Arbitration Process Issues

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that Nebraska’s statute prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance policies is preempted by the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA). At issue was a professional liability insurance policy from Allied Professionals Insurance Company, a risk retention group incorporated in Arizona and registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group. When a dispute arose between the policyholder and Allied, the policyholder filed an action seeking a declaration that Allied was obligated to provide coverage for an underlying civil suit pending against him. Allied moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the policy’s mandatory arbitration clause, which required binding arbitration of any dispute concerning the policy. The lower court rejected Allied’s argument that the Nebraska statute was preempted by federal law and concluded that the arbitration clause was neither valid nor enforceable. It therefore denied Allied’s motion to compel arbitration.

Nebraska’s Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt Nebraska’s law, the LRRA did. The LRRA provides, in part, that a foreign risk retention group is exempt from any state law that would “regulate, directly or indirectly, the operation of a risk retention group.” Nebraska’s prohibition of arbitration clauses in insurance policies “regulates the operation of a risk retention group” within the meaning of the LRRA. As a result, the arbitration clause in the Allied policy was not prohibited by state statute, but was a valid and enforceable clause compelling arbitration. Speece v. Allied Professionals Insurance Co., 289 Neb. 75 (Neb. Sept. 19, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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The Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court’s decision to deny arbitration, based on the fact that the lower court failed to hold a trial (as required by the FAA) when disputed questions of fact surrounding the parties’ agreement remained. The case surrounded a disagreement over whether a seller of equipment agreed to indemnify a manufacturer of heavy machinery, in connection with litigation against the manufacturer by a third-party. Disputed facts surrounded whether the agreement between the manufacturer and the seller included a form containing indemnification terms and arbitration provisions. The district court denied arbitration because it concluded that the only undisputed contract terms were the terms of the purchase, sale, and payment; the court left undecided the issue of whether arbitration provisions were included in the agreement, as not subject to a “definitive answer.” Citing a recent Tenth Circuit decision, on which we reported on May 20, 2014, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that “if the motions record reveals a material issue of fact, the FAA maintains that the court move summarily to trial. And, when that trial is not demanded by the party opposing arbitration [as was the case here], ‘the court shall hear and determine such issue.’” The court explained that here, “the district court never resolved the factual issues concerning the making of the contract but merely recognized their existence.” The Eighth Circuit vacated the order and remanded “for the district court to hold a non-jury trial, make findings of fact, and apply the appropriate U.C.C. provisions in light of those facts.” Nebraska Machinery Co. v. Cargotec Solutions, LLC, Case No. 13-2753 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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The Third Circuit recently was presented with the question of whether, in the context of an otherwise silent contract, the availability of classwide arbitration is to be decided by a court rather than an arbitrator. The underlying dispute involved a putative class action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act concerning an employer’s classification of its workers as overtime-exempt employees. The two named plaintiffs each had signed an employment agreement requiring that any dispute relating to their employment be submitted to arbitration, but the agreements did not mention classwide arbitration. A New Jersey federal court granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, but held that the arbitrator would have to decide whether the arbitration could include classwide claims. The arbitrator issued a partial award, and addressed the “who decides” issue, ruling that the employment agreements permitted classwide arbitration. The employer then returned to federal court and filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the issue of the availability of classwide arbitration should be decided by a court, not an arbitrator.

In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit noted that “questions of arbitrability,” such as whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause or whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy – are “gateway issues” to be resolved by a court. This is in contrast to “procedural” questions that are resolved by arbitrators. The Third Circuit ruled that the permissibility of classwide arbitration is not solely a question of procedure or contract interpretation (which would be decided by an arbitrator) but rather involves a “substantive gateway dispute qualitatively separate from deciding an individual quarrel” (which would be decided by a court). In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit holding in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013), which is the only other circuit court opinion to have squarely addressed the “who decides” issue.

David Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., No. 12-4444 (3rd Cir. July 30, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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