New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields
The Dodd-Frank Act encouraged states to cooperate in the regulation of surplus lines insurance premium tax allocation. In a Special Focus article, John Pitblado provides an update on the efforts of the states to address this issue.
This post written by John Pitblado.
We previously reported on December 17, 2013, about a dispute in federal court between Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, National Casualty Company, and Employers Insurance Company of Wausau (collectively, “Nationwide”) and Arrowood Indemnity Company. The dispute concerned the process for appointing a “tie-breaking” umpire in a series of reinsurance coverage arbitrations. Most of the reinsurance agreements contained express provisions regarding the steps to be taken to select the umpire, including the “drawing of lots.” However, certain of the treaties – referred to as the 1967 Treaties – did not provide a clear process for what to do if the two party-appointed arbitrators failed to agree on the selection of the umpire. The court instructed the parties to follow the procedure set forth in the other treaties, and then report back regarding how to handle the appointment under the 1967 Treaties. Once an umpire had been validly appointed pursuant to the terms of the other treaties, the same umpire would be “presumptively appropriate for appointment by the Court” for the remaining disputes under the 1967 Treaties.
After the court issued those instructions, Joseph Goldberg was selected as the umpire pursuant to the terms of the other treaties. Thereafter, Nationwide moved the court to appoint Goldberg as the umpire for the remaining disputes regarding the 1967 Treaties. Arrowood objected, arguing that the decision about Goldberg’s appointment under the 1967 Treaties was premature because the parties had not yet had an opportunity to obtain disclosures from Goldberg in connection with organizational meetings to determine whether he could be neutral. On April 9, 2014, the court agreed with Arrowood and deferred ruling until after the organizational meetings have been held and the parties have had sufficient opportunity to consider the resulting disclosures. Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., Case No. 12-cv-08005-LLS (USDC S.D.N.Y April 9, 2014).
This post written by Catherine Acree.
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A reinsurance dispute between Guarantee Trust and American Medical has been ongoing for some time; we posted prior updates in March 2011 and July 2013. Most recently, Guarantee Trust filed motions seeking to file a second amended complaint to add a request for specific performance and seeking a preliminary injunction requiring American Medical to post a bond to prevent a potential insolvency from impeding Guarantee Trust’s collection of any future judgment. The court denied both motions. No amended complaint would be allowed because Guarantee Trust could not show “excusable neglect” for having waited so long after its “need” for the equitable remedy first arose – months after the deteriorated financial strength of American Medical was publicized. Because Guarantee Trust had no equitable relief in its complaint and only a claim for money damages, the court ruled that it had no power to enjoin American Medical’s use of its property by requiring it to post a bond. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co. v. American Medical & Life Insurance Co., Case No. 10 C 2125 (USDCN.D. Ill. May 5, 2014).
This post written by Kyle Whitehead.
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Interest holders in a vessel insured a 50% interest with certain Lloyd’s Syndicates, and a 30% interest with Aigaion Insurance Company. The terms of the Aigaion policy contained a clause reading, “Agreed to follow London’s Catlin and Brit Syndicate in claims excluding ex-gratia payments” (the “Follow Clause”). When the Syndicates later settled a claim after the vessel was damaged, a dispute between the insureds and Aigaion arose over whether Aigaion was required to follow the settlement. Aigaion contended that it need not follow the settlement due to the following provision in the settlement agreement between the Syndicates and the insureds (the “Settlement Clause”): “The settlement and release pursuant to the terms of this Agreement is made by each Underwriter for their respective participations in the Policy only…and do not bind any other insurer providing hull and machinery cover in respect of the [vessel].” The insureds disagreed that this provision was enforceable by Aigaion, and argued that Aigaion was obligated to follow the Syndicates’ settlement under the Follow Clause.
The court interpreted the plain meaning of the Aigaion policy and ruled that the Follow Clause did indeed require Aigaion to follow any settlement made by the Syndicates. The court rejected Aigaion’s argument that the clause’s purpose was only to make the Syndicates Aigaion’s agent to negotiate settlement of disputed claims. The court also found that, although it interpreted the Settlement Clause as an attempt to exclude other parties from the settlement between the insureds and the Syndicates, Aigaion was not an intended third-party beneficiary of that agreement, Aigaion was bound under the Follow Clause, and Aigaion therefore could not rely on the Settlement Clause to avoid liability to the insureds. San Evans Maritime Inc., et al. v. Aigaion Insurance Co. SA, [2014] EWHC 163 (U.K. High Court of Justice, Comm. Div. Feb. 4, 2014).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
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There have been a number of recent court opinions enforcing class arbitration waivers, compelling individual arbitration and denying class arbitration, with the lone exception being a California Court of Appeal opinion which, in conflict with an opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, distinguished Concepcion and found a waiver of class arbitration to be unenforceable.
Alakozai v. Chase Investment Services Corp., No. 12-55553 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (Affirming denial of motion to compel arbitration of class action claims, finding class arbitration exclusion in FINRA rules was not incorporated explicitly into parties’ agreement, potentially allowing for arbitration of class action claims in another arbitral forum).
Hickey v. Brinker Nat’l Payroll Company, LP, 1:13-cv-00951 (USDC D. Colo. Feb. 18 2014) (granting motion to compel individual arbitration of employees’ claims against employer, rejecting claims that agreement with class arbitration waiver was unenforceable under NLRA or was otherwise unenforceable as unconscionable or against public policy).
Michael Appelbaum v. AutoNation Inc., SACV 13-01927 (USDC C.D. Cal. April 8, 2014) (granting motion to compel individual arbitration of employee’s claims against employer, finding class arbitration waiver not unenforceable under NLRA or otherwise unconsionable, substantively or procedurally)
Johnson v. Consumerinfo.com, Inc., No. 11-56520 (9th Cir. March 20, 2014) (dismissing appeal of trial court’s grant of motion to compel individual arbitration of consumer protection claims, finding FAA bars appeals of court orders staying judicial proceedings and compelling arbitration).
Imburgia v. DirectTV, Inc., No. B239361 (Cal. App. Ct. April 7, 2014) (affirming denial of motion to compel individual arbitration, finding choice of law provision which did not explicitly mention FAA, but did mention state law, allowed for interpretation of enforceability issues under state law, despite that result would otherwise be preempted by FAA. The case distinguishes Concepcion, and is in conflict with Ninth Circuit decision in Murphy v. DirectTV, Inc., No. 11-57163 (9th Cir. July 30, 2013), discussed in prior ReinsuranceFocus.com post.
This post written by John Pitblado.