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Arbitration Process Issues

Illinois Federal Court Leaves Issues of Venue and Contractual Attorneys’ Fees to Be Decided by the Arbitrator

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This matter concerns a dispute between a securities clearing firm and commodities futures investors over the investors’ losses sustained while trading options on the clearing firm’s e-trading platform. Both parties agreed the dispute should be resolved through arbitration but disagreed as to whether the National Futures Association (NFA) should serve as their arbitrator. An Illinois district court judge resolved the issue by compelling the parties to arbitrate before the NFA and to cease all other arbitrations pending before other arbitral bodies. The investors appealed the nonfinal arbitration order.

During the pendency of the appeal, the clearing firm requested the district court issue a briefing schedule for a proposed motion that it intended to bring seeking certain contractually mandated attorneys’ fees. The investors objected that the arbitrator, not the court, should decide the issue concerning contractually mandated fees.

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the investors’ appeal of the district court’s arbitration order, and the clearing firm filed a motion to enforce the arbitration order, complaining that the investors had violated the order by demanding and obtaining from NFA final hearings and proceedings, including final evidentiary hearings, outside the Northern District of Illinois — the judicial district that ordered arbitration. In turn, the investors filed a motion to stay the case arguing that the venue decision should be made by the arbitrator in the first instance.

The district court denied the clearing firm’s motion to enforce the arbitration order, noting that the arbitration order did not address the issue of venue. The district court held that under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, it only had the power to compel arbitration before the NFA in the Northern District of Illinois and that the interpretation of the arbitration agreement’s venue selection clause is a procedural question that should be decided by the arbitrator.

The district court similarly declined to decide the issue whether the clearing firm was entitled to contractually mandated fees under the arbitration agreement for bringing the action, holding again that the arbitrator, not a federal court, should determine whether the clearing firm is entitled under the arbitration agreement to reimbursement of attorneys’ fees incurred in compelling the investors to arbitrate in the proper forum.

Accordingly, the district court stayed the case.

INTL FCStone Financial, Inc. v. Jacobson, No. 1:19-cv-01438 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2021)

Sixth Circuit Agrees Farmer Must Reimburse Crop Insurer for Overpayments Received Due to Farmer’s Poor Record-Keeping

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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a Michigan district court order confirming an arbitration award for Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa. The award ordered Edgar Miller to return the extra payments he received from Farmers Mutual after it was discovered that, due to Miller’s poor record-keeping, Farmers Mutual had overpaid him under his crop insurance policy. After the award was rendered in favor of Farmers Mutual, the parties had the overpayment issue considered by the Federal Crop Insurance Corp. (FCIC), a body created by Congress to establish and regulate rules for crop insurance coverage. The FCIC determined that Farmers Mutual was permitted to seek reimbursement from Miller, and Farmers Mutual subsequently filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in Michigan federal court.

Where, as here, the FCIC provides an interpretation after the arbitrator has acted, the award must be reviewed to determine if it is consistent with the FCIC’s view. The award must be nullified if it is determined that any inconsistency materially affected the award. Here, the district court ruled, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that the award was not inconsistent with the FCIC’s determination that a crop insurer may reject a claim for coverage based on poor record-keeping alone and may obtain retroactive reimbursement for an overpaid claim on that basis. The Sixth Circuit rejected Miller’s argument that the arbitrator nonetheless exceeded its authority by placing the burden of proof on him with respect to reimbursement. The court also rejected Miller’s claim preclusion argument, finding there had been neither a final decision on the merits nor an identical claim raised in two lawsuits.

Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Miller, No. 20-1978 (6th Cir. July 20, 2021).

Eleventh Circuit Denies Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award Based on Alleged Bias Where Arbitrator’s Prior Employment by Opposing Law Firm Was Disclosed

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A pro se litigant sought to vacate an adverse summary judgment in arbitration that rejected her wrongfully termination claim. At the outset of the arbitration proceeding, the parties agreed on the selection of the proposed arbitrator, even though his curriculum vitae showed that he had previously served as the managing shareholder of an office of the law firm representing the employer adverse to the pro se litigant. This fact was further mentioned by the law firm in an email to the pro se litigant, and again by the arbitrator himself in another email to the parties.

After the arbitrator entered judgment for the employer, the pro se litigant sought to vacate the award, alleging that the arbitrator had failed to disclose his friendship with one of the lawyers representing the employer. The pro se litigant based her argument in part on the discovery of a photograph of the arbitrator and opposing counsel “standing arm in arm in celebration of [the arbitrator’s] 50th birthday” and further that this “undisclosed relationship and their friendship demonstrates bias.”

The Eleventh Circuit found these arguments insufficient to demonstrate the requisite bias. The court noted that the arbitrator’s prior employment by the law firm had been disclosed and stated that “it follows necessarily from this disclosure that he likely has friendships with many of [the firm’s] employees.” Further, to the extent the alleged friendship “should have been separately disclosed, we have explained that standing alone, the fact that an arbitrator had previous contacts with counsel for one of the parties does not suggest evident partiality.” To demonstrate bias, the pro se litigant had to produce some additional basis, such as “financial incentives” or “concurrent representations” involving opposing counsel that “might give a reasonable impression of partiality.” The evidence that was presented offered “mere speculation of unfair bias … which is too remote, uncertain and speculative to create a reasonable impression of partiality.”

