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You are here: Home / Archives for Arbitration / Court Decisions / Jurisdiction Issues

Jurisdiction Issues

Court Finds Jurisdiction Over Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Dispute Between Liquidator and Foreign Reinsurer

April 29, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

In the wake of the liquidation of Legion Indemnity Co., the Illinois Director of Insurance, as liquidator of Legion, and Catalina Holdings arbitrated claims originating under reinsurance agreements between Legion and a predecessor of Catalina. After the arbitrators ruled in favor of Catalina, Catalina filed a petition to confirm the award with the Northern District of Illinois. The Director moved to dismiss.

The court found that it had jurisdiction over the petition under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The arbitration agreement arose out of a dispute over reinsurance contracts, which are generally considered “commercial” under 9 U.S.C. § 2, and the contracts arose out of a relationship between a citizen of the United States and a citizen of the United Kingdom. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 202, all arbitral awards fall under the Convention unless they arise out of “a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States.”

The court ruled against the Director’s argument that the Convention is reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act because the Convention did not “invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by [the] State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” Finally, the court found that Burford abstention would be inappropriate in this case. The Director argued, pursuant to Burford, that the court should “abstain from the exercise of federal review that would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” There are two “essential elements” to this type of Burford abstention: The state must offer a forum where these claims may be litigated, and that forum must “stand in a special relationship of technical oversight or concentrated review to the evaluation of those claims.” The requisite elements were not present in this case and, as a result, the court refused to abstain.

Catalina Holdings (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Hammer, No. 1:18-cv-05642 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Arbitration Process Issues, Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues

Discovery Under Section 1782 Denied Based on Finding That Chinese Arbitration Organization Was Not a “Foreign or International Tribunal”

April 8, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

Section 1782(a) permits a person to seek a court order for the production of documents for use “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. …” To obtain discovery under the statute, the petitioner must meet three requirements: (1) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district where the application was made; (2) the discovery must be for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal; and (3) the applicant must be either a foreign tribunal or an interested person.

Here, the court relied on precedent in the Second Circuit holding that when Congress enacted section 1782, “it intended to cover governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals and conventional courts and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies,” but did not intend to cover “arbitral bodies established by private parties.” Based on this precedent, the court found that the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) did not qualify as a foreign tribunal under section 1782(a). While the court acknowledged that CIETAC was originally established in 1954 by the Chinese government, the court explained that: (1) CIETAC’s jurisdiction is derived exclusively from the private agreement of the parties to arbitration proceedings; (2) the parties, not the state, are permitted to choose their own arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding upon both parties; and (4) CIETAC itself emphasizes it is “independent of the administrative organs of the Chinese government, and free from any administrative interference in handling cases.” The court also noted that permitting parties to seek discovery through American courts under section 1782(a) would undermine significant advantages of arbitration, specifically, its efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and thereby conflict with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The court therefore held that CIETAC is not a “foreign or international tribunal” within the meaning of section 1782(a).

In re Application of Hanwei Guo, No. 1:18-mc-00561-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2019).

Filed Under: Arbitration / Court Decisions, Arbitration Process Issues, Discovery, Jurisdiction Issues

Court Enforces Arbitration Subpoena Against Third-Party Walgreens in Pharmaceutical Drug Overcharge Dispute

