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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions

Arbitration / Court Decisions

Second Circuit Concludes That Workers Who Deliver Baked Goods Are Not Transportation Workers and Must Arbitrate Their Claims

May 31, 2022 by Brendan Gooley

A divided panel of the Second Circuit recently held that independent distributors who distribute bakery products were not transportation workers and therefore were not exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Second Circuit therefore concluded that the transportation workers were bound by an arbitration clause in their agreements.

The plaintiffs were “independent distributors” who “own[ed] distribution rights” to distribute baked goods in Connecticut. The plaintiffs contracted with subsidiaries of Flowers Foods Inc. for those rights. They would “pick up” “baked goods from local Connecticut warehouses and deliver the goods to stores and restaurants within their assigned territories.” The plaintiffs “earn[ed] the difference between the price at which” they “acquire[d] the bakery products” “and the price paid by the stores and restaurants.” “In their roles as independent distributors, the plaintiffs” sought to “maximize sales; solicit new locations [to make sales]; stock shelves and rotate products; remove stale products; acquire delivery vehicles; maintain equipment and insurance; distribute Flowers’ advertising materials and develop their own (with prior approval by Flowers); retain legal and accounting services; and hire help.” The plaintiffs could also sell their distribution rights for a profit and carry other goods but did not carry any other goods.

The plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Connecticut wage laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the distribution agreements. The plaintiffs sought to avoid arbitration by arguing that they were transportation workers and were therefore exempt from arbitration under the FAA’s exclusion for “seamen, railroad employees, [and] any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” (i.e., transportation workers). The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were not “transportation workers” and therefore compelled arbitration.

A Second Circuit panel affirmed with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting. The Second Circuit defined “transportation workers” “by affinity” (i.e., by looking to the examples of transportation workers in the FAA’s exemption: Seamen and railroad employees). Both seamen and railroad employees, the court noted, work in the transportation industry. The Second Circuit concluded that “an individual works in a transportation industry if the industry in which the individual works pegs its charges chiefly to the movement of goods or passengers, and the industry’s predominant source of commercial revenue is generated by that movement.”

Applying that standard to the facts before it, the Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were “in the baking industry,” not the transportation industry. Although the plaintiffs spent “appreciable parts of their working days moving goods,” “the stores and restaurants [were] not buying the movement of the baked goods, so long as they arrive.” “The charges [were] for the baked goods themselves, and the movement of those goods [was] at most a component of total price. The commerce [was] in breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes — not transportation services.”

The Second Circuit also noted that the distributor agreements identified the industry that the distributors worked in as the “baking industry,” not the transportation industry.

Because the plaintiffs worked in the baking industry, not the transportation industry, they were not exempt from the FAA, and the district court therefore properly compelled arbitration.

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, No. 20-1681 (2d Cir. May 5, 2022).

 

 

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions

Delaware Federal Court Confirms Arbitration Award, Holds Arbitrator Did Not Exceed Authority in Finding Unambiguous Contract Provision Was Unconscionable

May 26, 2022 by Alex Silverman

QAD Inc. petitioned the Delaware federal court to confirm an arbitration award it obtained against Block & Company Inc. Block cross-moved to vacate the award. The arbitrator awarded QAD more than $740,000 in connection with a contract dispute between the parties. In moving to vacate the award, Block claimed the arbitrator exceeded his authority in declaring that a limit of liability provision in the contract was unconscionable, despite also finding the contract language itself was unambiguous. Block argued that QAD drafted the provision, and there was no evidence of a gross imbalance between the two sophisticated parties in negotiating the term. The court nonetheless confirmed the award, and denied Block’s motion to vacate, finding Block had not satisfied its “heavy burden” under FAA section 10(a)(4) to show that the award was not “rationally derived from the agreement or supported by the record.” Even if the arbitrator had erred in his interpretation of the case law on unconscionability, the court explained that its power to vacate the award would be constrained because “[e]xceeding one’s powers … is not synonymous with making a mistake.” Because the arbitrator based his assessment of unconscionability on the facts on the record and applicable law, the court held that it could not re-litigate the merits of the unconscionability ruling, regardless of whether the arbitrator reached the correct decision.

QAD, Inc. v. Block & Co., Inc., No. 1:21-mc-00370 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Contract Interpretation

Virginia Supreme Court Declines to Enforce Arbitration Clause in a Trust, Agrees Trusts Aren’t “Contracts” Under FAA and Virginia Law

May 24, 2022 by Alex Silverman

Linda Anderson sued Sarah Boyle alleging that Boyle breached her duties as trustee of an irrevocable trust to which Anderson and Boyle were beneficiaries. Boyle moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration clause in the trust. The lower court denied the motion and Boyle appealed.

