Arbitration Process Issues

Cryptocurrency Theft Class Not Estopped From Avoiding Enforcement Of Arbitration Clause Under Either California Or Florida Law

June 6, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration based on equitable estoppel in a putative class action by victims of a cryptocurrency exchange website (Cryptsy) CEO’s theft of money derived from the conversion of cryptocurrencies into cash, regardless of which state’s law applied. The class complaint filed on behalf of Crypsty customers and the Cryptsy receiver alleged Coinbase, an online marketplace for the sale, exchange, and purchase of cryptocurrencies, failed to adequately monitor Crypsty, detect the theft, and report suspicious activity as required under the federal Bank Secrecy Act. The court analyzed the equitable estoppel basis to compel arbitration under both California and Florida law and found that regardless of which applied, the motion to compel must be denied.

First, the court assessed the present claims under Florida’s two standards for compelling arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory: the narrow scope of arbitration clauses requiring arbitration for claims “arising out of” the subject contract and the broad scope for clauses requiring arbitration for claims “arising out of or relating to” the contract. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the claims were based on duties and obligations imposed by the Bank Secrecy Act—intended to detect money laundering, not protect customers—and imposed by the underlying contract, they did not rely on nor bear a significant relationship to the underlying contract sufficient to trigger application of the arbitration clause. Because the claims failed to satisfy the lower burden of broader scope standard, the court held they would likewise not be able to satisfy the higher burden required for the narrow scope analysis.

Second, the court reached a similar conclusion under California’s inquiry on whether equitable estoppel requires compulsion of an arbitration agreement for claims that are “dependent upon, or inextricably intertwined with” the underlying contract obligations. Even if claims are related to the contract, California does not compel arbitration unless a complaint “relies” on the agreement to establish its cause(s) of action. Here, the court found the class representative did not seek to enforce any terms or obligations of the underlying user agreements, but rather sought to enforce duties and obligations imposed by federal statutes and regulations and state common law. Therefore, because plaintiffs’ claims, if viable, would be so viable without any reference to the user agreements, the complaint did not rely on them and plaintiffs were not estopped from avoiding the arbitration clauses.

Leidel v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-12728 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018).

This post written by Thaddeus Ewald .

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Fifth Circuit Allows Non-Signatories To Enforce Arbitration Agreement

June 5, 2018 by Rob DiUbaldo

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed an order compelling arbitration, despite the fact that the parties seeking to compel arbitration were not signatories to the relevant arbitration agreement.

The litigation arose out of a 1998 transaction in which Henry House purchased a home and real property from Jim Walter Homes, Inc. and Mid-State Trust IV. The sale contract contained an arbitration agreement under which the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes “in accordance with the Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures administered by J●A●M●S/Endispute.”

In 2016, Mr. House sued Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C. and Walter Investment Management Corporation (WIMC), alleging that they conspired with Jim Walter Homes and Mid-State Trust IV to induce Mr. House to enter into the 1998 agreement based on the false premise that he would get a properly constructed home. Green Tree and WIMC moved in federal court to compel arbitration. Mr. House argued that Green Tree and WIMC, as non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, lacked standing to enforce it, but the district court found that they had standing under Mississippi’s intertwined claims test and that the arbitration agreement, by incorporating the JAMS rules, delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

On appeal, Mr. House argued (1) that the intertwined claims test did not apply because Green Tree and WIMC did not exist at the time the arbitration agreement was executed; (2) that Mr. House, as an unsophisticated party, could not agree to delegate the question of arbitrability by agreeing to the JAMS rules; and (3) that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was fraudulently induced.

The court quickly disposed of the second argument, refusing to consider it at all because Mr. House had not raised the issue of his lack of sophistication before the trial court.

As regards the first, the court found that the exact date when the entities formed was irrelevant. Mississippi’s intertwined claims test allows a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration agreement against a party who makes “‘allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct’ between a non-signatory and a signatory that have a close legal relationship.” The court found that this was satisfied by Mr. House’s complaint, which alleged that Green Tree and WIMC were coconspirators and joint venturers with the parties to the 1998 arbitration agreement in a scheme to get Mr. House to enter into that transaction.

Finally, the court held that when the parties have delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, a court may only find that the arbitration agreement was procured by fraud if the party seeking to avoid arbitration challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement specifically, rather than the contract as a whole. Mr. House did not do that, however, instead alleging generally that his signature on the 1998 sales contract and related documents was procured through fraud, which the court found was not specific enough to take this question out of the hands of the arbitrator.

Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., et al. v. House, et al., (5th Cir. May 14, 2018)

This post written by Jason Brost.

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Supreme Court Upholds Employee Individualized Arbitration Agreements Against Challenges Based On The National Labor Relations Act

May 29, 2018 by Michael Wolgin

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that agreements between an employer and an employee providing for individualized arbitration do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). We previously reported on the conflicting cases pending before the Supreme Court here.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, explained that Congress instructed the courts to uphold arbitration agreements through the Federal Arbitration Act and nothing in the NLRA (or its predecessor, the Norris-La Guardia Act) requires the contrary. The dissent, written by Justice Ginsberg, focuses in large part on the policy motivating the enactment of the NLRA, and finds that the “adhesive waivers” at issue here were the type of employer action the NLRA was meant to counteract. Justice Ginsberg’s dissent argues that class actions are the type of “other concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection” shielded by § 7 of the NLRA. Justice Gorsuch, however, points out that § 7 “focuses on the right to organize unions and bargain collectively…. But it does not express approval or disapproval of arbitration. It does not mention class or collective action procedures. It does not even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act – let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.” Although the NLRA protects employees’ right to organize unions, it does not speak to their right to arbitrate collectively. Therefore it does not conflict with and override the FAA. As such, the NLRA presented no obstacle to the Court’s enforcement of the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” embodied in the FAA. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Case No. 16-285 (USSC 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Colorado Federal Court Adopts Report & Recommendation to Compel Arbitration Despite Challenge

May 23, 2018 by Carlton Fields

Plaintiff sought to compel arbitration and enjoin defendant from pursuing claims of negligence and violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) in state court. Defendant argued the Court should abstain from ruling and allow the state court to address the arbitration issue or dismiss the complaint since the arbitration agreement is unenforceable under state law. As to the abstention argument, the Court applied the Colorado River factors. It found the state and federal actions to be parallel, but there were no exceptional “factors supporting Defendant’s position in favor of abstention, and since there are several factors that are neutral (or point the other way), the court has little choice but to exercise jurisdiction.” The arbitration agreement’s enforceability was largely dictated by whether Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act (“HCAA”) is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Finding the HCAA was preempted by the FAA, the arbitration agreement was found to be valid and enforceable.

The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation, granting the motion to compel and staying the state court proceeding.

Watermark Harvard Square, LLC, et al. v. Willie Lee Calvin, Case No. 1:17-cv-00446 (USDC D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018).

This post written by Nora A. Valenza-Frost.

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Missouri Federal Court Remands Action To State Court Because Missouri Law “Reverse Preempts” The New York Convention Based On The McCarran-Ferguson Act

May 22, 2018 by Carlton Fields

Foresight Energy, LLC (“Foresight”) brought an action in Missouri state court against various domestic and Bermuda and London market insurers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract and statutory vexatious refusal to pay a claim related to an event at a coal mine in Hillsboro, Illinois. The policies at issue provided for an arbitration in London and that the policies were to be governed by Missouri law. One of the insurers removed the action to Missouri federal court, asserting that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed under Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “New York Convention”) because the agreement did not arise out of a relationship “entirely between citizens of the United States,” given the involvement of the non-U.S. insurers/defendants. Foresight then moved in Missouri federal court to remand the action back to state court because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Missouri law, the law governing the policies, prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance policies and that Missouri law “reverse preempts” the New York Convention in light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.

The Missouri federal court noted that McCarran-Ferguson states that “[n]o act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.” The court then found that the New York Convention, an act of Congress, was not a self-executing treaty and could not itself provide the rule of decision, and that the Missouri anti-arbitration statute was a state law regulating the business of insurance. The court also found that application of the New York Convention to enforce the arbitration agreement in the policies at issue would “invalidate, impair or supersede” the Missouri anti-arbitration statute. The court then held that because the New York Convention was an act of Congress and was not self-executing, McCarran-Ferguson “reverse preempted” the New York Convention, which thus eliminated the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Missouri federal court granted Foresight’s motion to remand the action to state court.

Foresight Energy, LLC. v. Certain London Market Ins. Cos., No. 17-CV-2266 (USDC E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2018).

This post written by Jeanne Kohler.
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