Jurisdiction Issues

Contract Claims Dismissed Against Reinsurers and Reinsurance Service Providers, but Negligence Claim Against Service Providers Allowed to Go Forward

September 20, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

Vantage, the plaintiff, had purchased insurance from Assured Risk Transfer (ART) against the risk that a company to which Vantage had loaned $22 million would default. ART then reinsured 90% of its risk with seven reinsurance companies. When the borrower defaulted, Vantage made a $22 million claim, which ART denied. An arbitrator decided that ART owed Vantage $22 million plus interest and costs. ART did not pay, claiming it had insufficient assets to satisfy the award and that the only source of funding was amounts owed to it under its reinsurance contracts. The reinsurers, however, refused to pay on the claim. Vantage filed suit in U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, asserting a claims for breach of contract against the seven reinsurers and negligence and breach of contract against three related companies that provided services to ART—Willis Captive Management, Willis Re, Inc. and Willis Towers Watson Management (the Willis Defendants).

The court first addressed the argument that it could not exert personal jurisdiction over the seven reinsurers. While it found that the requirements for specific jurisdiction over these reinsurers had been met, the court found that Vantage had not effected service of process on these defendants. Vantage had served them through a law firm that was listed in the relevant reinsurance contracts as their agent for service of process, but those contracts authorized service only if ART sued to compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. The court found that Vantage could not show that it was a party to any of the reinsurance contracts or overcome the general rule that a reinsurer does not have a contractual relationship with the original insured, and thus that it could not take advantage of the service of process provisions within those contracts. The court then denied Vantage an extension of time to effect service, as Vantage’s lack of a contractual relationship with the reinsurers meant that its breach of contract claims against those reinsurers must necessarily fail.

The court then addressed the breach of contract claims against the Willis Defendants. Vantage alleged that they had breached their contractual obligation to transmit information to the reinsurers when they failed to timely notify them of Vantage’s $22 million claim—a failure the reinsurers relied upon when denying the claim. However, the court found that the contracts at issue were between the Willis Defendants and ART, not Vantage, giving ART no enforceable right under these contracts, and the court dismissed these claims. However, while no contractual duty existed, the court found that a tort duty might, as the Willis Defendants were alleged to have undertaken to render services to one party (ART) that was necessary for the protection of a third party (Vantage). Thus, the court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of such a duty to Vantage to avoid dismissal.

Vantage Commodities Financial Service I, LLC, v. Assured Risk Transfer PCC, LLC, et al., Case no. 1:17-cv-01451(TNM) (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Court Enforces Forum Selection And Choice Of Law Clauses In Worker’s Compensation Reinsurance Participation Agreement

August 20, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

Plaintiff AGL Industries, Inc. (AGL), a steel fabrication and erection business, enrolled in a workers’ compensation insurance policy with Defendant Continental Indemnity Company and a reinsurance participation agreement (RPA) with Defendant Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. After Continental canceled the workers’ compensation insurance policy, AGL sued in New York for breach of contract and related claims and obtained emergency injunctive relief. Defendants then removed the case to federal court, which then granted a motion by Defendants to transfer venue to Nebraska based on the RPA’s forum selection and choice of law clauses. The federal court rejected AGL’s argument that the RPA was void ab initio because it was “an illegal workers’ compensation policy” in violation of New York insurance law. The court found that AGL did not assert that the forum selection clause was the result of fraud or misrepresentation, and therefore, at worst, the clause was severable from the RPA. Moreover, the Court found unpersuasive AGL’s sole argument against enforcing the forum selection clause that transferring the action to Nebraska would violate New York’s public policy in favor of “granting insureds access to the courts of the State of New York for all disputes regarding policies written in and for residents of the State [of New York].” AGL Industries Inc. v. Continental Indemnity Co., Case No. 17-4179 (USDC E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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Fifth Circuit Allows Non-Signatories To Enforce Arbitration Agreement

June 5, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed an order compelling arbitration, despite the fact that the parties seeking to compel arbitration were not signatories to the relevant arbitration agreement.

The litigation arose out of a 1998 transaction in which Henry House purchased a home and real property from Jim Walter Homes, Inc. and Mid-State Trust IV. The sale contract contained an arbitration agreement under which the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes “in accordance with the Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures administered by J●A●M●S/Endispute.”

In 2016, Mr. House sued Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. and Walter Investment Management Corporation (WIMC), alleging that they conspired with Jim Walter Homes and Mid-State Trust IV to induce Mr. House to enter into the 1998 agreement based on the false premise that he would get a properly constructed home. Green Tree and WIMC moved in federal court to compel arbitration. Mr. House argued that Green Tree and WIMC, as non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, lacked standing to enforce it, but the district court found that they had standing under Mississippi’s intertwined claims test and that the arbitration agreement, by incorporating the JAMS rules, delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

On appeal, Mr. House argued (1) that the intertwined claims test did not apply because Green Tree and WIMC did not exist at the time the arbitration agreement was executed; (2) that Mr. House, as an unsophisticated party, could not agree to delegate the question of arbitrability by agreeing to the JAMS rules; and (3) that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was fraudulently induced.

