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Arbitration Process Issues

Courts decide issues relating to arbitrability of claims and appointment of arbitrators

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Three opinions were issued recently of interest regarding arbitration procedures:

  • In Ancon Ins. Co. (U.K.) Limited v. GE Reinsurance Corp., Case No. 06-2106 (USDC D. Kansas Mar. 30, 2007), one party was five days late in appointing an arbitrator due to a mistake by its run-off manager in reporting when an arbitration demand had been received. The party demanding arbitration sought to enforce a provision in the arbitration agreement, which would have allowed it to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of the defaulting party. The Court refused to enforce the provision, allowing the defaulting party to appoint an arbitrator on grounds of fairness and lack of prejudice.

  • In International Ins. Agency Services v. Revios Reinsurance U.S., Case No. 04-1190 (USDC N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2007), the Court granted the motion of a reinsurer to compel arbitration against an employee benefits firm that developed, marketed, administered and underwrote group life insurance programs on a fronted basis. The reinsurance agreement contained an arbitration provision, but the employee benefits firm was not a party to the agreement. The Court held that the firm was estopped to refuse to arbitrate, since it was asserting claims against the reinsurer based entirely upon alleged damage to its reputation arising out of the reinsurer's attempted repudiation of the reinsurance agreement.

  • In Invitrogen Corp. v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, Case No. 06-232 (USDC D. Az. Mar. 9, 2007), the Court granted an injunction prohibiting Wausau from pursuing arbitration against Invitrogen under a reinsurance contract, because it found, as a matter of law, that the claims were barred by a settlement agreement reached in a prior proceeding.

SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS JURISDICTION UNDER FAA TO HEAR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

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This ruling addresses the narrow issue of whether or not an appellate court has jurisdiction under the FAA to hear an interlocutory appeal of a decision denying a motion to compel arbitration. In 2004 appellees filed a class action against several American Express companies (collectively, “Amex”) alleging conspiracy to fix fees for transactions in foreign currencies and conspiracy to impose compulsory arbitration clauses on their cardholders in order to suppress competition and deprive their cardholders of a meaningful choice concerning the arbitration of disputes.

Amex moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the cardholder agreements. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that, because the plaintiffs/appellees had raised an antitrust claim concerning the validity of the arbitration clauses, a jury trial was necessary to determine the validity of the arbitration clauses prior to enforcement.

Amex appealed, invoking Section 16 of the FAA, which grants jurisdiction to courts of appeals over interlocutory appeals from refusals to stay an action under 9 U.S.C. § 3 and from denials of petitions to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Section 16 of the FAA does not apply in cases where arbitration is required by principles of equitable estoppel.

The Second Circuit denied appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that “when a District Court finds that a signatory to a written arbitration agreement is equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory, the writing requirement of Section 16 of the FAA is met.” Ross v. American Express Company, Case No. 06-4598 (2d Cir. February 13, 2007).

NON-SIGNATORY LACKED STANDING TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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This case addressed whether a court was required to recognize the right of a non-signatory to compel arbitration. The Defendant, Boris Bannai, executed an agreement for the sale of ore on behalf of Northgate. The agreement included an arbitration clause, requiring the arbitration of all claims relating to the agreement in London. When the plaintiff sued Bannai for fraud and unjust enrichment based on the agreement, Bannai moved to compel arbitration. Applying English law as required by the choice of law provision in the arbitration agreement, the court denied the motion, concluding that as a nonsignatory, Bannai lacked standing to compel arbitration. There are three expecptions to the general principle of English law that a non-party to an agreement may not compel arbitration, but none of the exceptions were asserted. Felman Productions Inc. v. Boris Bannai, Case No. 3:06-0644 (USDC S.D. W.Va. March 5, 2007)

U.S. COURT holds that it has jurisdiction to grant a prejudgment remedy relating to a foreign arbitration

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This case addresses the important and divisive issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards deprive a United States District Court court of jurisdiction to order injunctions and grant provisional remedies while an international arbitration is pending in London. Relying on precedent from the Second Circuit, a Connecticut District Court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a prejudgment remedy by a party to an arbitration currently pending in London. However, it denied a motion requiring the immediate disclosure of assets. Bahrain Telecommunications v. DiscoveryTel, Inc., Case No. 3:05cv1957 (D. Ct. March 9, 2007)

COURT UPHOLDS ARBITRATOR’S DECISION REGARDING CLASS CERTIFICATION

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Sutter, a New Jersey pediatrician, filed a class action complaint against Oxford and several other health insurers for failure to pay medical claims timely and correctly under New Jersey law. Shortly after the case was filed, a New Jersey court granted Oxford’s motion to compel arbitration. Arbitration proceeded under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, which included a specific rule governing class actions. In 2005, the sole arbitrator issued a partial final class determination award, where he defined the class of claimants and certified the class. Oxford promptly filed a motion in district court to vacate the award. The District Court upheld the award, rejecting defendant’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and manifestly disregarded the law. The Third Circuit recently affirmed the judgment, finding that the arbitrator had not acted in manifest disregard of law, because he had considered all of the requirements set forth in the AAA's class action rule. Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, Case No. 05-5223 (3rd Cir. February 28, 2007)