Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

Court Confirms Almost $23M Arbitration Award

November 2, 2022 by Brendan Gooley

A court recently confirmed an arbitration award totaling nearly $23 million after rejecting the losing party’s arguments that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, improperly calculated damages, and violated an American Arbitration Association rule.

AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) operated a number of pharmacies that supported AIDS patients. AHF contracted with Caremark LLC and Caremark PCS LLC for certain pharmacy benefit management services. Pursuant to the agreement, Caremark took Medicare Part D monies earmarked to pay for prescriptions for people of limited financial means to pay that money to Medicare Part D plan sponsors. AHF claimed that the manner in which Caremark did that violated the agreement between AHF and Caremark. An arbitrator agreed and awarded AHF $22.6 million in damages plus approximately $366,000 in costs and fees.

Caremark moved to vacate the award. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona rejected Caremark’s claims and added additional costs, fees, and interest to the award.

Caremark first claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by adjudicating the claims of 51 separate pharmacies collectively. According to Caremark, that violated the arbitration agreement’s provision that “[a]ll disputes are subject to arbitration on an individual basis, not on a class or representative basis, or through any form of consolidated proceedings.” The court concluded that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the anti-class action provision as not being violated by consolidating claims from separate AHF pharmacies was not “completely irrational” or in “manifest disregard of the law” and further noted that the agreement permitted consolidation of claims from any contracts and agreements from participation in Caremark’s networks.

The court similarly rejected Caremark’s argument that the arbitrator’s damages computation was irrational. It agreed with the arbitrator that Caremark first raised that claim in a motion to recalculate the damages and that the argument should have been raised earlier.

Finally, the court found that the arbitrator acted properly in increasing the damages after the deadline set by Rule 50 of the AAA rules had passed. The arbitrator concluded that Rule 50 did not apply because the award he amended was an interim award. The court found that the arbitrator’s interpretation of Rule 50 was plausible and therefore acceptable.

The court also awarded costs, fees, and interest related to Caremark’s motion to vacate.

Caremark LLC v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation, No. 2:21-cv-01913 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2022).

SDNY Confirms Unopposed Arbitration Award Using Summary Judgment Framework

September 29, 2022 by Benjamin Stearns

A Turkish manufacturer of motor coaches entered into a distribution agreement with a Delaware-based corporation for the exclusive distribution of its motor coaches in the United States. Years later, a dispute arose over the Delaware corporation’s (CH Bus) nonpayment for 72 motor coaches and its failure to repay a $1 million loan from the Turkish company (Temsa). Temsa commenced arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, a division of the American Arbitration Association, pursuant to the arbitration clause contained within the parties’ distribution agreement. After a hearing, the arbitration panel awarded Temsa approximately $17.2 million. Temsa then sought confirmation of the award in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

CH Bus did not oppose or otherwise appear in the action. Nevertheless, the court noted: “Default judgments in the context of confirmation and vacatur proceedings are generally inappropriate; an unopposed petition should instead be resolved under a summary judgment framework.” The court found that it had jurisdiction over the award pursuant to chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Next, the court stated that an arbitration agreement falls within the scope of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards if four requirements are met:

There must be a written agreement;
It must provide for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention;
The subject matter must be commercial; and
The agreement cannot be entirely domestic in scope.

Here, the distribution agreement was written; the United States is a signatory to the Convention; the subject matter was commercial (i.e., the sale of motor coaches); and the distribution agreement was a non-domestic agreement because the importation of motor coaches from Turkey was not entirely domestic in scope.

The court then discussed the seven grounds for nonrecognition of an award under the Convention:

The parties to the arbitration agreement were under some incapacity or the agreement “is not valid” under the law designated by the parties, or in the event they have not designated any, the law of the country where the award was made;
The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made;
The competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
The competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

None of the bases provided by the Convention for refusing to recognize and enforce an arbitration award applied here. The court also noted that, in this case, because the arbitration took place in the United States, the award was also subject to the FAA provisions governing domestic arbitration awards, including the four grounds enumerated by the FAA for vacatur. However, none of those grounds applied either. As such, the court confirmed the arbitration award in favor of Temsa.

