of Illinois ex rel. Hammer v. Twin Rivers Ins. Co., No. 16 C 7371 (USDC N.D. Ill. Jul. 5, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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