A Special Focus article by Rollie Goss discusses a Court of Appeals opinion which gives practical effect to the honorable engagement provision of a reinsurance agreement.
This post written by Rollie Goss.
See our disclaimer.
Contract Interpretation
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS CHALLENGE TO ARBITRATION AWARD BASED ON “MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW” AND FRAUD
This case involved a FINRA arbitration held to resolve a dispute over money allegedly owed to Ameriprise Financial Services by a former financial adviser. The financial adviser appealed the district court’s confirmation of the award favoring Ameriprise, contending that the award was procured by fraud and that the arbitrator committed a manifest disregard of the law. On appeal, the financial adviser first contended that the award should be reviewed under the Wisconsin Arbitration Act instead of the FAA. The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed, holding that the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly selected the FAA, and that the FAA was applicable notwithstanding potential application of other Wisconsin law on the merits of the dispute. Regarding “manifest disregard,” the Seventh Circuit rejected the financial adviser’s contention that the panel inappropriately applied federal securities laws instead of certain states’ laws. The court explained that it “is not manifest disregard of a law to consider [the state law] and its relation to [federal law] and then conclude that the law does not apply in the specific factual situation at issue.” The court also noted that the panel had not issued a written opinion, and that the court would not “second-guess the arbitrators’ decision based on speculation when it is possible for the panel to have reached the decision it did based on the evidence presented to it.” As to fraud, the Seventh Circuit held that Ameriprise’s counsel’s closing argument, in which counsel asserted that the financial adviser “violated” certain laws and characterized certain cases as “on point,” did not misrepresent the record or the law. Renard v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., No. 14-1730 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2015).
This post written by Michael Wolgin.
See our disclaimer.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OVERTURNED IN COVERAGE DISPUTE
In late April, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Continental Casualty Company (“CNA”) must provide insurable relief for Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. (“Anthem”), reversing a lower court decision. Anthem’s expenditures were covered under their excess reinsurance policy.
Anthem, which later merged with co-defendant WellPoint Inc., was originally subject to multiple lawsuits in Florida and Connecticut for failing to pay claims in a timely manner, breach of state and federal statutes, breach of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Anthem later settled, without admitting wrongdoing or liability, a multi-district litigation that consolidated the various state actions. Anthem then sought indemnification from their reinsurers.
Anthem self-insured E&O liability coverage and also purchased additional reinsurance coverage. CNA and other implicated excess reinsurers denied coverage for Anthem’s underlying litigation expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CNA. Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin City”) later joined that verdict. A court of appeals affirmed that decision.
CNA argued that (1) Anthem’s alleged conduct was not solely in performance of “Professional Services,” a requirement under their reinsurance agreement; (2) that Anthem’s coverage relief was barred under Indiana public policy; and (3) Anthem’s alleged conduct was barred under the reinsurance agreements “dishonest or fraudulent act or omission” exception. The court found that Anthem’s coverage extended to “loss of the insured resulting from any claim or claims…for any Wrongful Act of the Insured…but only if such Wrongful Act…occurs solely in the rendering of or failure to render Professional services.” The court found that Anthem’s alleged conduct fit under this guidance, as the conduct was a part of Anthems handling of health claims. The court also noted a strong presumption for the enforceability of contracts, especially between CNA and Anthem, both sophisticated parties. For these and other reasons, the court reversed the trial court and granted in large part, summary judgment for Anthem.
WellPoint, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 49S05-1404-PL-244 (Ind. Apr. 22, 2015).
This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
See our disclaimer.
DISTRICT COURT DISMISSES BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM, ALLOWS BREACH OF DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH CLAIM IN REINSURANCE DISPUTE
The District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently held that defendant First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”) could maintain its breach of the utmost duty of good faith counterclaim against plaintiff Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”), but that it could not countersue Old Republic for breach of contract. First American alleged that Old Republic breached the Reinsurance Agreement (“Agreement”) the parties shared by 1) paying First American under a reservation of rights to assert claims against First American, 2) disputing Old Republic’s obligation to pay First American, and 3) improperly trying to claw back the $3.8 million payment. The court held that First American’s claims were insufficient because the Agreement did not explicitly prohibit Old Republic’s actions, a necessary basis for a breach of contract claim. The court did, however, find sufficient First American’s claim that Old Republic breached the utmost duty of good faith. As the court noted, “generously construing First American’s allegations under this count in conjunction with its claim that Old Republic breached the Reinsurance Agreement by failing to pay its share of defense costs,” the pleaded facts for First American’s “utmost good faith” claim were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss stage.
Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ, 2015 WL 1530611 (USDC M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2015)
This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
See our disclaimer.
PENNSYLVANIA COURT DENIES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OVER FACULTATIVE REINSURANCE CERTIFICATES
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied defendant OneBeacon Insurance Company’s (“OneBeacon”) motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs Century Indemnity Company (“Century”) and Pacific Employers Insurance Company (“Pacific”). Century and Pacific, which held reinsurance policies issued by OneBeacon, sued the reinsurer to recover expenses in addition to the stated policy limits and to recover an award of interest on the payments received. OneBeacon sought summary judgment on two grounds: 1) that the limit stated in the parties’ reinsurance certificates placed a total cap on its liability, and 2) that plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of interest on payments. The court denied OneBeacon’s motion. First, the court determined that certain conditions placed on premiums in the reinsurance certificates meant that the premium was subject to a condition that excluded expenses in calculating the total loss limit. “If anything,” the court noted, “the terms of the certificates may have created a presumption of expense-exclusiveness.”
Second, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds. OneBeacon cited two prior district court cases that considered the “limit-of-liability” issue, but the court held that this legal authority did not “hold the necessary weight of final judgments at this juncture in order to apply collateral estoppel against plaintiffs.” Finally, because the court had already granted plaintiffs’ separate motion for summary judgment on payments of interest, it denied OneBeacon’s motion on that issue as well. Century Indem. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., No. 02928 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 27, 2015).
This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields in Washington, DC.
See our disclaimer.