Jurisdiction Issues

THIRD CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF SUIT TO VACATE FINRA ARBITRATION AWARD

September 21, 2016 by John Pitblado

This case involved an underlying arbitration before an arbitration panel operating under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) rules, which was brought by Judith and Kenneth Goldman against their financial advisor, Barry Guariglia, and his employer Citigroup Global Markets. The Goldmans had followed their investment adviser when he left his prior employer, Merrill Lynch, and went to Citigroup. In the arbitration, they claimed that when they transferred their account to Citigroup, they were subjected to a “devastating margin call” that wiped out their retirement savings. After 10 days of evidence and argument, and after the Goldmans submitted their case in chief, Citigroup moved to dismiss for lack of evidence. The FINRA arbitration panel dismissed the case, noting that “[w]hile all the claims were quite stridently argued, not a single claim was proven to be true by evidence.”

The Goldmans then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in a Pennsylvania federal court, and Citigroup moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted by the court. In its decision, the court noted that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the Federal Arbitration Act does not itself create federal subject matter jurisdiction, and that the parties were not diverse, and thus, federal question jurisdiction would be required for the court to consider a motion to vacate an arbitration award. The Pennsylvania federal court found that the Goldmans failed to raise a federal question and simply sought to “assert the same claims they unsuccessfully brought in their arbitration.” The Goldmans then appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In their appeal, the Goldmans asserted that a district court can “look through a motion to vacate” at the underlying subject matter, relying on footnote in a prior Third Circuit decision, Goldman Sachs v. Athena Venture Partners, which stated that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to vacate because the arbitration included federal securities law claims. The Third Circuit, however, rejected that argument, and found that it was not bound to follow the footnote in that case, noting that the footnote was an “unexamined exercise of jurisdiction and so is without precedential effect” and that the “drive-by jurisdictional ruling” in Athena goes against Third Circuit precedent. Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the Pennsylvania federal court’s order dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Goldman et al. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., et al., No. 15-2345 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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SEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS SERVICE OF SUIT CLAUSE IN REINSURANCE TREATIES AND GRANTS CEDENT ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO SELECT FORUM

September 19, 2016 by John Pitblado

Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the service of suit clause, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a reinsurer waived its right of removal. The service of suit clause provided:

It is agreed that in the event of the failure of the Reinsurer hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Reinsurer hereon, at the request of the Company, will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of such Court.

Cases interpreting this service of suit clause as far back as 1949 have found such a clause forecloses a defendant’s right of removal. Although the reinsurer urged the Court should adopt a heightened “clear and unequivocal” standard when determining whether it waived its right of removal, the Court declined to do so, as litigation-based waivers are distinguishable from contractual waivers, and such a high standard should not be applied to the right of parties to contract where they will litigate a dispute.

The reinsurance treaties required the reinsurer to submit to the jurisdiction of any court chosen by the cedent “whether it be to determine the arbitrable nature of the dispute, to confirm an arbitration award, to compel arbitration, or resolve on the merits, a claim not subject to arbitration,” which included the cedent’s breach of contract claim in this instance. Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Transfercom, Ltd., No. 16-1073 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 2016)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ALLOWS FEDERAL COURTS TO “LOOK THROUGH” § 10 FAA PETITION TO DETERMINE FEDERAL JURISDICTION

September 13, 2016 by Carlton Fields

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reversed its own precedent to allow federal courts examining petitions under § 10 of the FAA to “look through” the petition to examine if there is federal jurisdiction. In the case, which arose out of a dispute involving registered FINRA members and their former employees, the district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, finding that it did not state a “substantial federal question on its face.” On appeal, the petitioner argued that the Second Circuit’s precedent in Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000), which led the district court to its determination, had been displaced by Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009). The Second Circuit panel held that Vaden “rendered Greenberg’s result fundamentally inconsistent with the Act’s statutory context and judicial interpretations.” Thus, the Second Circuit returned the case to the district court with instructions that it could “look through” the § 10 petition, “applying the ordinary principles of federal-question jurisdiction to the underlying dispute as defined by Vaden.” Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, No. 15-2814 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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FEDERAL COURT HAS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PETITION TO COMPEL; DETERMINES PARTY DID NOT WAIVE ARBITRATION BY AGREEING TO MEDIATION

August 23, 2016 by Carlton Fields

Despite a pending motion to compel arbitration in state court, a party (MetLife) petitioned a Tennessee district court under the Federal Arbitration Act for the same relief. As that Act itself does not create federal-question jurisdiction, the court sua sponte looked to the citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy. Finding both requirements met, and declining to invoke the doctrine of abstention as the respondent requested, the court determined the merits of the parties’ claims. Applying federal law, the court looked at the contract created by the parties’ exchange of emails while the issue of arbitrability was pending before the state court. The pertinent email from MetLife stated that it was agreeable to mediating within 90 days of the state court’s ruling on the arbitration issue. In the Sixth Circuit, a party waives a contractual right to arbitrate by “(1) taking actions that are completely inconsistent with any reliance on the arbitration agreement; and (2) delaying its assertion to such an extent that the opposing party incurs actual prejudice.” MetLife merely expressed its openness to mediation. The respondent also challenged the validity of the arbitration provisions themselves, characterizing them as unenforceable contracts of adhesion, which the court could determine under the Federal Arbitration Act. As the parties agreed that New York law governed the arbitration provisions, the court looked at the elements of adhesion and determined the account application the respondent signed contained enforceable and valid arbitration provisions. As to the account applications respondent directed her MetLife representative to sign, the court reserved a ruling on the issue of agency. Metlife Securities, Inc. v. Holt, Case No. 2:16-cv-32 (USDC E.D. Tenn. July 21, 2016).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURT DENIES MOTION TO TRANSFER WHERE CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO AND PARTY LOCATED IN ILLINOIS

August 2, 2016 by Carlton Fields

Earlier this month, a federal court in Illinois denied a motion to transfer a case to California. The motion arose out of a reinsurance dispute between the R&Q Reinsurance Company and American Insurance Company. R&Q filed its case in the Illinois federal court, and American moved to transfer the case to California, arguing that R&Q was seeking to “avail itself of Illinois’ notice laws, which arguably provide reinsurers with a less onerous path to avoid their obligations on late notice grounds.” R&Q argued that the case should remain in Illinois, among other reasons, because R&Q was based in Illinois and the reinsurance contracts were executed there. Additionally, R&Q argued that to the extent that AIC’s records were electronic, those documents and that data is “as much present in Illinois” as in California. However, R&Q noted that “this action arises out of events that transpired in at least three, and possibly 5 different states.” American replied that the key witnesses were “either in California or outside of Illinois,” continuing to make its case for a transfer to California. After an oral hearing, the court denied the American’s motion to transfer, keeping the case in Illinois. R&Q Reinsurance Co. v. American Insurance Co., Case No. 1:16-cv-4199 (USDC N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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