Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Uber Drivers’ Class Action Thrown Into Reverse: Ninth Circuit Overturns Class Certification Order and Denial of Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

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A putative class action against Uber filed by some of the company’s California-based drivers has crashed. The Ninth Circuit reversed rulings denying Uber’s motion to compel arbitration, certifying the class of drivers, and enjoining Uber from distributing and enforcing a new arbitration agreement. Relying on its decision in a previous class action against Uber (Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration agreements delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Thus, the determination of arbitrability was not within the district court’s province.

The plaintiffs argued the district court’s determination that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable should be upheld because the named class representatives had “constructively opted out of arbitration on behalf of the entire class.” The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had no authority to take that action on behalf of and binding the other drivers. Although the plaintiffs found a Georgia Supreme Court case (Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank, 788 S.E. 787 (Ga. 2016)) supporting their position, they were unable to point to any federal case doing so. Bickerstaff relied exclusively on state law grounds and did not discuss the Federal Arbitration Act.

The plaintiffs’ second argument, that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they contain class action waivers that violate the National Labor Relations Act, was extinguished by the United States Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). Because the arbitration agreements were enforceable, Uber’s motion to compel arbitration should have been granted, and because the plaintiff’s claims would be arbitrated, the district court’s order certifying the class and restricting Uber’s communications with the class were also reversed. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 14-16078 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Years-Long Asbestos Reinsurance Battle Continues for Utica and Century, Including Whether Century Must Follow the Fortunes of Utica’s Allocation of Losses

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In 2013, Utica Mutual Insurance Company (the cedent) filed a complaint alleging that Century Indemnity Company (the reinsurer) (1) breached two reinsurance certificates executed between the parties covering the years 1973 and 1975 in connection with asbestos liability exposure; (2) owed the unpaid balance of prior billings under the two certificates; (3) violated the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing; and (4) is obligated to pay certain future billings. Century answered, refusing to acknowledge the existence of a valid 1975 reinsurance certificate, and asserted various affirmative defenses. After two years of discovery, Century amended its answer to assert bad-faith counterclaims against Utica alleging that Utica had been maintaining two sets of record-keeping systems to track asbestos settlements made on behalf of the underlying insured, allegedly part of a larger effort by Utica to conceal the fact it had been over-billing reinsurers, including Century, for these claims.

Utica sought partial summary judgment on various aspects of the litigation, including that (1) Utica’s allocation decisions related to the coverage and handling of the asbestos claims against the underlying insured were reasonable and made in good faith, such that the “follow the fortunes” doctrine applied; (2) the 1975 reinsurance certificate is valid and binding on Century; and (3) Century had no right to claw back any sums previously paid to Utica. Century responded with its own dispositive motions. The court denied the parties’ motions with respect to most issues, including whether Utica’s loss allocation decisions were reasonable and made in good faith. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., Case No. 6:13-cv-00995 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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Florida Federal Court Confirms Arbitration Award, Finding Defendants Did Not Meet “Heavy Burden” to Vacate the Award

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The background of this case can be found here. Floridians for Solar Choice, Inc. (“FSC”), is a Florida not-for-profit corporation formed for the purpose of qualifying for a solar energy amendment ballot initiative in Florida’s general election. FSC initially filed a complaint in Florida federal court in December 2015 against Defendants PCI Consultants, Inc. (“PCI”), a “national leader in obtaining signed petitions for ballot initiatives,” and PCI’s principal, Angelo Paparella (“Paparella”). The case stemmed from a failed ballot initiative to qualify a solar constitutional amendment for the 2016 election in Florida. In its complaint, FSC alleged causes of action for breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, conversion, and unjust enrichment against PCI, and fraud in the inducement and conversion against Paparella. FSC also filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the claims asserted relate to contracts which contain arbitration clauses. The Florida district court granted the motion to compel in January 2016 and closed the case. In October 2017, Defendants filed a motion to reopen case, which was granted. In its motion, Defendants advised the court that the parties had participated in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in April 2017, that the “sole arbitrator issued a non-final award on July 20, 2017 and on October 10, 2017, the arbitrator issued a ‘Final Award’ adopting the non-final award.” Defendants moved to vacate the award, and FSC moved to confirm the award.