The Virginia Supreme Court granted the appeal solely to decide whether the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act (VUAA) or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), each of which requires arbitration for “contracts,” compels enforcement of an arbitration provision in a trust. The court explained that a trust is, in general, a “donative instrument,” not an “agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.” As such, the court held that a trust is not a “contract,” as required to fall within the ambit of both the VUAA and the FAA. While the VUAA also compels arbitration for certain “written agreements,” the court disagreed with Boyle that a trust qualifies as an “agreement.” Further, even if it did, the court noted that an arbitration clause would not be enforceable under the VUAA as it relates to claims between a trustee and a beneficiary, the latter of whom is not a party to any “written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration.” The court therefore affirmed the lower court order denying Boyle’s motion, agreeing that neither the VUAA nor the FAA compels arbitration.

Boyle v. Anderson, No. 210382 (Va. Apr. 14, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Contract Interpretation

District Court’s Order Details 28 USC § 1782 Requirements for Granting Ex Parte Petition for Discovery of Documents in Foreign Proceeding

May 18, 2022 by Benjamin Stearns

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted an ex parte petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) for the discovery of documents held by Aimbridge Hospitality, Norton Rose Fulbright, and White & Case for use in a proceeding in the British Virgin Islands. In so doing, the court noted that such ex parte petitions are “routinely grant[ed].”

A district court has the authority to grant a section 1782 petition where:

  1. The person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district of the district court to which the application is made;
  2. The discovery is for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal; and;
  3. The application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person.

The court also described the following discretionary factors that the court may consider:

  1. Whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding, in which case the need for section 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent;
  2. The nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign court or agency abroad to U.S. federal court judicial assistance;
  3. Whether the section 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions; and
  4. Whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.

The petition, supported by declarations and memoranda of law, satisfied the required section 1782 criteria, where the petitioner averred that the respondents all resided in or were found in the Southern District, and the documents would be used to “strengthen [the petitioner’s] position” in ongoing litigation in the British Virgin Islands, which the petitioner had initiated, making it an “interested party.” In addition, each of the discretionary factors, including the fact that courts in the Southern District “routinely grant § 1782 applications for discovery for use in the BVI,” also weighed in favor of granting the petition.

In re Application of Tethyan Copper Co. Pty. Ltd., No. 1:21-mc-00377 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Discovery

Southern District of New York Concludes That Equitable Tolling Does Not Save Untimely Petition to Confirm Foreign Arbitration Award

May 11, 2022 by Brendan Gooley

The Southern District of New York has held that a petitioner did not show that it diligently pursued its rights or that extraordinary circumstances existed to equitably toll the three-year statute of limitation to confirm a foreign arbitration award. The court therefore dismissed the petition to confirm the award on the ground that it was time-barred.

PT Rahajasa Media Internet entered into contracts with a branch of the Indonesian government to provide internet access to various locations in Indonesia. PT Rahajasa completed certain work on the projects before the Indonesian government apparently decided not to proceed with the projects. In early 2017, PT Rahajasa and the Indonesian government arbitrated how much the Indonesian government owed PT Rahajasa. On July 27, 2017, the Indonesian National Board of Arbitration awarded PT Rahajasa approximately $17 million. PT Rahajasa registered the award in an Indonesian court in August 2017, and the award became final and binding in September 2017.

On March 26, 2018, PT Rahajasa made a formal application for an order of execution in the Indonesian court, which PT Rahajasa claimed the Indonesian court was required to issue within 30 days of PT Rahajasa’s request. The Indonesian court never issued the order, despite PT Rahajasa apparently following up on its application several times.

On December 30, 2020, PT Rahajasa petitioned the Southern District to confirm the award. The Southern District issued an order to show cause as to why the petition should not be dismissed on the ground that it was filed more than three years after the arbitration award was entered.

In response, PT Rahajasa argued that the three-year statute of limitation should be equitably tolled. It claimed, among other things, that the Indonesian government had colluded to preclude it from enforcing the award in Indonesia and that the COVID-19 pandemic and other issues had hampered its attempts to enforce the award in Indonesian courts in a timely fashion.

The district court concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because PT Rahajasa had not established that it had been diligent in pursuing its rights or that extraordinary circumstances stood in its way and prevented its timely filing. The court noted that PT Rahajasa had not explained why it waited six months after the award became final to seek an order of execution or what, specifically, it did in the years thereafter to follow up on its application or what happened when it did follow up. The court also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic did not arise until years after PT Rahajasa obtained its award. Nor did PT Rahajasa explain what efforts it made to pursue its award when the pandemic required Indonesian courts to begin virtual proceedings. PT Rahajasa also did not explain why it waited until December 2020 to file its petition. With respect to extraordinary circumstances, the court explained that PT Rahajasa’s claims of collusion were “conclusory and speculative” and that PT Rahajasa had not established a causal relationship between these alleged extraordinary circumstances and an inability to petition the Southern District to confirm its award in a timely fashion. The court therefore dismissed the petition.

PT Rahajasa Media Internet v. Telecommunication and Informatics Financing Provider and Management Centre, No. 1:20-cv-11035 (Mar. 31, 2022).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions

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