Arbitration / Court Decisions

MODIFICATION OF REINSURANCE AGREEMENT BY REINSURER AND AGENT WITHOUT INSURER’S CONSENT UPHELD WHERE IT DID NOT EFFECT INSURER

May 21, 2012 by Carlton Fields

Arch Reinsurance Company entered into a three-party agreement with a homeowners insurer and insurance agent, Underwriters Service Agency, under which Arch agreed to reinsure all of the risk associated with the underlying insurance policies, and Underwriters agreed to accept commissions based on the extent of the losses taken on the policies. During the agreement’s term, an Arch representative, who subsequently resigned, agreed with Underwriters to amend the reinsurance agreement to raise the minimum commission available to Underwriters by “capping” Arch’s reinsurance at a specified amount of loss.

When Arch’s chairman belatedly learned of the amendment, he unsuccessfully attempted to revoke it, and then sued Underwriters, contending that the amendment was void for want of the cedent insurer’s consent. After a jury verdict was entered in Underwriters’s favor, the appellate court affirmed, holding the reinsurance agreement could be amended even without the consent of the cedent insurer. Despite language in the agreement and state law requiring the insurer’s consent, the court held that a modification could stand if it did not materially affect the cedent insurer. Arch’s apparent agreement to “cap” the insurer’s reinsurance coverage notwithstanding, an indemnity provision in Underwriters’s agency agreement could be construed to permit the insurer to continue to seek unlimited reinsurance coverage from Arch, who could then, in turn, seek indemnity from Underwriters for losses above the cap. The insurer’s status quo was preserved, the amendment would not shift any risk back to the insurer, and the modification would stand. Arch Reinsurance Co. v. Underwriters Service Agency, Inc., Case No. 02-10-00365-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2012).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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INSURER PREVAILS ON CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS

May 17, 2012 by Carlton Fields

Land O’ Lakes, a member-owned agricultural cooperative, acquired a property in Oklahoma that was later designated by the EPA as a “Superfund” clean-up site. In or about 2001, the EPA notified Land O’ Lakes that it was a Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) for the clean-up costs, and demanded $8.9 million. Land O’ Lakes notified its insurers, who declined coverage. In or about 2008, the EPA sent a renewed notice to Land O’ Lakes, demanding more than $20 million in additional clean-up costs. Land O’ Lakes again turned to its insurers and all declined coverage. Land O’ Lakes sued and all issues were raised via cross motions for summary judgment, with all parties seeking judgment in their favor. While the majority of this opinion addresses the direct claims by Land O’ Lakes against its insurers, the Court granted summary judgment to White Mountains Reinsurance on contribution claims asserted against it by Travelers Indemnity and Employers Insurance Company of Wausau. Summary judgment was predicated upon alternative grounds, the most basic of which was that although Travelers and Wausau breached their duty to defend Land O’ Lakes, that claim, upon which the claim of contribution was based, was barred by the statute of limitation. Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Case No. 09-CV-0693, (USDC D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2012).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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INSURER DENIED REQUEST TO ENJOIN SPEEDY ARBITRATION PROCEEDING

May 15, 2012 by Carlton Fields

Policyholder Nero filed a putative class action lawsuit against American Family Insurance Company, alleging common law and statutory claims. American Family moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, among other grounds. Shortly thereafter, on March 1, Nero notified American Family that an arbitration hearing would be commencing on March 5 in a different state and in front of a single arbitrator. American Family sought a temporary restraining order from the court enjoining the arbitration. American Family argued that it did not have sufficient time to prepare and, furthermore, that the location and designation of a single arbitrator was contrary to the terms of the arbitration provision in Nero’s insurance policy. It further argued that it would be irreparably harmed by having to “oppose confirmation of an unjust arbitration award” in a different jurisdiction. The court denied American Family’s request. The court stated that American Family’s contention that the arbitrator would not follow the proper procedure for selecting arbitrators was only speculative, and, furthermore, that FAA section 10(a)(3) permits vacatur where an arbitrator wrongfully refuses to postpone an arbitration hearing. Nero v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. 11-02717 (USDC D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2012).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

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APPELLATE COURT REMANDS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION UNDER “DELEGATION PROVISION”

May 14, 2012 by Carlton Fields

Plaintiff sued her bank in Florida federal court for the manner in which she was charged overdraft fees. The bank moved to compel arbitration, but the district court found the agreement to arbitrate unconscionable and unenforceable. The bank appealed. After the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration in light thereof. The district court again refused to compel arbitration, avoiding an unconscionability finding, but nevertheless finding that the dispute did not come within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The bank again appealed and the Eleventh Circuit again reversed, finding the threshold issue of whether the dispute is arbitrable to be explicitly reserved for the arbitrator under the so-called “delegation provision” in the parties’ contract, which states that “[a]ny issue regarding whether a particular dispute or controversy is . . . subject to arbitration will be decided by the arbitrator.” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, No. 11-14282 (11th Cir. March 21, 2012).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION FOUND FOR STATE LAW CLAIMS BASED ON DISPUTED WITHDRAWALS UNDER FEDERAL REINSURANCE PROGRAM

May 9, 2012 by Carlton Fields

School districts brought a case in state court against their insurers, alleging that the insurers’ withdrawal of funds from the federal Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP) on the school district’s behalf was improper under the ERRP’s scheme. Despite the plaintiffs’ assertion of only state common law claims for conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty, the defendants removed the case to federal court as implicating a federal question. On plaintiffs’ motion to remand back to state court, the court analyzed plaintiffs’ allegations and determined that, notwithstanding that the legal claims were alleged under state law, meeting the elements of those claims required the court to interpret the ERRP and related federal regulations to determine whether the defendants’ withdrawals were proper. The court then determined that, because the case would entail a “substantial and disputed federal issue,” and because federal jurisdiction over the case would not create “a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal court,” federal jurisdiction was proper. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the lack of a right to a private right of action under the ERRP was a relevant factor, but did not require remand. Hartland Lakeside Joint No. 3 School District v. WEA Insurance Corp., Case No. 2:12-cv-00154 (USDC E.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 2012).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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