Confirmation / Vacation of Arbitration Awards

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DETERMINES PARTY’S COUNTERCLAIM TO PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS MOTION TO VACATE THE ARBITRATION AWARD

October 12, 2016 by John Pitblado

When the appellant failed to file a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award, it waived its right to raise Section 10 or 11 of the Federal Arbitration Action (“FAA”) as a defense to a motion to confirm the award. Appellant argued that its counterclaim to the petition for confirmation should have been construed as a motion to vacate. Although a district court has “discretion to liberally construe a poorly conceived filing”, there is no obligation for the court to “independently inquire into the most advantageous construction of a represented civil litigant’s filing.” The Court found the counterclaim was “so vague that the district court could not possibly have discerned a factual predicate for Section 10 relief.”

The Court also upheld the District Court’s decision denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration, as appellant neglected to timely move for vacatur or respond to petitioner’s supplement to its petition for confirmation. Since a motion for reconsideration exists for the correction of “obvious errors or injustices” and not to put forth a new argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to accept appellant’s belated request to construe the counterclaim as a motion to vacate. Careminders Home Care, Inc. v. Concura, Inc., et al., No. 16-10112 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016)

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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ILLINOIS FEDERAL COURT GRANTS MOTION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD FOR PRE-HEARING SECURITY

October 11, 2016 by John Pitblado

We previously reported on this case in our blog dated December 21, 2015. The background of the dispute is as follows. A dispute arose between an insurer and its insured under four written program agreements, each containing an arbitration clause. The insurer filed a single demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”), alleging that the insureds failed to pay amounts due under the four program agreements. The insureds raised various objections to the arbitration demand, including that they were entitled to four separate arbitrations. The AAA ruled that the arbitration would continue as one arbitration, and the insureds appointed the sole arbitrator. Shortly thereafter, the insureds filed an action in Texas state court, seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to stay the arbitration because it had been improperly consolidated. The Texas court granted the TRO, stating that the AAA had failed to follow the arbitration agreements by administering one proceeding, not four, and enjoined the AAA from administering the arbitration. The AAA removed the Texas action to federal court, and filed a motion to dismiss, to which the insureds did not file a response. After the TRO expired, the AAA attempted to resume administration of the arbitration, but the insureds would not participate in the arbitration and informed the AAA that their counsel could not communicate with the AAA given the pending Texas action. Thus, the insurer filed an action in Illinois federal court, where the arbitration was pending, seeking to compel arbitration, which was granted in November 2015. The parties then returned to arbitration.

In the arbitration, predicting future legal resistance from the insured, the insurer petitioned the arbitrators for the insured to post pre-hearing security. The arbitrators granted the petition, and ordered the insured to post about $4.6 million in security. The insured did not post such security, and the insurer thus sought to confirm the panel’s pre-hearing award for security in the Illinois federal court. In response, the insured argued that the award should be vacated because the arbitrators exceeded their authority under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).

The Illinois federal court first found that an interim pre-hearing security award is an “award” under the FAA. Thus, the court noted that, under the FAA, it must confirm the award unless a statutory exception applies, one of which is Section 10(a)(4)of the FAA. The court also noted that a party seeking relief under Section 10(a)(4) bears a heavy burden and that strong deference is given to arbitrators’ decisions. Then, focusing on the parties’ program agreements, the court held that there is support for the pre-hearing security award in the agreements and arbitration clause. Although the agreements did not mention prehearing security as a remedy available to the parties, the court noted that it does not mean such remedy is not available. In this regard, citing other precedents, the court noted that “[i]f an enumeration of remedies were necessary, in many cases the arbitrator[s] would be powerless to impose any remedy, and that would not be correct. Since the arbitrator[s] derive[] all [their] powers from the agreement, the agreement must implicitly grant [the arbitrators] remedial powers when there is no explicit grant.” The court then stated that the arbitration clause at issue provided that the arbitration was to be conducted under the AAA Rules, which allow for interim awards of security. Thus, the court held that, by adopting the AAA Rules into their agreements, the parties implicitly included the arbitrators’ authority to grant an award like the interim security award at issue. Finding the insured’s arguments to vacate unpersuasive, the court then granted the insurer’s motion to confirm the pre-hearing security award.

