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You are here: Home / Archives for Week's Best Posts

Week's Best Posts

NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSES HOLDING THAT ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS UNCONSCIONABLE

May 10, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In early April, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a lower court’s holding that an arbitration clause in an employment agreement with JP Morgan was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Because the arbitration agreement was adhesive in the employment agreement, the court held that it was “at least minimally procedurally unconscionable under California law.” However, the court continued to state that it was not substantively unconscionable for a variety of reasons, including where it excluded certain actions seeking only injunctive relief—where the court acknowledged that the carve out “does no more than recite the procedural protections” already afforded by California law. Additionally, where one party has the legal obligation to pay all of the costs unique to arbitration, the court held that it was not substantively unconscionable to have a non-mutual initiation provision. Next, the court determined that the employee could not challenge a confidentiality provision on the grounds that it “prevents others from observing and learning of Chase’s illegal policies and procedures” where no harm to himself was alleged. Finally, the court found that explicitly allowing an arbitrator to rule on summary judgment motions was not substantively unconscionable. As such, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable.

Ali v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 14-15076 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURT TRANSFERS “LATE NOTICE” REINSURANCE DISPUTE TO PENNSYLVANIA

May 9, 2016 by Carlton Fields

R&Q Reinsurance Company issued a facultative reinsurance certificate to St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, which reinsured a policy issued by St. Paul to Walter E. Campbell, Co. The broker who placed the certificate was located in Chicago, as were the R&Q employees who executed the contract. St. Paul was located in Minnesota at the time the certificate was negotiated and entered into.

The certificate provided that St. Paul was to “promptly” advise R&Q of “any occurrence and any subsequent developments pertaining thereto” which, in St. Paul’s opinion, might implicate the reinsurance coverage afforded by the certificate. After St. Paul defended and indemnified Campbell in several asbestos personal injury lawsuits arising under the reinsured policy, it sent R&Q its first notice of loss and demanded payment under the certificate. The notice of loss was sent via the broker’s Hartford, Connecticut office. R&Q subsequently brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to indemnify St. Paul under the certificate because it failed to provide prompt notice of the subject loss. St. Paul then filed a parallel suit against R&Q in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking coverage under the certificate, and moved to transfer the Illinois case to the latter forum. At the time the competing actions were filed, R&Q was a Pennsylvania corporation and St. Paul was a Connecticut corporation.

The parties did not dispute that venue was proper in both Illinois and Pennsylvania, but disagreed as to whether the transfer of the Illinois action to Pennsylvania served the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice. Analyzing these factors and others, the court granted St. Paul’s motion to transfer the case to Pennsylvania, because: (a) the bulk of the events material to St. Paul’s alleged late notice and R&Q’s purported breach of the certificate occurred in areas “much closer to Pennsylvania than Illinois, with some of the material events occurring in Pennsylvania”; (b) R&Q is based in Pennsylvania and St. Paul’s residence is closer to that forum than to Illinois; (c) the parties witnesses, and potential non-party witnesses, are located either in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or closer to it than to the Northern District of Illinois; (d) the dispute was “more likely” to be resolved sooner in Pennsylvania than Illinois, given the relative speed by which cases in each forum typically reach trial or are disposed of prior to trial; (e) Illinois law was “unlikely” to govern the dispute; and (f) Illinois’ interest in the action is “weak relative to that of Pennsylvania”. R&Q Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 15-cv-7784 (USDC N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2016).

This post written by Rob DiUbaldo.

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Filed Under: Jurisdiction Issues, Reinsurance Claims, Week's Best Posts

FIFTH CIRCUIT: DIVERSITY JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY AMOUNT SOUGHT IN ARBITRATION, NOT AMOUNT OF AWARD

May 3, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In a recent interlocutory appeal of a matter involving an arbitration of a claim for $80 million, but in which only $10,000 was awarded, the Fifth Circuit held that the amount in controversy for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction over petitions to confirm or vacate arbitration awards, is the amount sought in the arbitration, and not the amount ultimately awarded. In choosing the “demand approach” over the “award approach,” the court analyzed both positions, and noted that treatment by other circuits has varied. The Fifth Circuit found that the demand approach is the better of the two because it takes into account the true scope of the dispute between the parties. The court also reasoned that the demand approach avoids the application of two conflicting jurisdictional tests for the same controversy (jurisdiction for petitions to compel arbitration are based on the amount of the demand). Further, the court explained, the award approach might promote frivolous motions to compel, where demands for less than the jurisdictional requirement may be filed in federal court and then stayed pending the result of the arbitration. Last, the court explained, the demand approach permits jurisdiction consistent with that which would be present if the case were litigated rather than arbitrated. Pershing, LLC v. Kiebach, Case No. 15-30396 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2016).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

SPECIAL FOCUS: WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE MULTI-STATE ALLOCATION OF NONADMITTED PREMIUM TAX REVENUE?

May 2, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In the portion of the Dodd-Frank Act known as the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act, Congress established a public policy and stated its desire that “each State adopt nationwide uniform requirements, forms, and procedures, such as an interstate compact, which provide for the reporting, payment, collection, and allocation of premium taxes for nonadmitted insurance ….”  15 U.S.C. § 8201(b)(4) .  In a Special Focus article we provide an update on the lack of progress made by the states towards this goal.

This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation, Special Focus, Week's Best Posts

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ENFORCES ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, FINDING IT IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE

April 26, 2016 by Carlton Fields

In this case, a former employee of a retail store appealed to the California Supreme Court seeking reversal of an appellate court decision which found that an arbitration agreement in her employment application was not unconscionable.

An employee originally filed a suit against Forever 21 and individual defendants for harassment, race and sex discrimination and retaliation.  The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement in the employment application which was executed by the employee.  The California trial court denied the motion, finding that the agreement was unconscionable.  A California Court of Appeal reversed, finding that there was no substantive unconscionability in the agreement.  The California Supreme Court granted the employee’s petition to review, and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

In its decision, the California Supreme Court found that an arbitration agreement, which authorized the parties to seek provisional relief in a judicial action while still compelling the remainder of the dispute to arbitration, was enforceable, noting that the clause “does no more than restate existing law . . . [and] does not render the agreement unconscionable.”  The court also held that an arbitration agreement remains enforceable when the claims it specifically lists that are subject to arbitration are claims that would likely be brought by an employee because the employer’s claims, even though not listed, would also be subject to arbitration.  It also found that a provision in the arbitration agreement that required both parties to agree that during arbitration “all necessary steps will be taken” to protect from disclosure the company’s trade secrets and proprietary and confidential information, was not unduly one-sided.  Lastly, the court held that the fact that the arbitration agreement stated that the arbitration would be conducted under the model rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the employee was not provided with a copy of the AAA rules, did not make the agreement procedurally unconscionable.

Thus, the California Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable and was enforceable.  Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. et al., No. S208345 (Cal. Mar. 28, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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