January 15, 2019 by Carlton Fields

The plaintiff in the underlying arbitration (Health Options) served a third-party subpoena on Walgreens to attend a hearing and produce documents concerning the prices it charged for pharmaceuticals to Navitus that Health Options ultimately covered. Walgreens initially declined to produce the requested information and a corporate representative for the hearing, claiming its headquarters was more than 100 miles from the hearing location in Madison, Wisconsin, and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The court, however, granted a motion to enforce the arbitration subpoena. First, the court rejected Walgreens’s territoriality argument, accepting Health Options’s proposed method of measuring distance “as the crow flies” and finding that Walgreens’ headquarters in Deerfield, Illinois was less than 100 miles from Madison. Second, the court held that it had personal jurisdiction over Walgreens. The court concluded that Walgreens’s suit-related in-state activities—submitting inflated prices to Navitus that Navitus in turn submitted to Health Options—were sufficiently related to Health Options’s injuries—overpaying on Navitus’s claims. Walgreens’s “purposely-directed communications” to Navitus in Wisconsin were “part of the wrongful conduct” that prompted the lawsuit. Because it is unclear whether the traditional minimum contacts inquiry applies in the third-party discovery context, the court examined the additional criterion some circuits apply: whether a close relationship exists between the non-party’s contacts with the specific discovery request. Even with the heightened scrutiny, the court found the subpoena sought documents related specifically to Walgreens’s contact with Wisconsin. Finally, the court denied Walgreens’s request that Health Options pay its subpoena compliance costs up front. It found Walgreens did not demonstrate the subpoena would be unduly burdensome nor did it provide an estimate of costs, both flaws that precluded an award of costs, let alone upfront costs. Maine Community Health Options v. Walgreen Co., Case No. 18-0009 (USDC W.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2018).

Filed Under: Discovery, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

Ninth Circuit Holds that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Govern How to Calculate the FAA’s Three-Month Filing Deadline to Seek Vacatur of an Arbitration Award

January 14, 2019 by Benjamin Stearns

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition to vacate an arbitration award because the petition was filed one day late. The court determined that whether a petition to vacate is filed within the applicable three-month deadline under the FAA is based upon the method of calculating provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). That Rule provides a three-step process: (1) exclude the day the arbitrator delivered the final award (in this case, September 14, 2016); (2) calculate three months from the following day (in this case September 15); and (3) include the last day of the period, unless it is on the weekend or a legal holiday, in which case the period concludes at the end of the next weekday that is not a legal holiday. Here, the court focused on Step 2. The court stated that each month began on the 15th day of the month and ended on the 14th day of the following month, just as “the month beginning January 1 concludes on January 31, not February 1.” Because the plaintiffs filed their petition for vacatur on December 15, when the last day for filing within the available three-month window under the FAA was December 14, the Ninth Circuit found that the petition was properly denied as untimely. The Ninth Circuit also addressed the standard for whether a post-judgment motion tolls the time to file an appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4). Stevens v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc., No. 17-15965 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards, Jurisdiction Issues, Week's Best Posts

Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Landlord’s Attempt to Vacate Arbitration Award

January 10, 2019 by Alex Silverman

Sears Roebuck and Co. (Sears) entered a 40-year lease with Century III Mall, PA., LLC (“Century III Mall”), whereby Sears agreed to maintain an anchor store at the Century III Mall. In the event that Sears elected to discontinue operations, the lease provided Century III Mall with an option to acquire the Sears “Building and Improvements,” the valuation to be determined by a formula specified in the lease. The lease also contained an arbitration clause prohibiting the arbitrators from, among other things, changing any terms set forth in the lease. Sears later terminated the lease and Century III Mall exercised its right to acquire the Building and Improvements. Unable to agree on a valuation, Sears commenced arbitration and an arbitration panel awarded Sears nearly $4 million.

Century III Mall filed a petition in a federal district court in Pennsylvania seeking to vacate the award, claiming the panel exceeded its authority by “rewriting” the terms of lease and, in turn, inflating the property value. The district court disagreed and dismissed the action, as well as confirmed the award. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting, as an initial matter, that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 10 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and that appellate jurisdiction was proper under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Substantively, the Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the panel reasonably interpreted the lease and rationally applied its terms. Thus, citing the “highly deferential standard of review” applicable to arbitration decisions, the Court declined to disturb the district court’s decision not to vacate the award.

Century III Mall, PA., LLC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., Nos. 17-2284 and 17-2759 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).

This post written by Alex Silverman.
See our disclaimer.

Filed Under: Arbitration Process Issues, Jurisdiction Issues

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