In their motion to vacate, Defendants made five arguments: 1) the award must be vacated because FSC employed “fraud and/or undue means” to procure an arbitration award in its favor; 2) the arbitrator, acting alone, lacked jurisdiction under the AAA rules to enter an award exceeding one million dollars; 3) the arbitrator had “irrefutable bias” against Defendants; 4) the arbitrator failed to hear evidence related to FSC’s “surprise damages claim;” and 5) the AAA Rules barred entry of the October final award in favor of FSC because the July award was a “final award” that terminated the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In response, FSC argued that the arbitrator’s award is supported by the record evidence and that Defendants failed to meet their burden on their claim of fraud or undue means and on their claim of arbitrator bias. FSC further argued that the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to issue an award above one million dollars and to enter the October final award. FSC also moved to confirm the July award, as amended by the October final award (and a later corrected November 1, 2017 award).

The court found that Defendants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that FSC defrauded or used undue means to influence the arbitrator. The court also found that the arbitrator had the authority to enter the arbitration awards. The court also denied the motion to vacate on the ground that the arbitrator was biased. As to the arbitrator’ evidentiary rulings, the court noted that “[a]rbitrators enjoy wide latitude in conducting an arbitration hearing, and they are not constrained by formal rules of procedure or evidence,” and found that Defendants were not deprived of a fair hearing. Thus, the Florida federal court denied Defendants’ motion to vacate. As the Defendants did not meet the “heavy burden” to vacate the award, the Florida federal court also granted FSC’s motion to confirm the award.

Floridians for Solar Choice, Inc. v. PCI Consultants, Inc., No. 15-cv-62688 (USDC S.D. Fla. June 11, 2018).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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Dismissal of Forced-Placed Insurance Cases Pursuant to Filed-Rate Doctrine Upheld by Eleventh Circuit

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Borrowers’ complaints alleging their mortgage servicers breached loan contracts and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by charging “inflated amounts” for “force-placed” or “lender-placed” insurance and receiving “rebates” or “kickbacks” from the force-placed insurer, which savings were not passed on to the borrowers, were dismissed as the insurance rates were filed with and approved by the relevant state regulators.

“The filed-rate doctrine forbids a regulated entity from charging rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate regulatory authority. As a result, where the legislature has conferred power upon an administrative agency to determine the reasonableness of a rate, the rate-payer can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate.” Thus, the filed-rate doctrine precludes suits: (1) directly challenging a filed-rate; and (2) facially-neutral challenges – “i.e., any cause of action that is not worded as a challenge to the rate itself” but where the damages awarded “would, effectively, change the rate paid by the customer… to one below the filed rate by other customers or would, in effect, result in a judicial determination of the reasonableness of that rate.”

Despite the borrowers’ assertions that they are not challenging the reasonableness of the insurance rates, they repeatedly stated they were challenging the premiums charged. As the Court noted, “since these premiums are based upon rates filed with the state regulators, [the borrowers] are directly attacking those rates as being unreasonable as well… Their complaints therefore contain textbook examples of the sort of claims that we have previously held are barred by the non-justiciabilty principle.”

Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. represented American Security Insurance Company in this matter.

Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 16-12100, 16-6585 (USCA 11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2018)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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English Court Holds that Discovery Given by U.S. Citizen Pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Order can be Used in London Arbitrations

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This English court case involved arguments by Dreymoor Fertilisers Overseas Pte. Ltd. (“Dreymoor”), a Singapore trading company, to prevent EuroChem Trading GmbH, a Swiss company, and JSC MCC EuroChem, Russia’s largest fertilizer company (collectively, EuroChem”), from using information obtained through a U.S. court order under 28 U.S.C. §1782 (the “1782 Order”), which allows a federal court to order a person residing in its district to provide testimony or documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”

EuroChem had obtained the 1782 Order in Tennessee federal court in order to obtain information to be used in litigation against Dreymoor proceeding in the British Virgin Islands and in Cyprus. EuroChem also intended to use the information obtained pursuant to the 1782 Order in two arbitrations proceeding in London. In all of the cases, EuroChem alleges that Dreymoor paid bribes to secure various fertilizer supply and sales contracts. Dreymoor sought an injunction in an English court, restraining EuroChem from enforcing the 1782 Order with respect to the London arbitrations, which was originally granted.

However, recently, on an application to continue the injunction, an English court found that EuroChem has a legitimate interest in obtaining the evidence in question for use in the London arbitrations. Thus, the court held “[w]hether enforcement of the 1782 Order would constitute unconscionable conduct requires an overall evaluation,” and “[i]n my judgment, looking at the circumstances of this case as a whole and with particular regard to the factors which I have identified, many of which point strongly against the grant of an injunction, it would not.” Thus, the English court refused to continue the injunction.

Dreymoor Fertilisers Overseas PTE Ltd. v. EuroChem Trading GMBH, [2018] EWHC 2267 (Comm. Aug. 24, 2018).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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