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New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Week's Best Posts

BANKRUPTCY COURT GRANTS MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER DECISION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IN BERMUDA, BUT REACHES SAME RESULT

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On September 6, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued the latest order in the ongoing coverage battle between MF Global Holdings (“MF Global”) and Allied World Assurance Company regarding the former’s bankruptcy. The decision stemmed from MF Global’s motion to reconsider the court’s August 24, 2017 order compelling arbitration in Bermuda. While the court initially granted the motion to reconsider, it reached the same result and granted Allied World’s motion to compel arbitration.

MF Global’s request for reconsideration was based on the court’s alleged failure to address its argument that the global bankruptcy plan explicitly retained jurisdiction over adversary proceedings, a provision which should have superseded the underlying insurance contract’s arbitration provision which formed the basis of the court’s decision to compel arbitration. The court noted that while its decision mentioned the argument, it did not address the merits of the argument, so the court granted the motion to reconsider.

On reconsideration, the court was unpersuaded by MF Global’s argument that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction pursuant to the global bankruptcy plan. In a short opinion, the court distinguished the principal authority upon which MF Global relied: Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc., 304 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2002). That case addressed an adversary proceeding that commenced before the bankruptcy plan and a plan provision which retained jurisdiction over pending adversary proceedings. Here, the adversary proceeding was not filed until after the plan was confirmed, and, the court concluded, the plan language retaining jurisdiction of pending adversary proceedings should not be interpreted to supersede the contractual arbitration provision in the pre-petition contract without explicit instruction in the plan as to that interpretation. Furthermore, Allied World had not waived its right to demand arbitration at any point in the proceedings.

Thus, even though the court granted MF Global’s motion to reconsider, it ultimately reached the same conclusion and granted Allied World’s motion to compel arbitration and denied MF Global’s motion to stay the arbitration.

In re: MF Global Holdings Ltd., Case No. 11-15059 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC., LOSES ARGUMENT TO ENFORCE MANDATORY FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN REINSURANCE CONTRACT

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On September 12, the District Court for Connecticut denied a motion to transfer predicated on a mandatory forum selection clause in a reinsurance contract. The contract was one of several entered into by Applied Underwriters, Inc., and its affiliates (collectively “Applied”) with Aiello Home Services (“Aiello”) for a “novel [workers’ compensation] insurance product known as ‘EquityComp,’ which required participation by the insured in a reinsurance facility. Applied’s relations with Aiello broke down when Applied sent Aiello a statement “assessing an additional premium charge of $195,786.52, and reporting total estimated costs nearly $200,000 higher than the previous month’s total cost estimate.” Aiello filed suit alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and other statutory violations. Applied removed the case to federal court and sought to transfer to the District of Nebraska based on the forum selection clause.

The court denied the motion to transfer. The court found that the bulk of Aiello’s claims arose from statutory violations, not the contract, and therefore were not within the scope of the forum selection clause. The fact that Applied’s defenses relied primarily on the contract was insufficient to bring the statutory claims within the scope of the clause.

The court also analyzed whether the clause would be enforceable under the law of the chosen forum state (Nebraska). As part of that analysis, the court had to determine if Aiello had sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction in Nebraska. “[T]here is a clear distinction between conventional commercial contracts and those that arise in the business of insurance.” While an insurance company that markets policies to residents of a given state establishes sufficient minimum contacts within that state, the insureds do not simultaneously establish sufficient contacts with the insurer’s home state. As a result, the court refused to enforce the clause.

Charter Oak Oil Co., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00689 (SRU) (USDC D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2017).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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NINTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS CLASS ARBITRATION TO PROCEED DESPITE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS REFERENCE TO CLASS ARBITRATION

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Lamps Plus appealed an order permitting class arbitration of claims related to a data breach of personal identifying information of its employees, alleging negligence, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, and other claims. The district court previously found that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous as to class arbitration and denied Lamps Plus’s motion to compel bilateral arbitration, allowing class-wide arbitration to proceed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, all the while acknowledging the Supreme Court’s finding in Stolt-Nielsen that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless “there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” However, the Court went on to find that the lack of an express reference to class arbitration was “not the ‘silence’ contemplated in Stolt-Nielsen.” As such, the Court construed the language “arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to my employment” as to authorize class arbitration and further found that its interpretation of that clause “require[d] no act of interpretive acrobatics” and was “the most reasonable” interpretation possible.

Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. 16-56085 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS NOT A CHALLENGE TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION

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A municipality sued the company that constructed its water treatment facility, in connection with contaminants found in the water supply. The parties had entered into a series of agreements which contained choice of law and arbitration clauses governing the resolution of any disputes. The company filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the contracts’ forum selection and arbitration clauses, and the court construed the motion as falling under Rule 12(b)(1). The court then found that the contracts were inconsistent and ambiguous, and considered extrinsic evidence. The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred by analyzing the motion to dismiss as a 12(b)(1) challenge to its jurisdiction. The court explained that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “federal venue laws, not forum-selection clauses, govern the propriety of venue under Rule 12(b)(3). The same logic applies where, as here, a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement under Rule 12(b)(1). Just as a forum-selection clause has no bearing on the issue of whether venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper,’ an arbitration agreement has no relevance to the question of whether a given case satisfies constitutional or statutory definitions of jurisdiction.” The Eighth Circuit found that summary judgment standards should apply on remand because the parties submitted, and the district court considered, matters outside the pleadings. City of Benkelman, Nebraska v. Baseline Engineering Corp., et al., Case No. 16-1949 (8th Cir. Aug. 11, 2017).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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NINTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS ARIZONA FEDERAL COURT’S ORDER DENYING PETITION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD AS UNTIMELY

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A. Miner Contracting, Inc. (“Miner”) appealed an Arizona federal court’s order denying Miner’s petition to vacate an arbitration award entered against it and in favor of Appellee Dana Kepner Company, Inc.

The Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not err in finding that Miner’s petition to vacate the award was untimely because under Section 12 of the Federal Arbitration Act, the petition had to have been served within three months after the award was filed or delivered, and Miner’s petition was filed more than three years after the award was final. On appeal, Miner argued that the district court should have applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to find the petition was timely filed. Noting that “equitable tolling” would be applied “in situations where, despite all due diligence, the party invoking equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim”, the court held that the facts of the case at hand did not merit application of the doctrine. The information Miner claimed it could not discover was the “evident partiality” of the arbitrator, namely that two of the partners in the arbitrator’s law firm represented the attorney for Miner’s adversary in the arbitration, in an unrelated divorce matter. The Ninth Circuit ruled that Miner had not acted with due diligence because it admitted that it discovered that information by searching the internet, which was readily available to it during the limitations period. The Ninth Circuit also found that even if the petition to vacate was not time-barred, Miner had not shown that there was “evident partiality” on the part of the arbitrator, as the connection alleged “is too attenuated and too insubstantial to create the necessary ‘impression of partiality.’” Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. A. Miner Contracting, Inc. v. Dana Kepner Co., Inc., Case No. 16-15209 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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