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You are here: Home / Archives for Week's Best Posts

Week's Best Posts

National Council of Insurance Legislators Calls upon Federal Reserve to Limit Examinations of State-Regulated Insurers

February 11, 2019 by Carlton Fields

The Dodd-Frank Act provided the Federal Reserve Board with limited authority over certain insurance holding companies with federally regulated banking subsidiaries, creating some tension with the general rule, embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, that insurance is regulated at the state level. The National Council of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) has issued a resolution critical of the Federal Reserve Board’s use of that authority, stating that, in exercising its limited authority over these entities, “the Federal Reserve Board has over-extended its examination powers by routinely requiring insurance companies to supply information and responses to inquiries of the sort in practice that are the province of” state insurance regulators, “on whose work Federal Reserve Board examiners are statutorily required” to rely. This, the NCOIL resolution states, “will most likely conflict with, the jurisdiction of State insurance regulators over solvency and market conduct regulation or, at best, will be duplicative.”

The NCOIL resolution further:

  • “calls upon the Federal Reserve Board to direct its examiners that the insurance operations of state-regulated insurers . . . are regulated by the individual states and that the Federal Reserve Board’s examinations are, to the fullest extent possible, to rely upon the examination reports and other work of state insurance regulators and not to duplicate and/or conflict with the states’ regulatory powers over the insurers’ market conduct or solvency”;
  • “encourages Congress to provide oversight and, if necessary, enact legislation to ensure” that the Federal Reserve Board abides by these limits; and
  • “calls upon the Federal Reserve Board to consult with, defer to, and rely on to the fullest extent possible, and to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, duplication of, the work of state insurance regulators on matters involving the regulation of insurance operations and solvency of insurers, regardless of the insurers’ affiliations with federally-regulated financial institutions.”

Resolution Asserting McCarran-Ferguson Reverse Preemption over the Supervision of Insurance Companies by the Federal Reserve Board and Its Examiners (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators, Dec. 8, 2018)

Filed Under: Reinsurance Regulation, Week's Best Posts

Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Section 7 Of The FAA – The Diversity, “Amount In Controversy,” And “Place Of Sitting” Requirements

February 5, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

Presented with an argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Southern District of New York clarified the diversity, amount in controversy, and “place of sitting” requirements under Section 7 of the FAA – which relates to compelling the attendance of witnesses at arbitration.

With regard to diversity, the court held that, when presented with a Section 7 petition to enforce arbitration summonses, the court need not “look through” the petition to the citizenship of the parties to the underlying arbitration, but rather, should look to the citizenship of the parties to the instant enforcement action, to determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists. The court distinguished a Section 7 petition from petitions brought under Section 4 and Section 10, where courts may look through the petition to determine federal question jurisdiction, but are not required to do so. The court noted that Section 7 petitions, unlike Section 4 and 10 petitions, involve different parties than those in the underlying arbitration.

As to the “amount in controversy” requirement, the court recited the well-established principle that the amount is measured by “the value of the object of the litigation.” “The amount in controversy is not necessarily the money judgment sought or recovered, but rather the value of the consequences which may result from the litigation.” The petitioner here sought at least $134 million in damages in the underlying arbitration. The court noted that, even if the documents responsive to the summons pertained to only a small fraction of the amount sought in the arbitration, the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement would nevertheless be satisfied.

Finally, regarding Section 7’s requirement that a party petition a United States district court “for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting,” the court refused to look to the arbitrators’ individual business addresses to determine the arbitrators’ “place of sitting.” Rather, the court looked to the location the arbitrators had selected for the Section 7 hearing. Furthermore, the court stated that the arbitrators are not restricted to a single location. Here, the arbitrators had summoned nonparties to appear for hearings in both New York and Philadelphia. Therefore, the court held that the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were the arbitrators’ “place of sitting” for any contest of the respective Section 7 summonses.

Washington National Insurance Co. v. Obex Group, LLC, Case No. 18-CV-9693 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Discovery, Week's Best Posts

Fourth Circuit Holds Reinsurance Participation Agreement Is Insurance Contract Under Virginia Statute, Effectively Voiding Its Arbitration Clause

February 4, 2019 by Carlton Fields

On September 14, 2017, we reported on the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, which found that a party was judicially estopped from arguing that a Reinsurance Participation Agreement (“RPA”) was not an insurance contract. (If the RPA is an insurance contract, its arbitration provision becomes invalid under state law.) Subsequent to that ruling, on remand, the district court held that the RPA is indeed an insurance contract and that the RPA’s arbitration clause is void.

The Fourth Circuit has now affirmed the district court. The circuit court explained that the RPA was part of a workers’ compensation insurance program that Appellee Minnieland Private Day School purchased from Appellant Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. (AUCRA) and its affiliated entities. Under this “EquityComp” program, the pooled companies provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage to employers and also mutually reinsure each other’s insurance business. A layer of reinsurance is also provided by AUCRA. AUCRA in turn enters into RPAs with EquityComp customers, under the terms of which each customer pays into a segregated “cell” or account that is then used to fund AUCRA’s liabilities. In this fashion, EquityComp customers participate in underwriting the risk of their own workers’ compensation insurance policies. Minneland sued AUCRA alleging that AUCRA was not authorized or licensed to act as an insurance company under Virginia law; that the RPA was an “insurance contract” and not a “reinsurance” agreement; and that AUCRA misrepresented the EquityComp program, and the RPA specifically, to circumvent Virginia insurance and workers’ compensation laws.