Zurich American Insurance Company, et al. v. Trendsetter HR, LLC, et al., No. 1:15-cv-08696 (USDC N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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THIRD CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF SUIT TO VACATE FINRA ARBITRATION AWARD

September 21, 2016 by John Pitblado

This case involved an underlying arbitration before an arbitration panel operating under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) rules, which was brought by Judith and Kenneth Goldman against their financial advisor, Barry Guariglia, and his employer Citigroup Global Markets. The Goldmans had followed their investment adviser when he left his prior employer, Merrill Lynch, and went to Citigroup. In the arbitration, they claimed that when they transferred their account to Citigroup, they were subjected to a “devastating margin call” that wiped out their retirement savings. After 10 days of evidence and argument, and after the Goldmans submitted their case in chief, Citigroup moved to dismiss for lack of evidence. The FINRA arbitration panel dismissed the case, noting that “[w]hile all the claims were quite stridently argued, not a single claim was proven to be true by evidence.”

The Goldmans then filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in a Pennsylvania federal court, and Citigroup moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was granted by the court. In its decision, the court noted that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the Federal Arbitration Act does not itself create federal subject matter jurisdiction, and that the parties were not diverse, and thus, federal question jurisdiction would be required for the court to consider a motion to vacate an arbitration award. The Pennsylvania federal court found that the Goldmans failed to raise a federal question and simply sought to “assert the same claims they unsuccessfully brought in their arbitration.” The Goldmans then appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In their appeal, the Goldmans asserted that a district court can “look through a motion to vacate” at the underlying subject matter, relying on footnote in a prior Third Circuit decision, Goldman Sachs v. Athena Venture Partners, which stated that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to vacate because the arbitration included federal securities law claims. The Third Circuit, however, rejected that argument, and found that it was not bound to follow the footnote in that case, noting that the footnote was an “unexamined exercise of jurisdiction and so is without precedential effect” and that the “drive-by jurisdictional ruling” in Athena goes against Third Circuit precedent. Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the Pennsylvania federal court’s order dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Goldman et al. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., et al., No. 15-2345 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2016).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.

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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ALLOWS FEDERAL COURTS TO “LOOK THROUGH” § 10 FAA PETITION TO DETERMINE FEDERAL JURISDICTION

September 13, 2016 by Carlton Fields

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reversed its own precedent to allow federal courts examining petitions under § 10 of the FAA to “look through” the petition to examine if there is federal jurisdiction. In the case, which arose out of a dispute involving registered FINRA members and their former employees, the district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, finding that it did not state a “substantial federal question on its face.” On appeal, the petitioner argued that the Second Circuit’s precedent in Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2000), which led the district court to its determination, had been displaced by Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009). The Second Circuit panel held that Vaden “rendered Greenberg’s result fundamentally inconsistent with the Act’s statutory context and judicial interpretations.” Thus, the Second Circuit returned the case to the district court with instructions that it could “look through” the § 10 petition, “applying the ordinary principles of federal-question jurisdiction to the underlying dispute as defined by Vaden.” Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, No. 15-2814 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REINSURER’S ATTORNEY AND PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATOR LEAD TO VACATUR OF AWARD

September 7, 2016 by Carlton Fields

The Sixth Circuit recently held that a lower court erred by refusing to vacate an arbitration panel’s interim and final awards due to ex parte communications between one of the arbitrators and the attorney for the appellee, reinsurer National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh (NUFIC). The appellant, cedent Meadowbrook Insurance Group (Meadowbrook), and NUFIC entered into a reinsurance agreement containing an arbitration provision. When NUFIC asserted that Meadowbrook overbilled its reinsurance claims, the parties instituted an arbitration in front of a three person panel, including two party-appointed arbitrators and a neutral umpire. The parties agreed to scheduling orders that instituted a ban on all ex parte communications after the filing of the first brief in any arbitration. After the date of filing, the attorney for NUFIC and the arbitrator that had been selected by NUFIC commenced ex parte communications on three different occasions. The Sixth Circuit, upon review, found that while such ex parte communications did not void an award per se, the communications could void an award if they violated the terms of the arbitration agreement. The Sixth Circuit found here that the ex parte communications violated the scheduling orders and also prejudiced Meadowbrook’s rights under the arbitration agreement. The Sixth Circuit therefore vacated both awards. Star Insurance Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., Case Nos. 15-1403/1490 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2016).

This post written by Joshua S. Wirth.

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