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New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Michael Wolgin

COMMUTATION, SETTLEMENT, AND RELEASE AGREEMENT OF THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY APPROVED

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A New Hampshire court has approved the commutation, settlement, and release agreement between The Home Insurance Company (in Liquidation) and Providence Washington Insurance Company (PWIC), as successor to Unigard Mutual Insurance Company, which merged with Seaton Insurance Company.

Home entered liquidation in 2003, and the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner was appointed as Liquidator. Prior to the merger of PWIC with Seaton, the Liquidator entered into a separate commutation agreement effective March of 2015 as to all PWIC business. The instant commutation agreement (approved in December 2016), provides for the commutation of all of Home’s ceded and assumed business to/from Seaton (pre-merger), as well as resolution of all of Seaton’s contribution claims against Home (which related to increased payments Seaton made to insureds common to both parties as the result of Home’s insolvency). A redacted copy of the commutation agreement, with economic terms removed, was filed with Home’s motion for approval. In re Liquidation of The Home Insurance Co., 217-2003-EQ-00106 (N.H. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016) (order approving commutation); Motion for Approval (Oct. 18, 2016).

This post written by Brooke L. French.

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COURT APPLIES THE “LOOK THROUGH” APPROACH TO FAA SECTION 10 PETITIONS IN DETERMINING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

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Plaintiffs, members of the Harman family, sold their family farm and sought investment advice from defendant Wilson-Davis. The Harmans claimed they were damaged after making certain investments due to forged financial statements by Wilson-Davis, and that Wilson-Davis spoliated evidence pertaining to those investments. At arbitration, the panel found no liability against Wilson-Davis. The Harmans then sought to vacate the panel’s award.

The court considered whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, and whether there were sufficient grounds to vacate the award under either public policy grounds or section 10 of the FAA. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the court analyzed whether it could “look through” the face of the petition to vacate the award, and find jurisdiction based on whether federal-law claims were raised in the underlying arbitration. (There is a split among the federal circuits as to whether a court may look through a section 10 petition to vacate an award in order to find federal question jurisdiction; the Supreme Court previously applied “look through” only under section 4.) The Tenth Circuit, in which the district court in this matter is located, has not yet addressed the issue. The court here sided with the Second Circuit, and not the opposing view of the Third and Seventh Circuits, holding that applying the “look through” approach to the entire FAA was the only logical construction of the law, notwithstanding differences in statutory language between sections 4 and 10. The court, however, denied the Harmans’ petition because it found no public policy or statutory grounds supporting vacatur. Harman v. Wilson-Davis & Co., Case No. 2:2016-cv-00229-CW (USDC D. Utah Jan. 6, 2017).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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COURT AFFIRMS DISMISSAL OF CEDENT’S CLAIMS ASSERTING REINSURANCE PREMIUM FRAUD SCHEME, BASED ON EXPIRATION OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD

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The appellant (Guarantee Trust) had forwarded reinsurance premiums to the reinsurer to be held in a custodial account for the payment of claims. Guarantee Trust initially sued Kribbs, the founder of the reinsurer, alleging that he acted in concert with an employee inside Guarantee Trust’s organization to improperly obtain the funds from the account for Kribbs’ own use. During depositions (six years after filing suit), Guarantee Trust discovered the identity of two of its own employees, whom Guarantee Trust named in its re-filed action after having voluntarily dismissed the initial complaint. To address the running of the statute of limitations, Guarantee Trust argued that the limitations period was tolled due to fraudulent concealment. The trial court, however, dismissed Guarantee Trust’s claims, finding that Guarantee Trust provided no reason why it could not have discovered its claims against the two employees sooner through reasonable diligence.

On appeal, the court addressed the tolling issue under both the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment, and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court found it was significant that Guarantee Trust knew at the time it filed its original complaint that one of its own employees was involved in the alleged wrongdoing, and that Guarantee Trust had been provided in 2008 with discovery responses disclosing a short list of potential witnesses that included the two employees later addressed at depositions. The court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that Guarantee Trust failed the “reasonable diligence” test. The Court also found no fraudulent concealment during discovery that would toll the statute of limitations. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Kribbs, Case No. 15 L 11262, (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 29, 2016).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

FIFTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DENIAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AGAINST NON-SIGNATORY TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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The appeal arose from a consolidated case, originally three separate class actions, resulting from the alleged underfunding of Singing River Health System’s pension plan and KPMG’s alleged failure to detect that underfunding due to allegedly faulty auditing. The plaintiff from one of these class actions (Lowe) brought claims against KPMG but did not expressly rely upon KPMG’s engagement letters with Singing River – which included arbitration clauses. KPMG argued that, notwithstanding that the members of the Lowe class were not signatories to the engagement letters, the Lowe claims implicitly relied on the engagement letters because the letters “defined the scope of KPMG’s contractual role.” Therefore, KPMG argued, “equitable estoppel compel[led] the submission of Lowe’s claims to arbitration.”

Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit disagreed with KPMG’s argument. The Fifth Circuit explained, “the present case is based on tort rather than contract law. While it might well be easier for Lowe to pursue her claims based on the Engagement Letters, the standard for showing ‘direct dependence’ is what she pled, not what she might have pled … “ And, because Lowe’s tort claims were not “directly dependent” on the engagement letters, the Fifth Circuit found that KPMG’s motion was properly denied. The Court did go on to note, however, that if Lowe “later attempts to claim a remedy under the Engagement Letters, KPMG can seek relief including a renewed request for arbitration.” Thomas Jones, et al. v. Singing River Health Services Foundation, et al., Case No. 16-60263 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2017).

This post written by Brooke L. French.

See our disclaimer.

COURT HOLDS ALLEGED INDUSTRY BIAS AMONG ARBITRATORS INSUFFICIENT TO VACATE AWARD

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The case concerned two purchase orders whereby defendant BJB LLC dba Agri Trading (Agri Trading) agreed to purchase corn oil from plaintiff Hardy Industrial Technologies, Inc. (Hardy). A dispute arose and was submitted for arbitration pursuant to language in the purchase orders incorporating the American Fats and Oils Association, Inc.’s (AFOA) trade rules. A three-member panel of the AFOA Arbitration Tribunal issued its award finding in favor of Agri Trading that both purchase orders were invalid.

Hardy moved to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award, principally relying on “evident partiality” on the part of the arbitrators, namely, that the arbitrators were biased in favor of Agri Trading. In support of its motion, Hardy argued that the arbitrators were biased because Agri Trading was a member of the AFOA but Hardy was not, and because the president of Agri Trading attended AFOA meetings with the arbitrators, worked on AFOA committee meetings, served on the AFOA Board of Directors, and socialized with them.

The Court rejected this argument, finding that Hardy failed to establish that the alleged partiality was direct, definite, and capable of demonstration, or that specific facts existed which indicated improper motives on the part of the arbitrators. The Court reasoned that Hardy’s claim was “one of institutional bias, which, at best, establishes an appearance of bias.” Furthermore, the Court noted that the AFOA’s arbitration rules, which required that three-member panels be comprised of one arbitrator designated as a buyer, one as a seller, and one as other, undermined Hardy’s argument that the arbitrators were biased. As such, the Court denied Hardy’s motion to vacate and affirmed the arbitration award. Hardy Indus. Tech., LLC v. BJB, LLC, Case No. 1:12-cv-3097 (USDC N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2016).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.