Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

Shingled Out: Eleventh Circuit Binds Homeowners to Individual Arbitration Provisions Displayed on Roofing Shingle Packaging

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This case involved a twist on the classic “shrinkwrap” agreement. Here, plaintiff homeowners brought a putative class action seeking damages and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of building owners who had used Tamko shingles. In response, Tamko filed a motion to compel arbitration, contending that by unwrapping and retaining its shingles, the homeowners had accepted the terms of its purchase agreement and warranty which were both printed—in full—on the outside wrapper of every shingle package. Specifically, each package wrapper displayed the all-capped word “IMPORTANT” and warned the purchaser in all caps to “READ CAREFULLY BEFORE OPENING [THE] BUNDLE.” The warranty also contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which was similarly printed in capital letters on the outside of every shingle wrapper and specified that any action against Tamko must be arbitrated individually rather than as part of a consolidated or class action. The district court granted Tamko’s motion and dismissed the homeowners’ complaint, reasoning that the homeowners were bound to arbitrate because through their roofers, they had accepted the terms of Tamko’s purchase agreement, including its mandatory-arbitration provision.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that (1) Tamko’s packaging sufficed to convey a valid offer of contract terms; (2) unwrapping and retaining the shingles was an objectively reasonable means of accepting that offer; and (3) the homeowners’ grant of express authority to their roofers to buy and install shingles necessarily included the act of accepting purchase terms on the homeowners’ behalf. In so finding, the appellate panel reasoned that “[a]s in the shrinkwrap cases, Tamko’s packaging provided conspicuous notice of its offer—something a reasonable, objective person would understand as an invitation to contract.” The panel further stated that, as master of its offer, Tamko was “free to invite acceptance by specified conduct” and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that they never saw the shingle packaging and thus never had a reasonable opportunity to consider Tamko’s purchase terms. Instead, the panel found that “acceptance of Tamko’s purchase terms—arbitration clause and all—was incidental to, and reasonably necessary to accomplish, the homeowners’ express grant of agency authority to their roofers to purchase and install shingles” and therefore, notice of the terms printed on the shingle wrappers was properly imputed to the homeowners. Dye v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., Inc., Case No. 17-14052 (11th Cir. Nov. 2, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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Arbitration Award Against HGTV Designer Confirmed Due to Failure to Raise Fairness Objections During Arbitration

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The case involved an award in excess of $800,000 against a home designer and some affiliated companies for a renovation project that went bad. One of the affiliated companies brought an arbitration proceeding against the homeowners for nonpayment, and after appointment of the arbitrator, the homeowners sought to join the home designer pursuant to Construction Industry Arbitration Rules R-7.

The designer’s participation in the arbitration was limited. He did not file an answer to the homeowners’ claims against him and failed to appear at the hearing. After the arbitrator issued a final award holding the designer and other companies jointly and severally liable, the designer moved the federal district court for vacatur.

The district court held that, under the FAA, the appointment of the arbitrator prior to the designer’s participation in the arbitration did not result in a proceeding that was “not fundamentally fair,” distinguishing a case under the New York Convention that had held otherwise because the Convention specifically provides a defense based on “improper composition of the arbitral tribunal.” Under the FAA, the requirements for a “fundamentally fair hearing” are “notice, opportunity to be heard, and to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decision makers, and that the decision makers are not infected with bias.” There was no indication that those requirements were not met here.

The Tenth Circuit confirmed the district court’s ruling, and denied the designer’s appeal on the additional ground that the designer failed to object to the arbitrator and failed to invoke CIAR R-7(c), which provides an opportunity for the arbitrator to “establish a process for selecting arbitrators for any ongoing or newly constituted case” after the joinder of additional parties. The designer’s failure to invoke CIAR R-7 was fatal to his claim to have been denied due process through the pre-joinder selection of the arbitrator. Gidding v. Fitz, No. 18-1106 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Federal District Court Declines to Rule on Arbitration Award, Finding No Independent Basis for Jurisdiction

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Following arbitration, the parties filed cross-motions to confirm and vacate the arbitration award. The District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the FAA does not independently confer jurisdiction, and the parties did not adequately plead a jurisdictional basis that would permit the court to rule. Golub, moving that the award be vacated, argued that the court had jurisdiction because (1) she was denied a fair arbitral hearing, and (2) the award was in manifest disregard of federal law. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that federal question jurisdiction to enforce or vacate an arbitration award exists only when ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law, such as when the petition alleges that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded federal substantive law. The court went on to warn that “even in those cases where the arbitrator manifestly disregarded federal substantive law, courts are reluctant to find jurisdiction.” Last, the court stated that the allegation that the arbitrator denied a party a fair opportunity to present its case by refusing to compel production of documents, does not raise a “substantial question of federal law.” The court was “aware of no case … stating that failure to follow federal procedure in an arbitration can give rise to federal question jurisdiction.” BOFI Fed. Bank v. Golub, Case No. 3:18-cv-00816 (USDC S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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$100 Million Arbitration Award Supported by “Even a Barely Colorable Justification” Upheld Under the FAA

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A $100 million arbitration award against NutraSweet was reinstated by a New York state appellate court due to the “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution embodied in the FAA, a policy that applies with special force in the field of international commerce.” NutraSweet’s acquisition of a Korean aspartame producer went sour, and the two companies proceeded to arbitration. The arbitration panel ruled against NutraSweet on all of the issues and rendered an award in excess of $100 million to Daeseng Corp. However, when Daeseng petitioned a New York trial court for confirmation of the award, the court reversed and remanded, finding the arbitrators had “manifestly disregarded the law and had misconstrued the procedural record.”

On appeal, the New York appellate court held the reversal to be in error, stating that “ordinary errors” of law are insufficient to constitute the required “manifest disregard of the law” necessary to overturn an arbitration award. The doctrine of manifest disregard of the law is “severely limited” and is a “doctrine of last resort limited to the rare occurrences of apparent egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators.” To modify or vacate an award on that ground, a court must find that “the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.”

Under this demanding standard, even if the court held the arbitrators had made a mistake in their application of the law, that would not be sufficient to set the award aside where the issue was “far from obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.” The court walked through each of NutraSweet’s arguments, and, without deciding that the arbitrators’ decisions were correct, nevertheless found that there was at least a “barely colorable justification” for each of them, and therefore they must be upheld. In re Daeseng Corp. v. NutraSweet Co., Case No. 2018 NY Slip Op. 06331 (NY. Sup. Ct. App. Div., Sept. 27, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Ninth Circuit Enforces Arbitral Immunity Following FINRA Arbitration

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Plaintiff Syed Nazim Ali appealed a Northern District of California judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ diversity action against FINRA alleging state law claims arising from an arbitration proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of arbitral immunity “because the claims alleged effectively seek to challenge the decisional acts of an arbitrator or an arbitration panel” contrary to California precedent.

The District Court had previously confirmed the FINRA arbitration award, as previously reported here.

Global Ebusiness Services, Inc. et al. v. FINRA, No. 18-15716 (USCA 9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2018)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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