Arbitration Process Issues

LOUISIANA LOSES BID TO VACATE DENIAL OF RECONSIDERATION OF ARBITRAL DECISION IN FEMA ASSISTANCE DISPUTE

February 21, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

FEMA denied a request by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) for assistance restoring barrier islands following Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. LDNR appealed the decision via arbitration, but the arbitral panel upheld FEMA’s denial and dismissed the arbitration entirely. LDNR moved for reconsideration on the grounds the panel did not provide LDNR an opportunity for oral presentation and did not have all the available evidence at the time it made its decision. The panel denied reconsideration because LDNR failed to indicate any new evidence it intended to produce or prove that any such evidence would be material and change the arbitral outcome.

In a lawsuit, LDNR sought vacatur of the panel’s denial of reconsideration—not the underlying arbitral award. The district court refused to vacate the decision and LDNR appealed. The Fifth Circuit declined to disturb the district court’s decision. Because LDNR did not challenge the arbitral panel’s merits decision, the court narrowly reviewed the denial of reconsideration for whether the panel deprived LDNR of a fair hearing. The court concluded that LDNR failed to show the arbitral panel refused to hear any of its evidence, failed to claim any of that evidence was even material, and failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result.

La. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. 17-30140 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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SECOND CIRCUIT REBUFFS ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS IN FEDERAL COURT ACTION RELIEF PREVIOUSLY DENIED IN STATE COURT SUIT

February 20, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Second Circuit has held that a federal district court reached the correct result but for the wrong reason when it dismissed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff was not subject to a contract containing an arbitration clause.

The complaint, filed by KIPP Academy Charter School, arose out of a dispute between KIPP and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) regarding whether KIPP teachers were represented by the UFT. In an attempt to settle this dispute, UFT served KIPP with a demand for arbitration under the provisions of the UFT’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the New York City Department of Education. KIPP filed a complaint in New York state court seeking a stay of arbitration on the basis that it was not subject to the CBA, and the court dismissed that complaint. KIPP then filed a complaint in federal district court in which it sought a declaratory judgment that it was not subject to the CBA. The UFT moved to dismiss on the basis that the action was barred by res judicata and by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which, broadly speaking, prevents parties from using federal suits to reverse state court judgments. The district court dismissed KIPP’s complaint based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine without deciding whether res judicata would also bar the suit.

On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment; and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.” The court found that the second factor was not satisfied, because KIPP’s alleged injury was caused by the UFT’s arbitration demand, not by the state court judgment, which merely ratified the UFT’s allegedly injurious conduct. However, the court found that the suit was barred by res judicata. While KIPP argued that its claim for declaratory relief was unique to the federal court action, the Second Circuit found that the state court action was a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same cause of action, while the claim for declaratory relief was “unique in name only,” based on substantially identical facts, and thus duplicative for res judicata purposes.

KIPP Acad. Charter Sch. v. United Fed’n of Teachers, AFT NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 17-1905-CV (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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GENTLEMEN’S CLUB CANNOT COMPEL ARBITRATION WHERE IT ACTIVELY LITIGATED MERITS OF DISPUTE

February 19, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Fourth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision refusing to compel arbitration in a labor dispute between a gentlemen’s club (“Crazy Horse”) and a putative class of entertainers because of Crazy Horse’s extensive merits-based litigation conduct. Plaintiff Degidio, an entertainer at Crazy Horse, sued the club under the FLSA and South Carolina labor laws for allegedly misclassifying entertainers as independent contractors rather than employees.

Crazy Horse answered the complaint, participated in discovery, filed several merits-based motions for summary judgment, opposed Degidio’s motions for certification of class and collective actions, and repeatedly moved to certify state law questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. In the midst of this conduct and without informing the court, Crazy Horse began entering into arbitration agreements with its new entertainers. Three years after the litigation had commenced, Crazy Horse moved to compel arbitration against a handful of plaintiffs who had recently joined the suit. The district court declined to enforce the arbitral agreements.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a party waives its right to compel arbitration when it has “so substantially utilized the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.” The court emphasized that Crazy Horse engaged in substantive litigation maneuvers for over three years, including extensive and substantive motions practice that indicated it was hoping for a favorable ruling on the merits. More, those same issues Crazy Horse pursued in court would need to be reargued before an arbitrator if the court were to compel arbitration. Thus, the court concluded the “only possible purpose” of the arbitration agreements was to grant Crazy Horse another “bite at the apple” if it lost on the merits in court.

Crazy Horse argued it could not have moved for arbitration earlier because the entertainers with whom it had entered arbitration agreements had only recently joined the case. The court rejected this argument because Crazy Horse failed to notify the court of the agreements as they occurred, thereby avoiding court supervision, and because compelling arbitration here would give perverse incentives to parties to delay the motion to compel arbitration as long as possible. The court also denounced Crazy Horse’s conduct in entering the arbitration agreements because they gave false impressions and the secretive manner in which Crazy Horse implied it sought to avoid the court’s supervisory role.

Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon & Rest. Inc., No. 17-1145 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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INSURANCE RECEIVER’S PREEMPTION ARGUMENT UNDER MCCARRAN-FERGUSON FAILS TO AVOID ARBITRATION OF REINSURANCE DISPUTE

February 12, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

The receiver for Gramercy Insurance Company sought to avoid arbitration of a reinsurance dispute with Contractor’s Bonding, Ltd., by arguing the FAA was reverse preempted under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The receiver argued the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction and remand the case to state court under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court noted, however, that Burford abstention is appropriate only when the district court has discretion to grant or deny relief. CBL argued the court lacked discretion regarding whether to compel arbitration under the FAA. The receiver argued the FAA was inapplicable because it was reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

A state law may only reverse preempt a federal statute where, among other things, the “federal statute operates to invalidate, impair, or supersede the state law.” The FAA did not impair or supersede the relevant state statute because the statute expressly provided that it did not “deprive[] a party of any contractual right to pursue arbitration.” As such, the court denied the receiver’s motion to remand and enforced the forum selection clause contained within the party’s agreement by transferring the case pursuant to CBL’s motion. Gramercy Ins. Co. v. Contractor’s Bonding, Ltd. No. AU-17-CA-00723-SS (USDC W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.
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CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL REMANDS MATTER FOR SUPERIOR COURT TO DECIDE ISSUE OF ARBITRABILITY AND WHETHER DELEGATION CLAUSE WAS UNCONSCIONABLE

February 7, 2018 by Carlton Fields

Plaintiff argued both the delegation clause and the arbitration provision of the agreement at issue were unconscionable, requiring the trial court to resolve the merits of the challenge, which it did not. “If the party’s challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole – even if it applies equally to the delegation clause – the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. By contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable).”

Under California law, a delegation clause must be clear and unmistakable to be enforceable. The delegation clause at issue stated “[a]ll disputes arising with respect to any provision of this Agreement shall be fully subject to the terms of this arbitration clause” and incorporated the AAA procedures. Relying on this, the Court determined the language of the AAA rules was sufficiently clear and unmistakable, and thus the delegation clause was enforceable unless it was unconscionable. The trial court erred by not deciding the arbitrability of the delegation clause in light of the unconscionability concerns raised by the Plaintiff. The case was remanded.

Ramar Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., D071443 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.
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