The court quickly disposed of the second argument, refusing to consider it at all because Mr. House had not raised the issue of his lack of sophistication before the trial court.

As regards the first, the court found that the exact date when the entities formed was irrelevant. Mississippi’s intertwined claims test allows a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration agreement against a party who makes “‘allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct’ between a non-signatory and a signatory that have a close legal relationship.” The court found that this was satisfied by Mr. House’s complaint, which alleged that Green Tree and WIMC were coconspirators and joint venturers with the parties to the 1998 arbitration agreement in a scheme to get Mr. House to enter into that transaction.

Finally, the court held that when the parties have delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, a court may only find that the arbitration agreement was procured by fraud if the party seeking to avoid arbitration challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement specifically, rather than the contract as a whole. Mr. House did not do that, however, instead alleging generally that his signature on the 1998 sales contract and related documents was procured through fraud, which the court found was not specific enough to take this question out of the hands of the arbitrator.

Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., et al. v. House, et al., (5th Cir. May 14, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Missouri Federal Court Remands Action To State Court Because Missouri Law “Reverse Preempts” The New York Convention Based On The McCarran-Ferguson Act

May 22, 2018 by Carlton Fields

Foresight Energy, LLC (“Foresight”) brought an action in Missouri state court against various domestic and Bermuda and London market insurers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract and statutory vexatious refusal to pay a claim related to an event at a coal mine in Hillsboro, Illinois. The policies at issue provided for an arbitration in London and that the policies were to be governed by Missouri law. One of the insurers removed the action to Missouri federal court, asserting that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “New York Convention”) because the agreement did not arise out of a relationship “entirely between citizens of the United States,” given the involvement of the non-U.S. insurers/defendants. Foresight then moved in Missouri federal court to remand the action back to state court because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Missouri law, the law governing the policies, prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance policies and that Missouri law “reverse preempts” the New York Convention in light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

The Missouri federal court noted that McCarran-Ferguson states that “[n]o act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” The court then found that the New York Convention, an act of Congress, was not a self-executing treaty and could not itself provide the rule of decision, and that the Missouri anti-arbitration statute was a state law regulating the business of insurance. The court also found that application of the New York Convention to enforce the arbitration agreement in the policies at issue would “invalidate, impair or supersede” the Missouri anti-arbitration statute. The court then held that because the New York Convention was an act of Congress and was not self-executing, McCarran-Ferguson “reverse preempted” the New York Convention, which thus eliminated the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Missouri federal court granted Foresight’s motion to remand the action to state court.

Foresight Energy, LLC. v. Certain London Market Ins. Cos., No. 17-CV-2266 (USDC E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2018).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.
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Court of Appeal of England and Wales Finds That Party’s Forgery of Documents in Connection with a Transaction Does Not Bar Confirmation of Arbitration Award

May 15, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has rejected a challenge to an arbitration award issued by the China International Trade Arbitration Commission (the “Tribunal”) against RBRG Trading (UK) Limited in favor of Sinocore International Co. Ltd., despite an argument from RBRG that the award was contrary to public policy.

The matter arose from Sinocore’s agreement to sell steel to RBRG. The parties later amended the contract to give RBRG a right to inspect the steel, and RBRG claimed that the parties agreed to amend a letter of credit issued by a Dutch bank in connection to the transaction to change the shipping date to July 20 and 30, 2010. Sinocore then shipped the steel on July 7, 2010, a fact of which RBRG was informed, but presented bills of lading that falsely gave the date of July 20-21, 2010 to the bank. The bank refused to pay due to the fraudulent bills of lading, and Sinocore terminated the contract and sold the steel to a third party. RBRG then commenced the arbitration, claiming that Sinocore had breached the agreement to allow RBRG to inspect the steel by shipping it too soon, and Sinocore counterclaimed for damages related to the termination of the contract.

The Tribunal determined that RBRG had not asked to inspect the steel and had been timely notified of its shipment and thus could not claim damages from Sinocore’s failure to allow an inspection. The tribunal further determined that RBRG had breached the contract by instructing the bank to issue the amended letter of credit, an amendment to which Sinocore had not agreed. The Tribunal further determined that that forgery of the bills of lading had not harmed RBRG and had not been the cause of the termination of the agreement, which instead resulted from RBRG’s instruction to issue the non-conforming letter of credit.

When Sinocore attempted to enforce the award in the United Kingdom, RBRG argued that it should not be enforced because it was based on Sinocore’s forgery of bills of lading, and that it was contrary to public policy to assist a seller who present forged documents under a letter of credit. The court disagreed, however, and emphasized the importance both of enforcing arbitral awards and of strictly construing the exception for awards that violate public policy. Ultimately, relying in part on the Tribunal’s determination that RBRG’s conduct caused the contract to terminate, the court found that the connection between the forged bills of lading and the award was simply too weak to justify a departure from the general rule that arbitral awards should be enforced.

RBRG Trading (UK) Limited v. Sinocore International Co. Ltd., [2018] EWCA (Civ) 838

This post written by Jason Brost.

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