Interim or Preliminary Relief

COURT REJECTS MOTION TO SEAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT EXHIBITS WHEN MOVING PARTY FAILS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH SEALING

June 13, 2017 by Rob DiUbaldo

Utica Mutual Insurance Company’s request that numerous exhibits filed in support of summary judgment be sealed has been rejected by a federal district court, which found that Utica’s general statements about the documents were insufficient to allow the court to “make the ‘specific, on-the-record findings’ required to seal judicial documents.”

Utica and Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. are on opposing sides of two related lawsuits regarding Utica’s attempt to seek reimbursement for asbestos claims under two reinsurance contracts. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and Utica moved to have numerous exhibits in support of these motions filed under seal on the basis that they contained privileged communications with in-house and/or outside attorneys, referred to such privileged information, or contained attorney’s handwritten notes protected by the work product doctrine.

The court began by describing the standards for such a sealing motion, noting the “strong presumption of access” that attaches to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion and that overcoming this presumption requires a party to provide facts sufficient to allow the court to make “specific, on-the-record findings . . . demonstrating the closure is essential to preserve higher values and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Utica’s explanations, the court found, were not specific enough to meet this standard. In its descriptions of attorney-client communications, the court found that Utica did not explain who all of the recipients were or show that the communications were intended to be or were kept confidential. Regarding attorney notes, the court found that Utica did not indicate whether they were fact or opinion work product. Similarly, the court found that Utica did not specify whether other documents it wished to file under seal were protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and otherwise failed to provide information sufficiently specific for the court to determine which documents contained protected information or to narrowly tailor a sealing order to protect that information. However, the court allowed Utica to file as exhibits certain briefs from prior litigation in the same redacted form that they were previously filed.

Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00196 (BKS/ATB) (N.D.N.Y. April 26, 2016)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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LOUISIANA FEDERAL COURT FINDS REMOVAL PROPER AS DISPUTE COULD RELATE TO AN UNDERLYING ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN INSURANCE POLICY

April 18, 2017 by John Pitblado

In this case, a Louisiana federal court denied a motion for remand of a former machinist’s asbestos-related claim, finding that an English insurer’s removal from state court was appropriate and that the dispute could relate to an underlying arbitration agreement contained in an insurance policy.

The background of this case can be found here. In short, plaintiff filed a personal injury action in Louisiana state court against defendants Cove Shipping, Inc. and Maritime Management Corp. (together, “Cove Shipping”), alleging that he now suffers from lung cancer as a result of asbestos exposure from years spent working as a machinist onboard several oil tankers in the early 1980s while he was working for Cove Shipping. Via the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, plaintiff also named West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association, a P&I Club (“West of England”) as a defendant, for its role as Cove Shipping’s insurer during the years in question. West of England subsequently removed the action, invoking the removal provision of the Uniform Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”).

As justification for using the Convention for removal, West of England cited an arbitration clause found in its Club Rules that it contends were in effect at the time of plaintiff’s alleged employment and now apply to his lawsuit, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff is a third-party to the insurance agreement between West of England and Cove Shipping. In his motion for remand, plaintiff made various arguments in support of the contention that he is not bound by the arbitration clause and, thus, the case should be remanded: First, West of England has failed to demonstrate it is entitled to arbitration under documents it submitted with removal as the arbitration agreement at issue was not attached. Second, English law forbids the application of this arbitration agreement to non-signatories such as plaintiff. Third, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because the prohibitive costs of the agreement prevent plaintiff from vindicating his federal statutory rights. Fourth, West of England waived its right to arbitrate. Fifth, Jones Act Claims are not subject to arbitration. And sixth, the law of Louisiana forbids arbitration in insurance disputes, which does not run afoul of the Convention.

Rejecting all of plaintiff’s arguments and/or finding them premature merit-based challenges to arbitration, the Louisiana federal court denied the motion to remand, finding that removal of the direct action plaintiff’s lawsuit against a foreign insurer was appropriate based on the existence of an arbitration clause found in the Club Rules of the insurer. The court noted that what was at issue in the present motion was a jurisdictional question, and that the plaintiff is not left without redress, as merit-based arguments may be presented in the form of an opposition to a motion to compel arbitration, which is typically the first matter to be raised after removal under 9 U.S.C. § 205 of the Convention. Finally, the court found that the arbitration clause at issue could conceivably have an effect on the outcome of plaintiff’s lawsuit, such that the two are related, and that therefore section 205 of the Convention confers subject matter jurisdiction on the court, making removal of the case by West of England proper.

O’Connor v. Maritime Management Corp., et al., No. 16-16201 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2017).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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UPDATE ON LIQUIDATION OF THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY

March 15, 2017 by Michael Wolgin

The New Hampshire liquidation court approved the commutation, settlement, and release agreement between The Home Insurance Company (liquidating) and Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Insurance Company (PMAIC). The commutation agreement was approved February 10, 2017 and provides for the commutation of all of Home’s ceded and assumed business to or from PMAIC, as well as the resolution of all of PMAIC’s contribution claims against Home. A redacted copy of the commutation agreement, with economic terms removed, was filed with Home’s motion for approval. Additionally, in New York, in a contested claim between the liquidator and a Danish non-admitted reinsurer, the court approved the reinsurer’s posting of a security bond in the stipulated amount of $259,886.13. In re Liquidation of The Home Insurance Co., 217-2003-EQ-00106 (N.H. Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 2017) (order approving commutation); Motion for Approval (Dec. 15, 2016); Sevigny v. Trygvesta Forsikring A/S, Case No. 16 Civ. 4874 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017) (stipulation and bond); (Feb. 14, 2017) (bond).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURT GRANTS MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD FOR PRE-HEARING SECURITY

