Contract Formation

The plaintiff sought coverage for property loss due to Hurricane Irma, and the defendant successfully moved to compel arbitration. The plaintiff opposed arbitration, arguing that the subject policy was unsigned and thus did not constitute a signed written agreement to arbitrate. As Florida law recognizes that an insurance application and the policy together “form the contract of insurance,” the district court found that the plaintiff’s signature on its insurance application “is sufficient to constitute a signature on a written agreement to arbitrate.”

The district court further rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that: “(1) it had no knowledge of the arbitration provision and (2) the Policy’s Service of Suit clause supersedes the arbitration provision or renders it ambiguous.” The plaintiff was instructed to carefully read the entire policy and “cannot now contend that it was unaware of the arbitration provision.” Furthermore, “[t]he Policy mandates arbitration and the Service of Suit Clause merely provides a means for the parties to go to court to either compel arbitration or enforce an arbitration award. Indeed, courts consistently read arbitration clauses and service of suit clauses as compatible.”

Gold Coast Prop. Mgmt. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 1:18-cv-23693 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2019)

The plaintiff challenged the formation of an arbitration clause contained in her employment contracts and acknowledgment of employee handbooks, arguing: (1) there was no “meeting of the minds” and therefore there was not the mutual assent necessary for contract formation; and (2) the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the plaintiff’s “assent was obtained through misrepresentation, she never had a meaningful opportunity to bargain, and there was a gross disparity in the parties’ bargaining power.” A Mississippi federal court rejected the plaintiff’s first argument, finding that there was a meeting of the minds, but deferred the procedural unconscionability argument to the arbitrator under the agreement’s delegation clause.

The Fifth Circuit upheld the ruling on contract formation, as the district court “correctly found that the electronic communications transmitting the Arbitration Agreement clearly identified an arbitration agreement as the subject of the communications … [and the plaintiff] was given the opportunity to read the Agreement and certified” that she had done so. The plaintiff’s “unilateral lack of diligence” in failing to do so “does not preclude contract formation under Mississippi law.”

However, the Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to procedural unconscionability, as that “objection challenges the formation of the Arbitration Agreement itself, the district court had the duty to resolve this challenge.” Thus, the case was remanded to the district court to resolve the issue.

Bowles v. Onemain Fin. Grp., LLC, No. 18-60749 (5th Cir. June 19, 2019)

The plaintiff sued his former employer for discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act. The defendant moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate (MAA). The MAA incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association and the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, both of which authorize the arbitrator to resolve threshold, or “gateway,” questions of arbitrability. As the court observed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the incorporation of these rules into an arbitration agreement constitutes a “clear and unmistakable” expression of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, “unless the provision delegating such authority to the arbitrator is specifically challenged.” Here, the plaintiff did not specifically challenge the MAA’s delegation provision; he argued only that the MAA as a whole was unenforceable for lack of consideration. As such, the court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Murphy v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 4:19-cv-01207 (E.D. Mo. June 19, 2019)

Estella Trammell was an at-will employee of AccentCare. She challenged the district court’s order requiring her to arbitrate a pay dispute with AccentCare. The district court held that there was an enforceable arbitration agreement under the mailbox rule. AccentCare mailed the arbitration agreement to Trammell’s home, but Trammell asserted that she did not receive or sign the arbitration agreement and therefore should not be bound to arbitration. Trammell asserted that she notified AccentCare that she was having difficulty receiving and sending mail at her address. She further asserted that she reported to AccentCare that she had not received timesheets mailed to her address, and she had also mailed timesheets to AccentCare and the company did not receive them. Further, AccentCare admitted that it could not produce a signed copy of the arbitration agreement. The court held that under the FAA the parties did not enter into an arbitration agreement. In Texas, the mailbox rule holds that a letter property addressed, stamped, and mailed may be presumed to have been received by the addressee in the due course of the mail. However, the court explained that Trammell overcame this presumption and created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an arbitration agreement was formed.

Trammell v. AccentCare, Inc., No. 18-50872 (5th Cir. June 7, 2019)

In a trademark dispute, Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP (SS LLP), an incense manufacturing company based in Mumbai, appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration against Balkrishna Setty and his company Shrinivas Sugandhalaya (BNG) LLP, located in Bangalore. SS LLP sought to compel arbitration under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York Convention), by invoking the arbitration clause in a partnership agreement to which SS LLP was not a signatory. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of arbitration, relying on the requirement under the New York Convention that the party seeking to compel arbitration be a party to the arbitration agreement. The court explained that to the extent the FAA would permit a nonsignatory to invoke arbitration through certain state contract or equitable laws, the Convention’s bar of arbitration would control over the FAA. The court also rejected other arguments of SS LLP, finding that they were not raised before the district court.

Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP, No. 18-35573 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019).