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New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Week's Best Posts

FSOC Rescinds Prudential’s Designation as Systemically Important Financial Institution

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The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) announced on October 17, 2018 that it has voted unanimously to rescind the designation of Prudential Financial Inc. (“Prudential”) as a systemically important financial institution (“SIFI”). Prudential is currently the largest life insurance company and the seventh largest insurer and bank holding company in the United States.  Due to the size, scope and complexity of its business, it was labeled a SIFI in 2013 and added to the list of nonbanks considered “too big to fail” – those whose collapse the Treasury Department believed could threaten the stability of U.S. financial markets.  SIFIs are subject to strict supervision and oversight by the Federal Reserve.  Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC must annually reevaluate the continued necessity of a SIFI-designation.

The FSOC previously identified three channels through which the negative effects of a SIFI’s distressed finances could be transmitted to the market, including exposure to the SIFI by market participants, asset liquidation, and the inability or unwillingness of the SIFI to carry out critical functions or services. In 2013, the FSOC found the threat posed by Prudential arose primarily from exposure and asset liquidation channels.  According to the FSOC’s most recent evaluation, although certain aspects of Prudential’s business and activities have not materially changed since 2013, several factors have significantly affected its previous conclusion that Prudential could cause financial instability if it experienced material financial distress.  The factors include actions taken directly by Prudential, such as creating and dissolving captive reinsurance companies and restructuring debt, as well as certain critical regulatory developments and related initiatives by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

Notwithstanding the FSOC’s determination, Prudential and eight other insurance companies remain designated as globally significant SIFIs by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the Financial Stability Board. Two of these insurers had also been designated as SIFIs under the Dodd-Frank Act, but the labels were since rescinded or otherwise removed.

This post written by Alex Silverman.
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European Reinsurers Question Whether Proposed Changes to the Credit for Reinsurance Models Would Ensure Compliance with the Covered Agreement

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We have posted a number of times on the Covered Agreement between the U.S. and the E.U. concerning the reduction of collateral requirements for reinsurance provided by reinsurers domiciled in the E.U. The approach of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) to the implementation of the Covered Agreement, through its Reinsurance Task Force, has been based upon proposed amendments to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Act and Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation, with the assumption being that the adoption of the revised Models by the individual states would ensure compliance with the Covered Agreement. Drafts of the revised Models have been under consideration, and are scheduled to be presented for a vote at the NAIC’s Fall National Meeting in approximately two weeks. The Reinsurance Advisory Board (“RAB”), which is a trade association composed of European domiciled reinsurers that purport to account for “approximately 60% of worldwide reinsurance business,” has submitted a comment letter to the chair of the NAIC’s Reinsurance Task Force expressing doubts over whether the proposed revisions to the Models would appropriately implement the Covered Agreement. This is potentially a serious issue, because if the revised Models do not appropriately implement the requirements of the Covered Agreement, the adoption of the revised Models by the states might not save state credit for reinsurance laws from preemption by the Covered Agreement. The RAB is represented at the CEO level by Gen Re, Hannover Re, Lloyd’s of London, Munich Re, Partner Re, Scor, and Swiss Re.

While many of the comments in the RAB’s letter concern fairly modest wording issues, one of the concerns expressed by the RAB is that “some of the language in the exposure drafts [of the proposed Model revisions] deviates significantly from the language of the bilateral agreement [i.e., the Covered Agreement] and thereby provides extensive discretion to state regulators in their compliance with the terms of the bilateral agreement.” We raised this issue as a possible concern in our last post on the Covered Agreement. One of the criticisms of the Covered Agreement in the Congressional hearing on the agreement shortly after it was announced was that it was too rigid, and took away the discretion and flexibility that individual state insurance commissioners have in our state-based structure of insurance regulation. The focus of the letter on the ability of individual state insurance commissioners to exercise some discretion in the implementation of the Models raises an issue that may be problematic. It will be interesting to see if and how the NAIC responds to this letter.

On a related note, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has announced plans to engage in discussions with the United Kingdom aimed at agreeing to a Covered Agreement with the U.K. that would be similar to that in place with the E.U. The NAIC has stated its position on that announcement.

This post written by Rollie Goss.
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UK Court Considers Whether Payment of Insurance Claim Violates Iran Sanctions

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A court in the United Kingdom has issued a ruling considering the intersection of a clause in an insurance agreement meant to protect the insurer from obligations that would violate international sanctions regimes and the rapidly changing realities of US sanctions against Iran.

At the heart of the case was an insurance agreement providing coverage for cargo carried on two ships that transported goods to Iran in August 2012. Upon arrival in Iran, certain cargo covered by the insurance agreement was put into storage, from which it was stolen in September or October 2012. The insured made a claim based on this loss in March 2013, but the insurer denied coverage on the basis of clause in the agreement providing that “no (re)insurer shall be liable to pay any claim . . . to the extent that the . . . payment of such claim . . . would expose that (re)insurer to any sanction, prohibition or restriction under . . . the trade or economic sanctions, laws, or regulations of . . . the United States of America.”