October 11, 2016 by John Pitblado

We previously reported on this case in our blog dated December 21, 2015. The background of the dispute is as follows. A dispute arose between an insurer and its insured under four written program agreements, each containing an arbitration clause. The insurer filed a single demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”), alleging that the insureds failed to pay amounts due under the four program agreements. The insureds raised various objections to the arbitration demand, including that they were entitled to four separate arbitrations. The AAA ruled that the arbitration would continue as one arbitration, and the insureds appointed the sole arbitrator. Shortly thereafter, the insureds filed an action in Texas state court, seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to stay the arbitration because it had been improperly consolidated. The Texas court granted the TRO, stating that the AAA had failed to follow the arbitration agreements by administering one proceeding, not four, and enjoined the AAA from administering the arbitration. The AAA removed the Texas action to federal court, and filed a motion to dismiss, to which the insureds did not file a response. After the TRO expired, the AAA attempted to resume administration of the arbitration, but the insureds would not participate in the arbitration and informed the AAA that their counsel could not communicate with the AAA given the pending Texas action. Thus, the insurer filed an action in Illinois federal court, where the arbitration was pending, seeking to compel arbitration, which was granted in November 2015. The parties then returned to arbitration.

In the arbitration, predicting future legal resistance from the insured, the insurer petitioned the arbitrators for the insured to post pre-hearing security. The arbitrators granted the petition, and ordered the insured to post about $4.6 million in security. The insured did not post such security, and the insurer thus sought to confirm the panel’s pre-hearing award for security in the Illinois federal court. In response, the insured argued that the award should be vacated because the arbitrators exceeded their authority under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).

The Illinois federal court first found that an interim pre-hearing security award is an “award” under the FAA. Thus, the court noted that, under the FAA, it must confirm the award unless a statutory exception applies, one of which is Section 10(a)(4)of the FAA. The court also noted that a party seeking relief under Section 10(a)(4) bears a heavy burden and that strong deference is given to arbitrators’ decisions. Then, focusing on the parties’ program agreements, the court held that there is support for the pre-hearing security award in the agreements and arbitration clause. Although the agreements did not mention prehearing security as a remedy available to the parties, the court noted that it does not mean such remedy is not available. In this regard, citing other precedents, the court noted that “[i]f an enumeration of remedies were necessary, in many cases the arbitrator[s] would be powerless to impose any remedy, and that would not be correct. Since the arbitrator[s] derive[] all [their] powers from the agreement, the agreement must implicitly grant [the arbitrators] remedial powers when there is no explicit grant.” The court then stated that the arbitration clause at issue provided that the arbitration was to be conducted under the AAA Rules, which allow for interim awards of security. Thus, the court held that, by adopting the AAA Rules into their agreements, the parties implicitly included the arbitrators’ authority to grant an award like the interim security award at issue. Finding the insured’s arguments to vacate unpersuasive, the court then granted the insurer’s motion to confirm the pre-hearing security award.

Zurich American Insurance Company, et al. v. Trendsetter HR, LLC, et al., No. 1:15-cv-08696 (USDC N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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TEXAS APPEALS COURT DENIES PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS THAT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION TO VACATE ARBITRATION PANEL’S ORDERS

September 20, 2016 by John Pitblado

A Texas appeals court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Irving Drobny, on behalf of National Accident Insurance Group (“NAIG”) and National Accident Insurance Underwriters (“NAIU”) (collectively, “NAIU”), challenging a trial court’s denial of NAIU’s motion to vacate an arbitration panel’s pre-hearing security and discovery orders in favor of American National Insurance Corporation (“ANICO”).

The background of this case can be found here. In sum, ANICO and NAIU were parties to an Underwriting Agreement, in which ANICO authorized NAIU to market, underwrite, issue and collect premiums for ANICO insurance policies. A dispute arose between the parties because one of NAIU’s vice presidents allegedly defrauded both NAIU and ANICO of approximately $43 million. The parties participated in an arbitration, in which ANICO filed a motion for pre-hearing security. On October 24, 2014, the arbitration panel granted ANICO’s motion and ordered NAIU to post $20 million in pre-hearing security. On January 12, 2015, the panel issued another order granting a motion to compel discovery responses and depositions, a motion to compel compliance with order requiring pre-hearing security and a motion for continuance. On March 4, 2015, NAIU filed in a Texas trial court a motion for temporary restraining order, temporary injunction and motion to compel arbitration, essentially asking the court to vacate the pre-hearing security order. The Texas court found that it had no authority to grant NAIU’s motion to vacate the panel’s pre-hearing security order because under the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), NAIU had failed to timely challenge it, and thus, the court denied NAIU’s motion. The court did not expressly rule on any discovery issues. NAIU appealed the trial court’s order, or in the alternative, requested that it be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Texas appeals court held that it did not have jurisdiction over NAIU’s appeal as it was interlocutory, and thus the appeal was treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus.

In its order, the Texas appeals court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying NAIU’s motion to vacate the arbitration panel’s pre-hearing security order because it was not timely challenged within the 90-day period under Texas law and the 3-month period under the FAA. With respect to NAIU’s argument that there is no authority for pre-hearing security during arbitration, the court noted while the FAA does not speak to pre-hearing security, Texas law allows for pre-hearing security. The court also noted that the trial court held a hearing on the motion to vacate the pre-hearing security order at which NAIU presented no evidence. Thus, the Texas appeals court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the panel’s award of pre-hearing security. Further, as the trial court did not rule on any discovery issues, the Texas appeals court overruled NAIU’s second issue and denied NAIU’s petition for a writ of mandamus.

In Re Irving Drobny, as Representative of National Accident Insurance Group, et al., No. 01-15-00435-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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