Reinsurance Focus

New reinsurance-related and arbitration developments from Carlton Fields

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Michael Wolgin

Court Finds New York Convention Applies to Arbitration Agreement in Insurance Policy That Would Otherwise be Invalid Under State Law

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Lloyd’s issued an insurance policy with an arbitration provision, covering direct physical loss or physical damage caused by windstorm and/or hail. The insured filed suit in state court alleging nonpayment of claims for damages from Hurricane Isaac. Lloyd’s removed to federal court, asserting that the court had original subject matter jurisdiction for the arbitration agreement in the policy pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention. The insured sought remand, arguing that the New York Convention did not apply.

The court denied remand, finding that the Convention applied because the dispute arose out of an insurance policy, a commercial legal relationship, with Lloyd’s, a citizen of the United Kingdom. The court also rejected the insured’s argument that the “Conformity to Statute” clause effectively amended the policy to comply with Louisiana state law, which would result in the arbitration provision being rendered unenforceable. The court held that because the Convention preempts state law, state law is inapplicable and cannot change the policy. The court also rejected the insured’s arguments that the Convention was reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson act, and that the Convention applies only to instances of enforcement of foreign arbitration awards. The plaintiff has appealed the court’s rulings. Gulledge v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, Case No. 2:18-cv-06657 (USDC E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2018); Notice of Appeal (Oct. 2, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

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Uber Drivers’ Class Action Thrown Into Reverse: Ninth Circuit Overturns Class Certification Order and Denial of Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

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A putative class action against Uber filed by some of the company’s California-based drivers has crashed. The Ninth Circuit reversed rulings denying Uber’s motion to compel arbitration, certifying the class of drivers, and enjoining Uber from distributing and enforcing a new arbitration agreement. Relying on its decision in a previous class action against Uber (Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration agreements delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Thus, the determination of arbitrability was not within the district court’s province.

The plaintiffs argued the district court’s determination that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable should be upheld because the named class representatives had “constructively opted out of arbitration on behalf of the entire class.” The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had no authority to take that action on behalf of and binding the other drivers. Although the plaintiffs found a Georgia Supreme Court case (Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank, 788 S.E. 787 (Ga. 2016)) supporting their position, they were unable to point to any federal case doing so. Bickerstaff relied exclusively on state law grounds and did not discuss the Federal Arbitration Act.

The plaintiffs’ second argument, that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable because they contain class action waivers that violate the National Labor Relations Act, was extinguished by the United States Supreme Court in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). Because the arbitration agreements were enforceable, Uber’s motion to compel arbitration should have been granted, and because the plaintiff’s claims would be arbitrated, the district court’s order certifying the class and restricting Uber’s communications with the class were also reversed. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 14-16078 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

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Years-Long Asbestos Reinsurance Battle Continues for Utica and Century, Including Whether Century Must Follow the Fortunes of Utica’s Allocation of Losses

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In 2013, Utica Mutual Insurance Company (the cedent) filed a complaint alleging that Century Indemnity Company (the reinsurer) (1) breached two reinsurance certificates executed between the parties covering the years 1973 and 1975 in connection with asbestos liability exposure; (2) owed the unpaid balance of prior billings under the two certificates; (3) violated the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing; and (4) is obligated to pay certain future billings. Century answered, refusing to acknowledge the existence of a valid 1975 reinsurance certificate, and asserted various affirmative defenses. After two years of discovery, Century amended its answer to assert bad-faith counterclaims against Utica alleging that Utica had been maintaining two sets of record-keeping systems to track asbestos settlements made on behalf of the underlying insured, allegedly part of a larger effort by Utica to conceal the fact it had been over-billing reinsurers, including Century, for these claims.

Utica sought partial summary judgment on various aspects of the litigation, including that (1) Utica’s allocation decisions related to the coverage and handling of the asbestos claims against the underlying insured were reasonable and made in good faith, such that the “follow the fortunes” doctrine applied; (2) the 1975 reinsurance certificate is valid and binding on Century; and (3) Century had no right to claw back any sums previously paid to Utica. Century responded with its own dispositive motions. The court denied the parties’ motions with respect to most issues, including whether Utica’s loss allocation decisions were reasonable and made in good faith. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., Case No. 6:13-cv-00995 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018).

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Rhode Island Makes Technical Changes to Its Credit for Reinsurance Regulation

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Rhode Island adopted the NAIC Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation in 2014. Recently, Rhode Island made technical changes to the regulation and substituted forms issued by the Rhode Island Department of Insurance by separate Bulletin. The regulation is codified in the Rhode Island Insurance Regulation 230-RICR-20-45-3 – Financial Standards and Corporate Operations – Credit for Reinsurance. The regulation and accompanying form bulletin are available online.

This post written by Gail Jankowski.

See our disclaimer.

Reinsurer’s Summary Judgment Upheld on Motion for Rehearing

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Capitol Life Insurance Co. moved the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas for rehearing of the court’s prior affirmance of summary judgment against Capitol in favor of MetLife Insurance Company USA, MetLife Investors Group, Inc., and American General Life Insurance Company, a decision we previously wrote about here [https://www.reinsurancefocus.com/archives/13403]. The Court denied Capitol’s motion but withdrew and superseded its previous opinion with a new memorandum opinion. The result for Capitol, however, was more of the same.

The Fifth District reversed the trial court’s summary judgment against Capitol in favor of the policyholder, holding that fact issues related to the policyholder’s intent in serving a demand letter on Capitol prevented summary judgment for either party. With regard to MetLife and American General, the court affirmed the no-evidence summary judgments against Capitol, stating Capitol had failed to provide “more than a scintilla of probative evidence” to demonstrate it had performed under the contracts, a necessary element of Capitol’s claim against both parties. Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Newman, Case No. 05-16-01476-CV (Tex. Civ. App. Sept. 13, 2018).

This post written by Benjamin E. Stearns.

See our disclaimer.