In affirming the denial of arbitration, the Fourth Circuit rejected AUCRA’s argument that the RPA was a standalone contract. Instead, the panel determined that the RPA was but one component of an integrated insurance sale because the documents, including the RPA, were intended to provide Minnieland with workers’ compensation insurance coverage.

Minnieland Private Day School v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. Inc., Case No. 17-2385 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Contract Interpretation, Week's Best Posts

U.S. Supreme Court Holds Arbitrability Questions Not Subject to A “Wholly Groundless” Exception

January 29, 2019 by Alex Silverman

Archer & White Sales, Inc. (“Archer”) sued Henry Schein, Inc. (“Schein”) in federal court seeking both monetary and injunctive relief. A contract between the parties required arbitration of all claims arising from the agreement, except those seeking injunctive relief.  Schein moved to compel arbitration based on the request for monetary damages.  Archer objected, pointing to its demand for injunctive relief.  The issue thus became one of arbitrability—who decides whether the dispute is subject to arbitration, the court or an arbitrator?  The contract at issue incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association, under which arbitrators are to decide arbitrability issues.  The district court nonetheless decided the issue and denied Schein’s motion, holding it was “wholly groundless” because an arbitrator would inevitably conclude that the dispute is not arbitrable and refer it back to the district court.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously vacated the judgment.

Even where a contract expressly delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the Supreme Court explained that several federal courts “short-circuit” the process and decide the question themselves when they think a request for arbitration is “wholly groundless.” To these courts, this “wholly groundless” exception is a means of blocking “frivolous” attempts to transfer cases out of the court system.  But the Supreme Court found the exception to be inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and Supreme Court precedent.  The FAA, Justice Kavanaugh wrote, does not contain a “wholly groundless” exception, and the Court must interpret the FAA as written.  The FAA, in turn, requires interpreting the relevant contract as written.  As a result, if a contract delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, courts have no power to decide the issue, even if they think a particular dispute is not ultimately arbitrable.  The Court held that the wholly groundless exception therefore “confuses the question of who decides arbitrability with the separate question of who prevails on arbitrability.”  And such was the case here, where neither of the lower courts actually decided whether the Archer/Schein contract delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, instead short-circuiting the issue based on the wholly groundless exception.  Having rejected the applicability of such exception, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded for this threshold determination.

Schein v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., No. 17–1272, 586 U. S. ____ (Jan. 8, 2019) (Slip Op.)

This post written by Alex Silverman.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

In Dispute Over Consolidation, California Federal Court Grants Petition to Compel Appointment of an Arbitrator in One of the Actions, and Denies Other Party’s Motion to Compel the Appointment of a Single Panel to Decide Consolidation Issue

January 28, 2019 by Jeanne Kohler

The background of this case in California federal court is that The Hartford (“Hartford”) issued reinsurance billings to Employers Insurance Company of Wausau (“Wausau”) for settlement payments made to one insured under nineteen different reinsurance treaties between Wausau and three of Hartford’s affiliates, which billings were denied by Wausau. In response, Hartford demanded arbitration and requested that the parties consolidate all the related disputes in a single arbitration. Wausau, in response, proposed that the parties agree to three arbitrations and identified three arbitrators for three separate panels for each of the three Hartford affiliates involved. Hartford refused and identified one arbitrator for a single arbitration and if other arbitrations were necessary, the same arbitrator was identified as arbitrator for such other arbitrations. Wausau’s arbitrators then requested that Hartford’s arbitrator select umpires for three separate arbitrations. In response, Hartford again requested that the parties agree to a methodology to select a single panel to decide how the matter should be consolidated. Wausau then filed four separate petitions in three jurisdictions to compel arbitration: one in California federal court, two in Massachusetts state court and one in Connecticut state court. In the California action, which involved one treaty, Hartford cross-moved to compel a single arbitration in order to adjudicate the parties’ dispute regarding consolidation and, in the alternative, a motion to stay pending arbitration of related proceedings.

As an initial matter, the California federal court noted that the issue of whether arbitrations may be consolidated is a question for the arbitrators and not the court to decide. However, the court noted that the parties remained at an impasse due to Hartford’s insistence of one consolidated arbitration. The court then rejected Hartford’s argument that its three affiliates who had entered into the nineteen treaties could act as a single party for the purpose of seeking reimbursement from Wausau. Noting that it was limited to the terms of the agreements, the court stated that Hartford was only named in two of the nineteen treaties, that the treaties entered into by two of the affiliates required arbitration in Massachusetts and the others required arbitration in Los Angeles. The court also noted that each of the treaties was a separate agreement, with different arbitration clauses. The California federal court then found that the treaty before it contained an arbitration clause which provided a procedure for selecting an umpire, and that once that panel is in place, it can decide the issue of consolidation. Accordingly, the court granted Wausau’s petition to compel appointment of an arbitrator, and denied Hartford’s motions to compel and stay pending arbitration of related proceedings.

Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. The Hartford, No. 2:18-cv-07240 (USDC C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018)

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Week's Best Posts

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