Temsa Ulasim Araclari Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. v. CH Bus Sales, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-00492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2022).

New York Federal Court Finds Arbitration Award Is Subject to Confirmation Even Though It Doesn’t Dispose of All Claims Submitted to Arbitration

September 21, 2022 by Alex Bein

In a recent decision, a New York federal district court considered whether two arbitration awards issued by a tribunal in an ongoing arbitration were “mutual, final, and definite” and thus subject to confirmation proceedings in the district court.

The underlying arbitration involved a long-running dispute between Gerling, a German insurance company, and Tosco Corp., a petroleum refining company, in which Tosco (through successor-in-interest Phillips 66 Co.) sought indemnity and defense costs arising out of its manufacture and sale of petroleum products containing methyl tertiary-butyl ether. On July 13, 2021, Gerling reimbursed Phillips 66 $725,412.94 pursuant to the Gerling policy’s “loss payable” provision in connection with defense costs incurred in certain ongoing lawsuits against Phillips 66. However, on November 26, 2021, the tribunal decided Gerling was not obligated to reimburse Phillips 66 under the “loss payable” provision until the underlying cases had been finally resolved. When Phillips 66 refused to repay the $725,412.94 amount to Gerling, the tribunal issued another order on December 21, 2021, directing Phillips 66 to repay that amount and reaffirming the tribunal’s prior interpretation of the “loss payable” provision. Gerling then sought to have the tribunal’s December 2021 award confirmed by the district court.

In confirming the portion of the tribunal’s December 2021 award directing repayment by Phillips 66, the court noted that that award “required specific action and did not serve as a preparation or basis for further decisions.” Rather, the court characterized it as a “separate and independent claim” that “can be confirmed even though it does not, in and of itself, dispose of all claims.” The court further noted that even though Phillips 66 had repaid the required amount six days before Gerling’s motion to confirm, “the fact that the arbitration award has been complied with is not a ground for refusing to confirm it.”

The district court declined to confirm the portion of the tribunal’s December 2021 award addressing the “loss payable” provision on the grounds that that portion of the award “merely decides issues that bear on future determinations as to claims that still must be made … in order to establish liability.” As a result, the district court granted in part and denied in part Gerling’s motion to confirm the December 2021 arbitration award.

HDI Global SE v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 1:22-cv-00807 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022).

Seller Wins “Battle” to Apply FAA Over VUAA to Arbitration Dispute, but Loses “War” Over Award Confirmation

September 7, 2022 by Benjamin Stearns

The case involved a seller of a 91% interest in a Virginia-based government contractor that provides overseas staffing and logistics support to government agencies. The parties’ sale contract contained a choice-of-law provision that stated the agreement “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia without giving effect to any choice or conflict of law provision or rule.” The contract also included an arbitration provision applicable to disputes related to any adjustment payments after the closing of the sale. The parties ultimately could not agree on the amount of a post-closing adjustment payment and proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded the buyer approximately $3.1 million, after which the parties filed cross-motions to confirm and to vacate the arbitration award. In support of its motion to vacate, the seller included an argument that the award was in “manifest disregard” of the applicable law.

The federal district court first noted that “manifest disregard” is recognized by the Fourth Circuit as a valid basis under federal arbitration common law to vacate an arbitration award, but it is not under Virginia law. As a result, the court was required to determine whether the contract’s general choice-of-law provision selecting Virginia law resulted in the application of the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act to the parties’ dispute. Again relying specifically on controlling Fourth Circuit precedent, the court found that “a contract’s general choice-of-law provision does not displace federal arbitration law if the contract involves interstate commerce.” Rather, the parties “may displace the FAA only by specifying that state law should apply specifically to arbitration proceedings.” Neither party disputed that the contract involved interstate commerce. As such, the contract’s choice-of-law provision was sufficient to invoke Virginia law for issues of contract interpretation, but not for purposes of displacing the FAA, because the agreement did not specifically address the law that would govern arbitration disputes.