Perez v. Cigna Health & Life Insurance Co., No. 20-12730 (11th Cir. July 13, 2021).

Court Refuses to Vacate Award Stemming From Workplace Personal Injury

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The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to vacate an arbitration award stemming from a workplace personal injury after the arbitrator concluded that the employee was primarily responsible for his own injuries.

Daniel Pacelli was working for Vane Line Bunkering Inc. (known as “Vane Brothers”), as a tankerman on one of Vane Brothers’ barges in New York Harbor when he slipped, fell, and was injured on ice while attempting to salt the deck of the barge. He initiated an arbitration action against Vane Brothers. A JAMS arbitrator heard the case and concluded that Pacelli had sustained $986,750 in damages and that both Pacelli and Vane Brothers were negligent. More specifically, the arbitrator concluded that Pacelli was 70% at fault while Vane Brothers was 30% at fault. The arbitrator therefore reduced Pacelli’s damages accordingly. Pacelli moved to vacate the award.

The district court declined to vacate the award. It rejected Pacelli’s arguments that the arbitrator had (1) manifestly disregarded the law; (2) been partial to Vane Brothers; (3) engaged in “misbehavior” by repeatedly delaying his decision; and (4) improperly failed to award interest.

With respect to manifest disregard, the court concluded that the arbitrator had applied the law regarding contributory negligence to the facts of the case and had supported his decision regarding comparative fault with evidence from the record, including evidence that Pacelli had acted carelessly by attempting to salt a narrow part of the deck at night and in freezing temperatures without seeking assistance. The court noted that the Second Circuit does not recognize manifest disregard of the evidence as a ground for vacating an award and refused to reweigh the evidence.

The court also rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator had been partial to Vane Brothers. After the arbitration hearing but months before the arbitrator issued his decision, the arbitrator disclosed that he had a small ownership interest in JAMS and JAMS disclosed that it had a small number of other arbitrations with Vane Brothers, its counsel, and/or its counsel’s law firm. The court noted that Pacelli had waived this argument by not raising it before the arbitrator. The court nevertheless also explained that the facts did not show improper partiality and rejected Pacelli’s argument that the arbitrator’s small ownership interest was material in any event.

Turning to Pacelli’s next argument — that the arbitrator’s delays warranted vacatur — the court noted that Pacelli had not pointed to any “authority to support his position that the arbitrator’s extension requests amounted to ‘misbehavior’ by the arbitrator such that Pacelli’s rights were prejudiced.” That was especially true because Pacelli had consented to the extensions.

Finally, the court rejected Pacelli’s contention that it should vacate the award because the arbitrator had not awarded prejudgment interest. Although the court acknowledged that it would have been proper for the arbitrator to award prejudgment interest, the court noted that Pacelli had failed “to point the Court to any case in which a district court vacated an arbitration award for failure to award prejudgment interest” and noted that courts had declined to do any such thing.

The court then went on to confirm the arbitration award.

Pacelli v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-09431 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021).

SDNY Declines to Adopt Collateral Attack Doctrine, Grants Motion to Compel Arbitration

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Petitioners Credit Suisse AG and Lara Warner sought to permanently stay an arbitration commenced by respondent Colleen Graham, who cross-moved to compel the arbitration. The petitioners claimed the proceeding was an impermissible “collateral attack” on a prior, related arbitration in which Graham’s claims against different parties were dismissed. As it relates to the second arbitration against the petitioners, there was no dispute as to whether Graham’s claims were subject to arbitration, nor that any threshold arbitrability questions were to be decided by an arbitrator. In deciding the petitioners’ motion, the court therefore started from the baseline that Graham’s motion to compel must be granted, absent a valid basis to stay.

The petitioners argued the issues raised in Graham’s arbitration against them were already resolved in the first arbitration, pointing to several cases in which courts found a second arbitration could not collaterally attack the final determination made in a first arbitration. According to the petitioners, the “collateral attack doctrine” is not a question or arbitrability, but rather a legal question to be decided by a court. But the court disagreed and declined to adopt the collateral attack doctrine. Under the FAA, the court explained, its role is to decide whether an arbitration falls within the terms of a valid arbitration agreement, not whether it is estopped by a prior arbitration. If, as here, an arbitration falls within a valid arbitration agreement, the court found it is well established that any threshold procedural questions about the arbitration “are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.” The court found its role was even more limited here, as the parties specifically agreed to delegate any gateway issues to the arbitrator. Comparing the petitioners’ “collateral attack” argument to the res judicata argument raised and rejected in a 2015 Second Circuit decision, the court ruled that the preclusive effect of Graham’s first arbitration, if any, should be decided by the arbitrator in the second arbitration. Graham’s motion to compel arbitration was thus granted, and the petitioners’ motion to stay was denied.

Credit Suisse AG v. Graham, No. 1:21-cv-00951 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2021)