The insurer argued that paying this claim would expose it to sanctions based on US sanctions barring the provision of services to Iran. The parties agreed that insurance is a covered service and that the insurer was prohibited by these sanctions from paying this claim when it was made in March 2013. The insurer argued that its obligations were extinguished at that time, but the insured argued that later developments allowed the insurer to pay the claim. Specifically, in 2015, the US entered in an agreement with Iran called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under which the sanctions were relaxed. Under provisions of the JCPOA that went into effect in January 2016, the insurer could have paid the claim but delayed doing so while awaiting confirmation from the US and UK governments that this was allowed. Then, in May 2018, President Trump announced that the US was withdrawing from the JCPOA effective June 27, 2018, with a wind down provision allowing certain transactions to take place through November 4, 2018, and the parties disagreed regarding whether paying this claim was among the permitted transactions.

The court made several significant findings. First, it found that the fact that payment was prohibited at the time the claim was made in 2013 did not extinguish the insurer’s obligation to pay the claim, but instead only suspended that obligation until such time as the law changed to allow such payment to be made, as happened in 2016. Second, it found that payment of the claim was a permitted transaction under the wind down provision of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Finally, it interpreted the provision excusing the payment of the claim to the extent it “would expose” the insurer to sanctions to mean that the insurer had the burden to show that the payment was prohibited under the sanctions law, and not merely that there was a risk that a relevant government entity would interpret the payment to be prohibited. The court therefore decided that the insured was entitled to payment of the claim.

Mamancochet Mining Ltd. v. Aegis Managing Agency Ltd., [2018] EWHC 2643 (Comm)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Fifth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Without Prejudice After Plaintiff Compelled to Arbitrate Refuses To Do So

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed a dismissal without prejudice of a plaintiff’s putative class action related to a multi-level marketing program selling electricity after the plaintiff refused to submit his claims to arbitration despite the district court compelling arbitration and staying the case pending arbitration. The case languished for over a year after the district court’s order compelling arbitration while plaintiff refused to arbitrate the putative class claims. Twice the court requested status reports in which the plaintiff indicated his failure to arbitrate and lack of intent to do so, at which point the district court ordered plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. The plaintiff responded by reiterating his disagreement with the court’s conclusions as to arbitration, his intent not to arbitrate, and his readiness to litigate the case to conclusion before the court. The court ultimately dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

On a threshold issue, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction over the dismissal as a “final decision with respect to an arbitration.” Defendants argued that plaintiff, through his response to the show-cause order, voluntarily dismissed the case, which is not a final appealable decision. The court disagreed, holding that plaintiff’s inaction in failing to submit his claims to arbitration was not sufficient to constitute voluntary dismissal. Specifically, the court determined that plaintiff’s response to the show-cause order did not serve as notice of dismissal, but rather were “statements of inaction,” and therefore did not constitute a voluntary dismissal.

Additionally, the court found that it could appropriately hear an appeal of a dismissal without prejudice. The court surveyed circuit precedent and distinguished the present case from those finding no appellate jurisdiction over dismissals without prejudice. Here, there were no concerns about piecemeal appeals of interlocutory issues because the dismissal concluded the litigation on the merits. Nor, as the court previously established, was the dismissal voluntary such that the litigant was voluntarily dismissing as a tactic to seek expedited appeal of interlocutory issues.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s use of its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute. Regardless of whether the heightened standard for dismissal without prejudice—where statutes of limitations risk barring any future litigation—applied, the court held that defendants would prevail. Dismissal was warranted for failure to prosecute because plaintiff demonstrated a “clear record of delay and contumacious conduct” by persistently refusing to arbitrate the claims as the district court so ordered and explicitly stating it would not pursue arbitration. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded the lower court acted within its discretion and affirmed.

Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 17-50655 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Uber Drivers’ Class Action Thrown Into Reverse: Ninth Circuit Overturns Class Certification Order and Denial of Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

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A putative class action against Uber filed by some of the company’s California-based drivers has crashed. The Ninth Circuit reversed rulings denying Uber’s motion to compel arbitration, certifying the class of drivers, and enjoining Uber from distributing and enforcing a new arbitration agreement. Relying on its decision in a previous class action against Uber (Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration agreements delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Thus, the determination of arbitrability was not within the district court’s province.

The plaintiffs argued the district court’s determination that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable should be upheld because the named class representatives had “constructively opted out of arbitration on behalf of the entire class.” The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had no authority to take that action on behalf of and binding the other drivers. Although the plaintiffs found a Georgia Supreme Court case (Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank, 788 S.E. 787 (Ga. 2016)) supporting their position, they were unable to point to any federal case doing so. Bickerstaff relied exclusively on state law grounds and did not discuss the Federal Arbitration Act.

The plaintiffs’ second argument, that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they contain class action waivers that violate the National Labor Relations Act, was extinguished by the United States Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). Because the arbitration agreements were enforceable, Uber’s motion to compel arbitration should have been granted, and because the plaintiff’s claims would be arbitrated, the district court’s order certifying the class and restricting Uber’s communications with the class were also reversed. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 14-16078 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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