Having won the argument that federal arbitration law applied to the parties’ dispute regarding confirmation or vacatur of the arbitration award, the seller then lost its argument that the arbitrator “manifestly disregarded” the applicable law. The court noted that, under federal arbitration law, a party moving to vacate an arbitration award faces a “heavy burden” and that the scope of a federal court’s review of an arbitration award is “among the narrowest known at law.” The court’s review is limited to “whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do — not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.” Pursuant to Fourth Circuit precedent, an arbitrator’s determination is not in manifest disregard and must be upheld “so long as it draws its essence from the agreement.” An award “fails to draw its essence from the agreement only when the result is not rationally inferable from the contract.”

After analyzing the seller’s claim, the court found that, “[d]istilled to its essence, the Seller’s argument does nothing more than challenge the arbitrator’s interpretation of applicable law.” As this argument was “plainly insufficient” to support a claim of “manifest disregard” of the law, the court confirmed the arbitration award.

Vogel v. Gracias Juan, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-01355 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2022).

Third Circuit Reverses Order Confirming Arbitration Award, Concluding Award Was Procured by Fraud

August 22, 2022 by Kenneth Cesta

Recognizing that it’s “a steep climb to vacate an arbitration award” and that “[c]ourts will disturb an arbitration award only in limited circumstances,” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s order confirming an arbitration award, finding that the award was procured by fraud.

The parties, Todd France and Jason Bernstein, are “agents” registered with the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA). Bernstein’s clients included Kenny Golladay, a well-known NFL wide receiver. Golladay terminated his relationship with Bernstein and his company, Clarity Sports International, on January 29, 2019. Three days before the termination, Golladay participated in an autograph signing event in Chicago that Bernstein did not arrange, even though the event was the type of opportunity that Bernstein and Clarity were hired to do for Golladay. Once Golladay’s agreement with Bernstein was terminated, he signed agreements with France. Bernstein then filed a written grievance against France pursuant to the dispute resolution process set forth in the NFLPA regulations. Bernstein alleged that France arranged the autograph signing event for Golladay and induced him to terminate his relationship with Bernstein. The dispute was referred to arbitration pursuant to the NFLPA regulations.

Bernstein sought discovery from France in the arbitration proceeding. France produced some discovery but denied having any documents responsive to key requests about Golladay’s appearance at the autograph signing event. Bernstein also obtained authorization from the arbitrator to issue subpoenas to nonparties for relevant documents; however, Bernstein received no information in response to the subpoenas and did not enforce the subpoenas in federal court. During the hearing, France repeatedly denied that he had anything to do with the autograph signing event, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of France concluding that Bernstein had not met his burden of proving that France had violated NFLPA regulations. France then filed a petition and motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Bernstein cross-moved to vacate the award, arguing that France had procured the arbitration award by fraud, relying on evidence that came to light after the arbitration in another lawsuit showing that France was indeed involved in arranging the autograph signing event.

The matter was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted France’s motion to confirm the award and denied Bernstein’s motion to vacate it. The district court noted the narrow circumstances in which a court may vacate an arbitration award, and then concluded that Bernstein had not offered a satisfactory reason for why evidence of France’s involvement in the signing event was not discovered before or during the arbitration hearing. The district court specifically noted that Bernstein had not sought judicial enforcement of the discovery subpoenas he had issued pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 7, which the court saw as a lack of diligence further supporting its decision to deny the motion to vacate the award.

Observing that the case was “like something out of the film Jerry Maguire,” the Third Circuit noted that a party making a claim like Bernstein — i.e., that the arbitration award was procured by fraud because of non-production of responsive documents and false testimony — must make a three-part showing: “first, that there was a fraud in the arbitration, which must be proven with clear and convincing evidence; second, that the fraud was not discoverable through reasonable diligence before or during the arbitration; and third, that the fraud was materially related to an issue in the arbitration.” The court closely examined all three factors and concluded that Bernstein had established that there was fraud in the arbitration that was not discoverable through reasonable diligence and that the fraud was material to the case. The court ruled in favor of Bernstein, reversed the district court’s decision, and remanded the case for entry of an order vacating the arbitration award.

France v. Bernstein, No. 20-3425 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2022).