Contract Interpretation

REINSURER’S EXPOSURE CAPPED AT THE CERTIFICATE LIMITS: NO OBLIGATION TO PAY DEFENSE EXPENSES ABOVE THE LIMITS

August 25, 2014 by Carlton Fields

A New York federal court recently was presented with a reinsurance dispute about the amount a reinsurer was required to pay under certain reinsurance Certificates. The issue was whether the reinsurer’s obligation was capped at the stated limit, or whether the reinsurer was also liable for defense costs in excess of the limit that the direct insurer had reimbursed. The court ruled that the “Certificate Limits” stated in the “Reinsurance Accepted” section of the Certificates capped the maximum amount that the reinsurer could be obligated to pay for combined loss and expenses.

The court rejected the direct insurer’s argument that the reinsurer should have to pay additional sums for defense costs above the amount of the “Certificate Limits,” ruling that “the unambiguous language in the ‘Reinsurance Accepted’ sections of the Certificates does not differentiate between reinsurance accepted for loss versus reinsurance accepted for expenses, but simply provides a total cap on liability. If the parties intended to exclude expenses from the total liability cap, they could have made that clear in the language of the Certificates.” Under New York law, for costs to be excluded from the liability cap in a reinsurance certificate, language in the certificate must expressly state that such costs were excluded from the indemnification limit. Because nothing in the Certificates that expenses were to be excluded from the Certificate Limits, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the reinsurer. Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Century Indemnity Co., Case No. 1:13-CV-6577 (USDC S.D. N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REVERSES COVERAGE RULING UNDER REINSURANCE AGREEMENT

August 13, 2014 by Carlton Fields

Public Risk Management of Florida, an intergovernmental risk management association that functions as a primary insurer for certain government entities in Florida, ceded some of its risk to One Beacon under a reinsurance policy. Public Risk’s insured, the City of Wintergarden, made a claim for defense and indemnity for an underlying lawsuit against it by a contractor who performed public works, but was claimed it was underpaid as a result of delays arising from the City’s failure to provide accurate plans and maps. Public Risk defended under a reservation of rights. It also tendered the claim to One Beacon, which disagreed there was a duty to defend. Ultimately, Public Risk was not required to indemnify its insured, but sustained over $286,941.07 in loss for legal fees above the $200,000 retention, which it believed were owed by One Beacon pursuant to the reinsurance agreement. Public Risk sued One Beacon, but the district court found no duty to defend and dismissed the claim. Public Risk appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the coverage ruling, finding that the underlying claims did not sound entirely in intentional tort, and therefore there was a duty to defend. Public Risk Management of Florida v. One Beacon Insurance Co., No. 13-15254 (11th Cir. June 24, 2014).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT UPHOLDS FOREIGN REINSURER’S RIGHT TO REMOVE ACTION TO FEDERAL COURT

July 28, 2014 by Carlton Fields

The Court for the Middle District of Louisiana upheld a magistrate’s ruling denying a motion to remand filed by the Louisiana Commerce and Trade Association of Self Insurer’s Fund (“LCTA”), holding that the defendant foreign reinsurers (“Reinsurers”) properly removed the state court action under the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) which Congress implemented under the Convention Act, 9 U.S.C. §§201-208. In so holding, the Court first found it had subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention Act and rejected LTCA’s argument that, because the issue of arbitrability was not raised below, the state court action did not “relate to” an arbitration as required by the New York Convention. Noting the extraordinary breadth of the New York Convention, the Court found that because LTCA’s claim against the Reinsurers arose under the Reinsurance Contract which included an arbitration clause, the state court action thus related to the arbitration clause. The Court also noted that a party is not required to first move to compel arbitration before it is permitted to remove the action and, in any case, the Reinsurers in this case had advised the state court that they intended to remove the action.

The Court then turned to LTCA’s contractual argument that the Reinsurers waived their right to remove under the Service-of-Suit Clause in the Reinsurance Contract. In this case, the Service-of-Suit clause provided that the Reinsurers agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction within the United States in the event they failed to pay any amount claimed under the Reinsurance Contract. The Service-of-Suit Clause, however, further provided that nothing contained in that provision constituted a waiver of the Reinsurer’s right to remove the action to a United States District Court. The Court found that this provision was not an explicit, clear, and unequivocal waiver of the right to remove, as required under applicable law, and further found it expressly and sufficiently reserved the Reinsurer’s right to removal. Louisiana Commerce and Trade Association Self-Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Subscribing to Contract Number A1430B600/A2430B600, No 13-700-JJB-RLB (M.D. La. July 15, 2014), affirming and adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations dated May 6, 2014.

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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DEFENDANTS GRANTED LIMITATIONS-BASED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CAPTIVE REINSURANCE CLASS ACTION

July 23, 2014 by Carlton Fields

A putative class of mortgage consumers sued Flagstar Bank and its captive reinsurer alleging that they engaged in an illegal “kickback” scheme with private mortgage insurers, which scheme artificially inflated the price of such insurance for the plaintiffs, in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). The defendants claimed plaintiffs failed to file suit within RESPA’s one year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs claimed the statute was equitably tolled because defendants actively concealed the “scheme.”

After declining to grant a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, and allowing the parties to make an adequate factual record on the statute of limitation issue for summary judgment, the court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The statute ran “from the date of the occurrence of the violation,” which commences upon the closing of the loan, and that each of the plaintiffs’ claims were filed in excess of a year from closing. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ equitable tolling argument, noting that in RESPA cases, “silence is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations; the defendant must have performed an independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied.” The record included no evidence of active concealment on the defendants’ part. Hill v. Flagstar Bank, Case No. 12-2770 (USDC E.D. Pa. June 26, 2014).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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COURT DENIES RENEWED ATTEMPT TO DISMISS DEFENSES IN REINSURANCE DISPUTE ASSOCIATED WITH ASBESTOS-RELATED LIABILITIES

July 15, 2014 by Carlton Fields

In this case, plaintiffs sought leave to renew their motion to dismiss certain retention-related and assignment affirmative defenses based on provisions of certain Loss Portfolio Transfer (LPT) agreements, and to re-argue the motion to dismiss based on their contention that the court: (1) overlooked arguments raised by the parties; (2) determined issues sua sponte without factual and legal support; and (3) misapplied precedent to the undisputed facts at issue. The court denied plaintiffs’ motions. The court determined that plaintiffs had failed to refute defendant’s assertion that the LPT may have transferred all of the plaintiffs’ relevant interests and constituted an impermissible assignment because plaintiffs failed to provide documentation showing that the cap in the LPT agreements could be exceeded. The court also decided that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that the defendant’s retention defenses were without merit as a matter of law. The court determined that the LPT did not satisfy the definition of treaty insurance because it was not obtained in advance of coverage. Furthermore, the court determined that the parties’ statements concerning the extent of plaintiffs’ assignment of their interests in the insurance certificates in question were not fatal to defendant’s assignment defenses as a whole. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Transatlantic Reinsurance Co., Index No. 652506/2012 (Sup. Ct of N.Y., County of N.Y. June 18, 2014).

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

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