Discovery

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted an ex parte petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) for the discovery of documents held by Aimbridge Hospitality, Norton Rose Fulbright, and White & Case for use in a proceeding in the British Virgin Islands. In so doing, the court noted that such ex parte petitions are “routinely grant[ed].”

A district court has the authority to grant a section 1782 petition where:

1. The person from whom discovery is sought resides or is found in the district of the district court to which the application is made;
2. The discovery is for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign or international tribunal; and;
3. The application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person.

The court also described the following discretionary factors that the court may consider:

1. Whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding, in which case the need for section 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent;
2. The nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign court or agency abroad to U.S. federal court judicial assistance;
3. Whether the section 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions; and
4. Whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.

The petition, supported by declarations and memoranda of law, satisfied the required section 1782 criteria, where the petitioner averred that the respondents all resided in or were found in the Southern District, and the documents would be used to “strengthen [the petitioner’s] position” in ongoing litigation in the British Virgin Islands, which the petitioner had initiated, making it an “interested party.” In addition, each of the discretionary factors, including the fact that courts in the Southern District “routinely grant § 1782 applications for discovery for use in the BVI,” also weighed in favor of granting the petition.

In re Application of Tethyan Copper Co. Pty. Ltd., No. 1:21-mc-00377 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022).

Third-party defendants AlixPartners LLP and Simon Freakley (collectively, “AlixPartners”) appealed from a July 2020 order of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which granted an application for discovery assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Section 1782 allows federal district courts to compel witness testimony or document production from any person or entity “residing” or otherwise “found” in the judicial district for “use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” The Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States sought assistance from the district court in seeking discovery from AlixPartners for use in an arbitration proceeding the fund had commenced against the nation of Lithuania. The fund brought the proceeding before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty between Lithuania and Russia. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether an arbitration between a foreign state and an investor, which takes place before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty to which the foreign state is a party, constitutes a “proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” under section 1782; (2) whether the fund is an “interested person” within the meaning of section 1782; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in finding certain factors established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), weighed in favor of granting the fund’s application.

Reinforcing its decision in In re Application of Hanwei Guo, 965 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit held that the arbitration panel here qualified as a “foreign or international tribunal” under section 1782, as it was established in accordance with a bilateral investment treaty between two nations and was governed by the UNCITRAL rules. The court found this conclusion to be consistent with both Guo and legislative intent to broaden the reach of section 1782 to allow for discovery assistance within the context of intergovernmental tribunals. Because the fund was a party to the arbitration for which it sought discovery assistance, the court ruled that the fund was an “interested person” under section 1782. Having also determined that the district court did not err in its weighing of the so-called Intel factors, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting the fund’s application for discovery assistance.

In re Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States v. AlixPartners, LLP, No. 20-2653 (2d Cir. July 15, 2021).

Nonparty Lawrence Satz received an arbitral subpoena in a proceeding between International Seaway Trading Corp. and Target Corp. Satz was a former owner of Seaway. The subpoena — the second issued to Satz during the proceeding — sought documents and virtual deposition testimony about certain issues he had refused to discuss at his first deposition. Before the second deposition, Satz moved to quash the subpoena on three grounds, each of which was rejected.

First, he claimed the arbitrator lacked the authority to issue a nonparty deposition subpoena before the arbitration hearing. In In re Security Life Insurance Company of America, 228 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit held that section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act implicitly authorizes arbitrators to issue pre-hearing document subpoenas, but did not reach the issue of pre-hearing deposition subpoenas. Despite decisions from various other circuit courts of appeal that section 7 does not authorize pre-hearing nonparty discovery, including cases expressly rejecting Security Life, the Minnesota district court declined to follow those other cases. Instead, it held that under Security Life, arbitrators are authorized to issue pre-hearing deposition subpoenas, finding no meaningful distinction between the reasoning for allowing such subpoenas for written discovery, but not depositions. Satz next argued the subpoena is unenforceable because it did not comply with the 100-mile territorial limit imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. But the court was unpersuaded, finding Rule 45 now allows service of subpoenas anywhere in the United States and, perhaps more importantly, that the distance limitation for holding the deposition does not bar enforcement of a subpoena for a virtual deposition that Satz could attend from home. Finally, the court rejected Satz’s relevance and burden arguments, noting both issues were already considered by the arbitrator and that the court would not second-guess the arbitrator’s conclusions. 

International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Target Corp., No. 0:20-mc-00086 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2021).

An insured filed suit in a Florida district court for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the defendant-carriers’ handling of claims made under the insured’s disability insurance policies. During discovery, the insured requested documents concerning the carriers’ general claims handling practices, as well as copies of any coinsurance or reinsurance agreements that the carriers entered into with respect to the insured’s insurance policies. The carriers refused to produce this material, and the insured filed a motion to compel.

The district court ruled at the outset that the insured was not entitled to discovery of the carriers’ general claims handling practices. Relying on D’Aprile v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, No. 2:09-cv-00270 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010), the court held that the carriers were required to produce only their “rules, guidelines, protocols, standards, and criteria, published or internal, which were utilized in whole or in part, or which relate to” the insured’s claims. With respect to coinsurance and reinsurance agreements, the insured argued that his request was permissible insofar as it related to assets available to satisfy a possible judgment. But the court rejected the argument, agreeing with the carriers that the insured failed to show how these requests were at all relevant to his breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary claims. The request for coinsurance and/or reinsurance material was denied accordingly.

Allen v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., No. 2:18-cv-00069 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2020).